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Landings of the Eastern or American oyster (Crassostrea
virginica) have declined dramatically during the twentieth
century. Initially, the decline was caused by depletion of
oysters on public grounds.
1
It was later tempered or, in some
cases, reversed by private leasing and by utilizing aquaculture
techniques such as seeding and shelling.
2
Over-fishing,
however, and outbreaks of MSX and Dermo have since depressed the
harvestable stock and landings. National Marine Fisheries
Service data reveal that the United States supply of oysters has
steadily declined from approximately 56.2 million pounds of meat
in 1982 to 31.9 million pounds in 1991.
3
In response to the decline of the industry, options
for restoring the fishery are being explored. Alternatives for
revitalization of the industry include new technologies and
practices related to oyster hatcheries, off-bottom rack culture
and introducing genetically altered and non-indigenous species of
oysters believed to be resistant to MSX or Dermo. These
alternatives represent departures from traditional and customary




users of the coastal environment and unforeseen legal 
impediments. 
2 
In recognition of the new climate in which the oyster 
industry finds itself, it is extremely important that an effort 
be undertaken to address the legal and policy issues related to 
the rejuvenation of the oyster industry in order to avoid 
conflicts resulting in serious economic and political 
consequences to the oyster industry. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to provide a 
legal/regulatory profile of the current oyster industry in the 
northeast region of the United States. 
Objectives 
The objectives of the study were: the identification and 
summarization of federal and state laws and regulations 
specifically impacting the oyster industry; the identification of 
international treaties, agreements, and memoranda of 
understanding impacting the oyster industry; and, the 
identification of federal and state court decisions impacting the 
oyster industry. 
Methodology 
Analyses of federal and state laws and regulations, 
international agreements, treaties, and memoranda of 
understanding, federal and state court decisions, and general 
3 
legal principles impacting the oyster industry in the 
northeastern United States were conducted. Information was 
obtained using materials available in the Department of Ocean and 
Coastal Law and the Marshall-Wythe School of Law of the College 
of William and Mary and through telephone interviews with 
federal, regional, and state agency personnel. 
The following states of the Northeast Region of the 
National Marine Fisheries Service comprised the study area: 
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. With 
regard to the analysis of state laws and regulations, only those 
states with an active oyster industry were included in this 
study. Those states are: Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, 
Maryland; and Virginia. 
4
STATE AHO IHTERJURISDICTIONAL REGULATION OF THE NORTHEAST 
UNITED STATES OYSTER INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
A broad range of governmental institutions are involved
in the control (e.g. regulation and management) of the oyster
industry. Governmental control may vary depending on the mission
of the organization (i.e., an environmental institution whose
primary duty is to safeguard a public resource or an agricultural
institution whose primary duty is to promote private use), the
structure of the organization (i.e., agency or commission),
hierarchical level (i.e., independent institution or division of
a major institution), and level of control (i.e., state or
municipal).
4
In most of the states covered, marine resources
(including shellfish), are the responsibility of an institution
that also manages other non-marine natural resources and/or
controls environmental matters (e.g., the Department of
Environmental Conservation in New York, the Department of Natural
Resources and Environmental Control in Delaware, and the Maryland
Department of Natural Resources). Massachusetts, Connecticut,
and to a lesser extent Maine, control shellfisheries through
local authorities in addition to state authorities. Some states,
such as Connecticut, New Jersey, and Delaware, have aquaculture
4. Bowden, H. ffective State Mar'ne 'sheries
Management 1981. 
5
commissions, councils, or task forces led by the Department of
Agriculture. From an examination of the states covered in this
study, only Maine and Virginia have independent agencies with
responsibilities over marine resources (i.e., the Department of
Marine Resources and the Virginia Marine Resources Commission,
respectively). The following table provides an overview of
state and interjurisdictional regulatory agencies and
commissions.
6 














Department of Agriculture (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
sec. 26-192a) 
Department of Natural Resources and Environmental 
Control, Division of Fish and Wildlife (DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 7, sec. 1902) 
Department of Marine Resources (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 12, sec. 6021) 
Department of Natural Resources (MD. NAT. RES. 
CODE ANN. sec. 4-101) 
Department of Fisheries, Wildlife and Environmental 
Enforcement, Division of Marine Fisheries (MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, sec. 1) 
Fish and Game Department (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
sec. 211:62); Division of Marine Fisheries 
(sec. 211:65) 
Department of Environmental Protection and Energy, 
Division of Fish, Game, and Wildlife 
(N.J. STAT. ANN. sec. 50:1-5) 
Department of Environmental Conservation (N.Y. 
ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW sec. 13-0101 (Consol.]) 
Potomac River Fisheries Compact (VA. CODE. ANN., 
sec. 28.1-203) 
Department of the Environment (R.I. GEN. LAWS, 
sec. 42-17.1) 
Virginia Marine Resources Commission (VA. CODE 
ANN. sec. 28.1-2.1) 
7
State Regulatory Agencies 
The primary agency, jurisdiction/responsibilities, regulatory
authority, advisory entities, and associated programs are provided for
each state where applicable.
Maine 
Priaary Agency: Department of Marine Resources.
Jurisdiction/Responsibilities: The Department of Marine
Resources is responsible for the conservation and development of the
marine resources of Maine. It implements, administers, and enforces
the laws and regulations regarding those resources and cooperates with










and close contaminated waters.
8
He may also make emergency




Advisory Council consists of nine members from the seafood community
5. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, sec. Q021, 6025.
6. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, sec. 6022.
7. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, sec. 6072.
8. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, sec. 6172.
9. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, sec. 6192 and 6171.
who make recommendations to the commissioner regarding the 
administration of the Department of Marine Resources.
10 
8 
Municipal Conservation P!:QgTAM� Any municipality may vote to 
adopt a shellfish conservation ordinance for regulating the taking of 
shellfish in any areas in the intertidal zone or coastal waters of the 
municipality (e.g., the amount taken, license fees, leasing of flats, 
and even municipal resident requirements).11
Associated Programs: 
Marine Products Marketing Prograa: The Marine Products 
Marketing Program is responsible for the promotion of seafood.
12 
Marine Shellfish Toxins Monitoring Program: The Marine 
Shellfish Toxins Monitoring Program operates under the Department of 
Marine Resources and is responsible for monitoring shellfish 
t . d th t t f · 
13 
oxins un er e Depar men o Marine Resources. 
Pathology Program: The Department of Marine Resources is 
responsible for pathological inspection related to the import and 
export of marine species. The pathology program was formed to protect 
the state's waters and support the shellfishery.
14
10. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, sec. 6024.
11. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, sec. 6671.
12. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, sec. 6021-a.
13. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, sec. 6076.
14. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, sec. 6075.
9
New HaJ1pshire 
(Although New Hampshire has no commercial
oyster industry, the structure of its
government is still relevant as there are state
regulations regarding oysters.)
Pri•ary Agency: New Hampshire Fish and Game Department,
Division of Marine Fisheries.
Jurisdiction/Responsibilities: The New Hampshire Fish
and Game Department has control over the fish, game, bird, and
wildlife resources throughout the state with the Division of
Marine Fisheries being that section of the department responsible
for those commercial and recreational fisheries within the
saltwater jurisdiction of the state.
15
Regulatory Authority: 
Fish and Gue Department: The Fish and Game Department
exists under a Fish and Game Commission consisting of eleven
members, all of whom are named by the governor and his appointing
counci1.1
6
One Commission member must be a member of one of the
tidewater towns listed under section 206:2-a, and the remaining
members must come from different counties. Of the eleven
17
members, only six may be from the same political party. The





15. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 211:65.
16. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 206:2.
17. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 206:2-a.
18. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 206:7.
19. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 206:5.
10 
The qualifications required of the members include:
knowledge in the area of fish and wildlife conservation (the
member representing the coastal communities must be familiar with 
all of the crustaceans and bivalves in the coastal waters and
with salt water fishing in general); commitment to a fish and
game program which involves research, habitat management, and law
enforcement; having held a resident fishing or hunting license
five of the ten years prior to appointment; and, experience in
either management of wild lands, soil conservation, water
conservation, fish and game management or propagation,
conservation engineering, conservation law, wildlife education,
or active membership in a conservation organization in the
state.
20
The members serve five year, staggered terms so that
each year two or three members are appointed.
21
The Commission
may appoint an acting director in the event the Executive
. . d t t t h 't'
22
Director of the Fish an Game Depar men vaca es t e posi ion.
Executive Director of the Fish and Game Department is selected by
the governor and his appointing council for a five-year term from
a list of five people submitted by the Fish and Game Commission.
The Executive Director is responsible for supervising the
department and enforcing the laws regarding fish, wildlife, and
' ' ' h. H h'
23
marine species wit in New amps ire. The Executive Director
20. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 206:2-a.
21. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 206:3.
22. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 206:8.
23. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 211:68.
11 
has the authority to regulate (with the advice of the Advisory 
Committee on Shore Fisheries and the approval of the Fish and 
Game Commission) the taking, inspection, and processing of marine 
species including size limits, quantity, method, season, sale or 
harvest, and aquaculture.24 With to oysters, the Executive
Director has the authority to take, remove, or transfer them as 
he deems· necessary in order to conserve and propagate the 
. 25 
species. 
Division of Marine Fisheries: Within the Department of 
Fish and Game is the Division of Marine Fisheries which has 




Advisory Committee on Shore Fisheries: consisting of 
five members,
27 
the Advisory Committee on Shore Fisheries is 
appointed by the governor with the approval and advice of his 
appointing council. It makes recommendations on programs, 
policies, and the rules and regulations of the Fish and Game 




24. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 211:62.
25. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 212: 21.
26. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 211:65.
27. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 211:60a.
28. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 211:60, 211 :61.
12 
Primary Agency: Department of Fisheries, Wildlife and 
Environmental Enforcement, Division of Marine Fisheries. 
Jurisdiction/Responsibilities: The Department of 
Fisheries, Wildlife and Environmental Enforcement has 
jurisdiction over the territory of the state of Massachusetts. 
The Director of the Division of Marine Fisheries claims authority 
to protect those marine resources between the mean high water 
mark out to 200 miles or to where the depth becomes 100 fathoms 
(whichever is greater)
29 
even though state authority is generally
thought to extend only out to three miles.30
Regulatory Authority: 
Director of the Division of Morine Fisheries: with the 
governor's approval, the Director of the Division of Marine 
Fisheries can adopt, amend, and repeal rules and regulations 
regarding the marine resources of the state of Massachusetts.
31 
The Director can initiate investigations pertaining to the 
conservation (e.g. propagation) of marine resources including the 
taking of fish for research and establishment of properties for 
propagation, rearing and protection. The Director also has the 
authority to adopt emergency regulations without a hearing,
32 
issue aquaculture permits in those instances where the species 
utilized is kept separate from natural stocks,
33 
investigate 
29. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 130, sec. 17. 
30. See, United states v. Maine, 4 20 U.S. 515 (1975).
31. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 130, sec. 17.
32. Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 130, sec. 17.
33. Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 130, sec. 17B.
13 
treatment of purification of shellfish, and cooperate with local 
shellfisheries and delegate monies provided a town or city 
matches a percentage of the original in either money or work.
34 
Marine Fisheries Advisory CO--ission: The Marine 
Fisheries Advisory Commission approves or disapproves proposals 
from the Director of the Division of Marine Fisheries (either 
originating from him or another party) affecting the management 
of a marine fishery and therefore has authority beyond most 
advisory committees. A public hearing regarding proposals 
affecting marine fishery management including manner of taking, 
legal size limit, season, time of day, quantity and area of 
harvest is required. The opening and closing of areas must meet 
with the approval of town selectmen or the mayor and council of a 
city.
35 
Local Control of Shellfisberies: For towns and cities 
bordering coastal waters, authorized selectmen and the board of 
elderrnert of a town or the council of a city, may regulate or 
prohibit the taking of shellfish within the town's limits as to 
the time, place, method, purpose, size, and quantity of harvest, 
and may grant permits,
36 
issue licenses, and collect fees.
37 
If 
a town or city does not take control of the shellfishery in their 
area, then the Director of the Division of Marine Fisheries does 
so temporarily, until the city or town can. A town or city, 
34. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 130, sec. 20.
35. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 130, sec. 17A.
36. Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 130, sec. 52.
37. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 130, sec. 57.
14 
however, does not have control over contaminated lands unless a 
town or city management plan for the use thereof is approved by 
the Director.
38 
Shellfish Constables: Appointed by the mayor of a city 
or the selectmen of a town, shellfish constables may enforce and 
manage the shellfisheries within their town or city, depending on 
the authority given by their appointment.
39 
Rhode Island 
Pri•ary Agency: Department of the Environment, Division 
of Fish and Wildlife, and the coastal Resources Management 
Branch. 
Jurisdiction/Responsibilities: As of July 1, 1992, Rhode 
Island dissolved its Department of Environmental Management. 
Reorganized under a new department, the Department of the 
Environment also includes branches controlling air and water 
pollution, hazardous waste, and enforcement.
40 
The Environmental 
Management Branch of the Department has jurisdiction and 
regulatory authority over agriculture, wetlands, ports and 
harbors, forests, boating safety, and parks and recreation along 
with the fish and wildlife within the state of Rhode Island.
41
Regulatory Authority: 
38. Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 130, sec. 52.
39. Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 130, sec. 98.
40. R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 42-17.1-2.
41. R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 42-17.1-3.
15 
Director of the Department of the Environment: The 
Director of the Department of the Environment develops policies 
to guide all environmental programs, but only oversees and 
coordinates the activities of the Environmental Management 
Branch. With regard to the development of resource management 
programs, the Director interacts with the Coastal Resources 
Management Branch. He/she supervises and controls the 
protection, development, planning, and utilization of the natural 
resources of the state (including shellfish) yet the director 
cannot deny or issue permits or licenses arising from the 
regulatory authority of either the Environmental Management 
42 
Branch or the Coastal Resources Management Branch. 
Division of Fish and Wildlife: The Division of Fish and 
Wildlife within the Environmental Management Branch carries out 
the functions of Title 20 relating to shellfish (as well as 
hunting, fishing, wetlands, marshlands, and other wildlife).
43 
coastal Resources Manageaent Branch: The coastal 
Resources Management Branch, although in the Department of the 
Environment, works under the direction of the Coastal Resources 
Management Council with the authority to issue permits, create 
regulations and enforce them.
44 
The Council's primary 
responsibility is the planning and management of coastal 
resources (including shellfish), identifying the abundance, 
42. R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 42-17.1-9.
43. R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 42-17.1-3.
44. R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 42-17.1-2.1, 42-17.1-12.
16 
problems, and potential uses of these resources and developing 
plans for the conservation of these resources. The Council has 
the authority to adopt regulations necessary to implement these 
plans.
45 
Marine Fisheries Council: The Marine Fisheries council 
consists of nine members, eight of whom are private citizens 
appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the 
senate. Three of these members represent the commercial 
fisheries, three represent the recreational fisheries, and two 
have knowledge of the conservation and management of marine 
resources. The ninth member is the Commissioner of the 
Environmental Management Branch, or his designee, and serves as 
the chairman of the Councii.
46 
The Council has regulatory 
jurisdiction over all marine species within the jurisdiction of 
the state and can regulate (after a public hearing) the method, 
size, seasons and hours, and place of taking fish, lobsters, and 
shellfish.
47 
It may close any coastal waters to harvesting when 
it judges it is necessary to do so for the conservation of the 
marine resources of the state.
48 
It may also designate certain 
areas as shellfish or marine life management areas making 
whatever rules and regulations it deems necessary to protect 
these areas.
49
45. R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 46-23-4.
46. R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 20-3-1.
47. R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 20-3-2.
48. R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 20-3-5.
49. R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 20-3-4.
17
Advisory Entities: 
Adyisox:y Council on Enviromaental Affairs: An Advisory
Council on Environmental Affairs serves to advise the governor
and the Director on matters concerning the Department of the
Environment. The eleven members are chosen from a wide variety
of disciplines such as natural resources, public health,
engineering, construction, and land use.
50
Connecticut 
Priaary Agency: Connecticut Department of Agriculture.
Jurisdiction/Responsibilities: The lead agency
controlling shellfish in Connecticut is the Department of
Agriculture.
51
The Department has exclusive jurisdiction over
those areas described under section 3294 of the General Statutes.
In these areas, the Department can regulate the method, time,
place of harvest, the leasing of oyster grounds, and other items
related to the oyster industry of Connecticut. Those areas not
included in section 3294 are under the control of the town in
which they occur; the towns deciding method, time, place, etc. of
52
harvesting or growing oysters.
Regulatory Authority: 
Department of Agriculture: The Department of Agriculture
has the following duties regarding shellfish activities:
50. R.I. Gen. Laws sec. 42-17.1-13.
51. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. sec. 26-192a.
52. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. sec. 26-192.
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coordination with other states; liaison between local 
shellfisheries and the state; ensuring compliance with the 
federal shellfish program and the National Shellfish Sanitation 
Program; encouraging depuration, monitoring and testing municipal 
resources in conjunction with the municipality and the Department 
of Health Services; and promulgating regulations in conjunction 
with the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Health 
Services pertaining to sanitary growth, production, purification, 
and preparation of shellfish. In addition, the Department 
issues/revokes licenses to those involved with the above 
activities or may choose to give such authority to the towns. 
Advisory Entities: 
State Agyaculture Copission: The state Aquaculture 
Commission is a division of the Department of Agriculture made up 
of fourteen members from various departments and disciplines 
(i.e., Department of Economic Development, Vocational Agriculture 
Divisiort of the Department of Education, Department of 
Agriculture, Sea Grant Marine Advisory Service at the University 
of Connecticut, Department of Environmental Protection, 
Department of Health Services, coastal management, marine 
fisheries, marketing agriculture, municipal shellfish commission, 
aquaculture industry, general public, and four more members 
appointed by the leaders of the Senate and House).53 The
Commission advises the state government on aquaculture policy, 
53. Conn. Gen. stat. Ann. sec. 22-417.
19




Local Shellfish COpissions: The board of selectmen of a
town, the mayor of a city, or the warden of a borough may
establish a Shellfish Commission. The Commission has the
authority to control the oysters and oyster grounds within their
territory, with the exception of those grounds either under the
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Agriculture or granted to
another. In areas under its jurisdiction, the Shellfish
Commission may determine the fee for an oyster license, set
limits on size, quantity, and method of harvest as well as
determine the locations of harvest.
55
54. Conn. Gen. stat. Ann. sec. 22-418.
55. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. sec. 26-257.
New York 
Primary Agency: Department of Environmental
Conservation.
20
Jurisdiction/Responsibilities: The Department of
Environmental Conservation is responsible for the environmental
policy of the state of New York and addresses agriculture, land
use, pollution, and waste issues along with the welfare of the
state's fish and wildlife.
56
The state owns all fish, game,




in priva e owners ip. The area under the authority of the
Department of Environmental Conservation involving the Marine
Coastal District is described in section 13-0103 of the state
statutes; this includes the tidal waters of the Atlantic Ocean up
to three miles from the coastline. Towns once regulated the
taking of oysters but the Environmental Conservation Law repealed
this through the above expression of state ownership and thus has
regulatory authority over fishing in the marine coastal
district.
58
Regulatory Authority: The Department of Environmental
Conservation may adopt regulations with respect to the
harvesting, transplanting, relaying, receiving, possessing,
transporting, importing, exporting, processing, buying, selling,
or otherwise trafficking of shellfish, and labeling and tagging
56. N.Y. Envir. Conserv. Law sec. 13-0301 (Consol.].
57. N.Y. Envir. Conserv. Law sec. 11-0105 (Consol.].




It also has the authority to lease state lands for





issue permits for marine hatcheries.
62
Advisory Entities: 
Marine Resources Advisory Council: The Marine Resources
Advisory Council reviews marine allocations and expenditures of
the Department of Environmental Conservation, reports to the
Department on issues regarding marine resource programs, and
makes recommendations on program needs. Eleven of the members of
the Council are appointed by the Commissioner of the Department
from outside of the Department. The senate majority leader and
the speaker of the assembly each appoint two recreational
fishermen and one commercial fisherman. The Director of Marine
Science at The State University of New York - Stony Brook, or his
designee, serves as the chairman of the Councii.
63
New Jersey 
Primary Agency: Department of Environmental Protection
and Energy, Division of Fish, Game and Wildlife (previously the
Division of Fish, Game and Shellfisheries).
Jurisdiction/Responsibilities: The Department of
Environmental Protection and Energy has authority over the fish,
59. N.Y. Envir. Conserv. Law sec. 13-0319 (Consol.].
60. N.Y. Envir. Conserv. Law sec. 11-0305, 13-0301 [Consol.].
61. N.Y. Envir. Conserv. Law sec. 13-0307 (Consol.].
62. N.Y. Envir. Conserv. Law sec. 13-0316 (Consol.].
63. N.Y. Envir. Conserv. Law sec. 13-0350 (Consol.].
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game, and wildlife of the state as well as authority over solid
wastes, gas, and other responsibilities previously allocated to
the Board of Public Utilities. The specifics of the
reorganization plan are provided for in N.J. Stat. Ann. sec.
13:10-1.
Regulatory Authority: 
couissioner of the Depart:Jlent of Environaental 
Protection and Energy: As the head of the Department of
Environmental Protection and Energy, the Commissioner is
responsible for preparing fishery management plans for each
fishery within the state. With the advice of the Shellfisheries
Council and the approval of the Marine Fisheries Council, the
Commissioner may promulgate rules and regulations regarding the
shellfish industry. These rules and regulations may prohibit,
limit, or require gear, size, quantity, season, location, time,
and manner of taking of shellfish. The Department has the
authority to create emergency regulations for sixty days which
can be extended for sixty additional days if deemed necessary.64
The Commissioner sponsors research in cooperation with Rutgers,
the State University Marine Consortium, or other agencies, and
coordinates programs with other states.
65
Shellfisheries Council: The Shellfisheries Council is
made up of nine members, all of whom are licensed and practicing
shellfishermen. The governor appoints them with the advice and
64. N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 50:14B-4.
65. N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 23:2B-6, 23:2B-7, 50:1-5.
approval of the Senate, each serving a four-year term. It 
23 
is divided into two parts (the Delaware Bay section and the 
Atlantic Coast section) according to which area the member 
resides. Each part governs its own area, with each having a 
chairman who sits on the Marine Fisheries Counci1.
66 
The 
Shellfisheries Council serves to advise the Commissioner and the 
Marine Fisheries Council about implementation of shellfish 
programs and can relate shellfish rules and regulations to the 
Commissioner. It also approves lease grants with the approval of 
the Commissioner.
67 
Marine Fisheries Council: The Marine Fisheries council 
consists of eleven members, nine of whom are appointed by the 
governor to serve three-year terms. Of those nine, four 
represent the interests of the sport fishermen, two are active 
commercial fin fishermen, one is an active fish processor, and 
two are from the general public. The remaining two members are 
the chairmen of the two sections of the Shellfisheries Council. 
Any member of the Council can be removed by the governor if there 
is cause. In such cases, an opportunity must be provided for 
the board member to be heard.
68 
The Marine Fisheries Council is 
involved with the preparation, revision and approval of fishery 
management plans. It advises the Commissioner of the Department 
of Environmental Protection and Energy on policy, planning, 
66. N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 23:2B-4, 50:1-18.
67. N.J. stat. Ann. sec. 50:1-18.
68. N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 23:1B-4.
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development and implementation of programs related to marine
fisheries and makes recommendations regarding the conservation
and management of fisheries resources. The Council interacts
with the public by holding periodic hearings on current issues
and can recommend the convening of species-related citizen
councils. It also has the power to veto any rules and
regulations applicable to marine fisheries proposed by the
Commissioner.6
9
other Contributing Agencies/Institutions: 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Technology Extension center: 
In association with Rutgers University, the Fisheries and
Aquaculture Technology Extension Center contains an Advisory
Board which in turn contains an Aquaculture Committee. This
Aquaculture Committee has been developing aquaculture plans for
New Jersey. The plans currently have no regulatory authority
although participants are attempting to get an executive order
implemented to change this.
70
69. N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 52:14B-4, 23:2B-5.
70. Personal communication, Bruce Helgren, Div. of Fish &
Wildlife, Admn. of Mar. Fisheries, 7/31/92.
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Delaware 
Primary Agency: Department of Natural Resources and 
Environmental Control (Division of Fish and Wildlife). 
Jurisdiction/Responsibilities: The Department of Natural 
Resources and Environmental Control has authority to act 
throughout the state of Delaware and is responsible for the 
natural resources of the state as well as other areas including 
t t d h. h 
71 
was e managemen an ig ways. The Department has the 
authority to adopt, promulgate, amend and repeal regulations 
regarding shellfish in order to protect the industry and protect 
the resource. This includes regulations regarding inspections, 




secretary of the Departllent of Natural Resources and 
Enviromaental Control: The Secretary of the Department of 
Natural Resources and Environmental Control serves as the head of 
the Department performing supervisory and administrative duties 
among which is the appointment of the Director of the Division of 
Fish and Wildlife. The Secretary is qppointed by the governor, 
with the advice and consent of the senate, and serves at the 
73 
pleasure of the Governor. 
71. Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, sec. 8001, 8003.
72. Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, sec. 1902, 1905.
73. Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, sec. 8002.
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Division of Fish and Wildlife: The Division of Fish and 
Wildlife is a unit of the Department of Natural Resources and 
Environmental Control. It performs those duties once assigned to 
the Board of Game and Fish and the Delaware Commission of 
Shellfisheries and also performs the necessary duties which 
involve the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission.
74 
The 
Division may pass emergency regulations regarding the oyster 
industry with or without a public hearing and there are no time 
1. 't t' 
. 75 
imi a ions on these emergency regulations. 
other Advisory Entities: 
Council on Game and Fish: The council on Game and Fish 
consists of nine members appointed by the governor from the 
various political parties. It is their duty to advise the 
Director of Fish and Wildlife on the protection, conservation, 
and propagation of the state's fish and wildlife.
76
Council on Shellfisheries: Consisting of seven members, 
the Council on Shellfisheries advises the Director of Fish and 
Wildlife on matters pertaining to the shellfish of the state. 
The members of the Council are appointed by the governor. One 
must be a commercial oysterman. Three shall represent the 
lobster, clamming and crabbing industries. One represents marine 
fisheries, another represents the recreational shell fishery, and 
a final member serves as the chairman. Like the Council on Game 
74. Del. Code Ann. tit. 26, sec. 8005.
75. Personal Communication, Rick Cole, Div. of Fish and Wildlife,
7/20/92.
76. Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, sec. 8006.





Primary Agency: Maryland Department of Natural Resources 
(DNR), Tidewater Administration. 
Jurisdiction/Responsibilities: The Department of Natural 
Resources has jurisdiction over all of the natural resources 
within the boundaries of the state of Maryland. The DNR is 
responsible for promulgating and analyzing policies addressing 
the natural resources whether they are of state, local, regional, 
or federal origin. The DNR also advises the governor and the 
General Assembly.
78 
The Tidewater Administration is that section 
of the DNR responsible for the oyster industry and houses the 





esearch and Monitoring sec ion. Also included within the 
Tidewater Administration are the Maryland Membership Unit of the 
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission and the Maryland 
. . 
h 
. . . 80 
Membership Unit of the Potomac River Fis eries Commission. 
77. Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, sec. 8007.
78. Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. sec. 1-101.
79. Personal communication, Chris Judy, DNR, Fisheries Div. of
the Tidewater Admn., 7/30/92.
80. Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. sec. 1-102.
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Regulatory Authority: 
Secretary of Natural Resources: The secretary of Natural 
Resources serves as the head of the DNR. Appointed by the 
governor with the advice and consent of the Senate, the Secretary 
serves at the pleasure of the governor and is responsible for 
carrying out the governor's policies in the areas of natural 
resources research and development, management, and 
administration.
81 
The Secretary may also create or dissolve an 
advisory board for the DNR which would be represented by people 
in the different areas comprising the jurisdiction of the DNR.
82
Local Conittees of Oystenaen: Each tidewater county 
within the state has a committee of five licensed oyster tongers 
and a committee of five licensed dredgers. The chairmen of each 
of these committees serves on a state-wide committee of oystermen 
which advises the DNR on industry issues. The DNR appoints five 
licensed oystermen, who harvest oysters by diving, to serve on 
another committee as well as five licensed oystermen, who harvest 
oysters by patent tonging, to serve on a final committee. Both 
the diving committee and the patent tonging committee select a 
chairman to serve on the state-wide committee of oystermen. The 
DNR may close natural oyster beds without a public hearing only 
if they have approval of the appropriate committee of 
oystermen.83
81. Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. sec. 1-101.
82. Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. sec. 1-105.
83. Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. sec. 4-1106.
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Advisory Entities: 
Board of Review of Natural Resources: The Board of 
Review of Natural Resources is appointed by the governor with the 
consent of the senate. The Board may make recommendations to the 
Secretary as to the operation of the DNR and in lieu of the 
absence of an advisory board, will advise the Secretary on 
matters which he/she chooses to address.
84 
The Board is also 
responsible for hearing appeals of those decisions made by the 
DNR.
85 
Aquaculture Advisory Copjttee: consisting of 21 members 
from various departments in Maryland (e.g. Health, Agriculture, 
Natural Resources, Environment, etc.) and various members of the 
seafood and aquaculture community, the Aquaculture Advisory 
Committee makes recommendations which will further the 
aquaculture industry in Maryland. 
Depart.Jaent of EconQllic and BN>\o.nent Development CPBBP): 
The DEED·administers the Maryland Seafood and Aquaculture Loan 
Fund which provides below market, fixed rate loans to those in 
the seafood processing or aquaculture industries for expansion, 
. 
t' 
. . . 
t 
86 innova ion, or modernization proJec s. 
84. Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. sec. 1-106.
85. Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. sec. 1-106.
86. Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. sec. 13-123 through 13-128.6.
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Laboratory at oxford, Maryland: supported by both state 
and federal grants, the Laboratory at Oxford performs important 
research and is involved with the certification of oysters (e.g. 
diseases).
87 
Poto11ac River Fisheries cmnission: see 
Interjursidictional Regulatory Commissions. 
Other Contributing Agencies/Institutions: 
Departllent of Agriculture: The Department of Agriculture 
serves as the lead agency for promoting, coordinating, and 
marketing aquaculture and aquaculture products.88
university of Maryland: The University of Maryland is 
considered the lead agency for research in aquaculture 




Priaary Agency: Virginia Marine Resources Commission 
(VMRC). 
Jurisdiction/Responsibilities: The VMRC controls the 
commercial fisheries, marine fish, marine shellfish, and marine 
organisms of Virginia's tidal waters up to the fall line of tidal 





Personal communication, Chris Judy, DNR, 
the Tidewater Admn., 7/30/92. 
Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. sec. 10-1301. 
Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. sec. 10-1301. 
Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-3. 
Fisheries Div. of 
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other states because its marine resources are not grouped with 
other natural resources of the state into the same department 
(e.g. Maryland's Department of Natural Resources). 
Regulatory Authority: 
Chainaan and Me:eb@rs of the Virginia lfATioe Resources 
Cc>pjssion: The VMRC is controlled by a Commission made up of 
nine members all of whom are appointed by the governor and 
confirmed by the General Assembly. The Commissioner of the VMRC 
serves as the chairman and is the only member who can serve more 
than two terms. His term(s) are coincidental with the current 
governor (as are the terms of two other members), but the four­
year terms of the others end on staggered years. One member of 
the Commission must be a waterman with a minimum of five years' 
experience, and the others should represent various interests 
(commercial, recreational, and environmental) in marine 
resources.91 The commissioner is responsible for enforcing the
fish and shellfish laws of the Commonwealth.92 The commission
has the authority to make regulations, issue licenses, prepare 
fishery management plans and appoint fishery advisory 
committees.93 Emergency regulations adopted by the Commission
are effective immediately but only remain in effect for thirty 
days if a public hearing is not held.94
other Contributing Agencies/Institutions: 
91. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-4, 28.1-5.
92. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-9.
93. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-23.
94. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-25.
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Virginia Institute of Marine science, College of Willia11 
and Mary: The Virginia Institute of Marine Science has a state 
mandate to research all phases of the seafood industry, advise 
the public and the VMRC, and perform studies at the request of 
the governor.95
Virginia Narine Products Board: The Virginia Marine 
Products· Board is within the Department of Agriculture and 
Consumer Services. The eleven members of the board are appointed 
by the governor from persons who earn their living in the seafood 
industry. Of those appointed, one must come from the menhaden 
industry. The members serve three-year terms and no member may 
serve more than two terms.96 The Board conducts marketing and
promotional programs for Virginia's seafood industry. Similar to 
the Virginia Institute of Marine Science, the Board also makes 
recommendations regarding the regulations and management of the 
marine fisheries and may conduct research regarding the 
industry� 97
Department of Agriculture and ConsUJ1er services: under 
the auspices of the Aquaculture Development Act, the Department 
provides information and assistance in obtaining aquaculture 
permits, promotes aquaculture, and aids in the development and 
implementation of policy.98 These duties are promulgated by an
95. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-195.
96. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-230.
97. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-234.
98. Va. Code Ann. sec. 3.1-73.7.
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Aquaculture Advisory Board consisting of seven members serving 
staggered three-year terms.99
Potouc River Fisheries CQwjgsion: see 
Interjurisdictional Regulatory Commissions. 
* NOTE: Effective October 1, 1992, the sections of the
Virginia Code Annotated regarding marine fisheries will be 
recodified under Title 28.2. The content of most of the statutes 
remains the same, however, section numbers will be different. 
Interjurisdictional Regulatory comdssions 
Poto.ac River Fisheries Comdssion 
Purpose: The Potomac River Fisheries Commission 
(PRFC) gained its authority from the 1958 Potomac River Compact 
between the Commonwealth of Virginia and the State of Maryland. 
The compact, which was enacted into law and ratified by Congress, 
replaced the outdated Compact of 1785. It recognizes the 
importance of the resources of the Potomac River as well as the 
right of fishing in the river by residents of both Virginia and 
Maryland and allows for the use of the river by residents of both 
states.100 The PRFC is unique among interjurisdictional
commissions in that it has the authority to regulate the waters 
under its jurisdiction in contrast to others which have only the 
power to advise. 
99. Va. Code Ann. sec. 3.1-73.8.
100. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-203, Preamble.
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Jurisdiction: The PRFC has authority over those 
fisheries within the tidal portion of the Potomac River which are 
described in detail within the Compact of 1958 under Article II. 
Governing Body: The PRFC consists of three members from 
the Virginia Marine Resources Commission and three members from 
Maryland who are on the Tidewater Fishery Commission within the 
Department of Natural Resources. The chairman of the PRFC 
alternates annually between a representative of Virginia and a 
representative of Maryland.
101 The PRFC regulates those
fisheries within its jurisdiction regarding, but not limited to, 
the place and manner of taking, the issuance of licenses, taxes, 
funding and research. The Virginia Institute of Marine Science 
and the Maryland Department of Research and Education, or other 
institutes, can aid in such research.
102 
Any· regulation adopted
is preceded by a public hearing and must be approved by four 
members of the PRFC. Leasing, dredging, or patent tonging 
requires·the authorization by joint action by the legislatures of 
Virginia and Maryland with at least two members from each state 
present.103 The PRFC has been authorized to regulate the
d d .  . h h d 
l04 
It 1 h th re ging of oysters wit an scrapes. a so as e 
authority to regulate experimental oyster hatchery programs once 
105 also approved by Maryland. 
101. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-203,
102. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-203,
103. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-203,
104. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-229.
105. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-228.
Article I. 
Article III. 
Article IV, Article I. 
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Enforcement: The laws and regulations of the PRFC are 
enforced by both Virginia and Maryland enforcement agencies.106
Chesapeake Bay co-ission 
Purpose: The purpose of the Chesapeake Bay Commission 
(CBC) is to assist the legislatures of Maryland, Pennsylvania, 
and Virginia in evaluating and responding to problems of the 
Chesapeake Bay; to promote intergovernmental cooperation; to 
encourage cooperative resource planning and action; to provide, 
through recommendation, uniformity of legislative application; to 
help existing agencies; and to recommend improvements in the 
existing management system for the benefit of the present and 
f t  . h . k l07 h
0 
th· u ure in abitants of the Chesapea e Bay. To ac ieve is
purpose, the Commission may collect, organize,· and provide data 
relative to the Chesapeake Bay and make reports. The CBC can 
either receive or give grants and assistance to or from public 
and private sectors and can also use such powers and actions that 
a · f . th . d t. 108 re necessary or appropriate for per orming eir u ies. 
Governing Body: The CBC is composed of twenty-one 
members, seven £rom each of the three signatory states: 
Maryland, Pennsylvania,· and Virginia. Five of the seven members 
from each state shall be members of the state legislatures. The 
CBC must meet at least quarterly and, in order to constitute a 
106. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-203, Article IV.
107. Va. Code Ann. sec. 62.1-69.11, Article 2.
108. Va. Code Ann. sec. 62.1-69.12, Article 2.
quorum, eleven members, three from each state, must be 
present.109
36 
The duties of the CBC are set forth as follows: 
identifying specific Chesapeake Bay management concerns requiring 
intergovernmental cooperation and recommending actions necessary 
to federal, state, and local governments; considering industrial 
and agricultural development for gaining a high quality 
environment; assisting states in the management of their 
resources; preparing an annual report indicating the 
environmental and economic status of the Chesapeake Bay; and 
providing a forum as a mediator for conflicting member states.110
The budget of the CBC is to be equally apportioned among the 
states.111 The term of the agreement is ten years from the
effective date, 1980, and then another ten years unless one of 
the signatory states notifies the Commission of its intention to 
terminate the agreement at the end of the first ten year period. 
Any signatory state, however, can withdraw from the Commission 
through an act of its legislature at the end of any calendar 
year.112
Atlantic states Marine Fisheries Comrlssion 
Purpose: on June 14, 1940, the United States Senate 
approved the Atlantic states Marine Fisheries Compact. It has 
109. Va. Code Ann. sec. 62.1-69.9, Article 1.
110. Va. Code Ann. sec. 62.1-69.13, Article 2.
111. Va. Code Ann. sec. 62.1-69.15, Article 3.
112. Va. Code Ann. sec. 62.1-69.19, Article 5.
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since been ratified by all fourteen eastern coastal states: 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia. The stated 
purpose for creating the compact is to develop a commission that 
can advise how to better use, promote, and protect the fisheries 
(marine,· shell, and anadromous) of the Atlantic seaboard.
113
When two or more of the above states form an agreement, once it 
1. d b 
. 
t
· 114s approve y Congress, it becomes opera 1ve. 
Governing Body: The compact is administered by the 
Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (ASMFC). ASMFC
membership is composed of three representatives from each state. 
One representative shall be the executive of the state agency in 
charge of fisheries resources. Another representative shall be a
member of that state's legislature. The final representative is 
a citizen knowledgeable of marine fisheries.
115 
A majority vote 
of ASMFC· members present at a meeting is required for action 
regarding the general affairs of the Commission. With regard to 
species-specific or fishery-specific matters, the majority vote 
of only those states with an interest in that species is
required. The ASMFC defines what shall be an interest.
116 
It is the duty of the ASMFC to examine and make 
recommendations to the state governments regarding regulations
113. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-202, Article I.
114. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-202, Article II.
115. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-202, Article III.
116. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-202, Article VI.
and the conservation of the marine, shell, and anadromous 
fisheries of the Atlantic coast.
117
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The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is the primary 
research agency for the ASMFC. The ASMFC also has the right to 
establish advisory committees such as the ASMFC 
· 
118 
Interjurisdictional Shellfish Transport Committee. 
Regulatory Authority: The ASMFC cannot limit the powers 
of any individual state or enforce requirements and 
restrictions
119 
and has no regulatory authority except for
striped bass
120 
and as designated by Amendment I of the Atlantic
St t M . . h . t 
121a es arine Fis eries Compac . 
Amendment I of the compact states that the ASMFC can be 
named as a joint regulatory agency by any two or more the 
participating states. The authority given is to be determined by 
those states and the funding required is to be provided by those 
states.
122 
Otherwise the funding of the general affairs of the
commissibn is supported by the states in proportion to the market 
value of fish in their waters.
123
117. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-202, Article IV.
118. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-202, Article VII.
119. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-202, Article IX.
120. 16 USCA sec. 1851, note section 4.
121. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-202, Amendment I.
122. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-202, Amendment I.
123. Va. Code Ann. sec. 28.1-202, Article XI.
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STATE AND INTERJURISDICTIONAL REGULATION OF TRADITIONAL 
OYSTER CULTURE AND HARVESTING 
Introduction 
The following tables offer a comparison of state and
commission statutes relevant to:
- commercial oyster license residency requirements;
- commercial license fees (annual);
- commercial limits;
- recreational licenses;
- recreational limits (for own consumption);
- size limits (from public lands);
- season/time of day limitations;
- gear/boat licenses;
- gear restrictions;
- prohibited gear (not including aquaculture);
- seed oyster requirements;
- culling requirements;
- replenishment/support programs;
- shipping, processing, buying and/or shucking licenses;








- standards for measuring a bushel; and
- statutory sources.
41









Must be a resident of state for 1 year preceding
application (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 26-214);
non-resident will have Connecticut license
suspended or voided if suspended or voided in
state of residence (sec. 26-142a)
Reciprocity for commercial license as well as
leasing (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, sec. 1917)
Must be a resident for 6 months (ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, sec. 6301); non-resident license
is not less than 10 times resident license or
not less than $150 (done by shellfish ordinance),
municipality may set fees (tit. 12, sec. 6671)
Must be a resident 12 months preceding
application (MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. sec. 4-1003,
4-1004)
No permit except in city of New Bedford may be
issued to an alien unless he has resided in such
town for at least 5 years next preceding date of
application or has been a resident of county for
5 years next preceding date of application and
has taken shellfish commercially therefrom for
such period (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130,
sec. 55)
For residents, a tax receipt is required for a
license (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. sec. 214:lla); must
have 2 years previous residence and not claim
residence in another state (sec. 214:7b); yet, no
person shall at any time sell or take for sale
oysters from the waters under the jurisdiction
of the state (sec. 211:53)
Must be a resident at time of lease (N.J. STAT.
ANN. sec. 50:1-25); owners of boats must be
residents of New Jersey in order to obtain
licenses for harvesting oysters (sec. 50:3-3)
1 year of residence in order to lease shellfish
grounds (N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW sec.
13-0301 [Consol.]); 6 months residence for
diggers permit (sec. 13-0311); 1 year of







Must be resident of Maryland or Virginia for
12 months preceding application (PRFC REGUL. 1,
sec. l(a)); non-residents of Virginia or Maryland
shall not be licensed (REGUL. 1, sec. 3(a))
Commercial shellfish license issued to residents
of state (R.I. REGUL. 8.01)
Must be a taxpayer in the commonwealth and
resident for 1 year, must have resided 4 months
in house prior to application (VA. CODE ANN. sec.
















COMMERCIAL LICENSE FEES (Annual) 
Commercial license required, no specifics listed 
regarding fees (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 
26-142a); must have license to take or gather
from natural beds for commercial purposes,
fine $100 or not less than 30 days imprisonment,
or both (sec. 26-213)
Fee for residents taking from natural oyster beds 
is 15 cents/bushel, in Delaware Bay 50 
cents/bushel (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, sec. 2015); 
fee for non-residents taking from natural oyster 
beds is $1 - $10/bushel, in Delaware Bay 
$2 - $20/bushel (tit. 7, sec. 2016) 
Shellfish license is $38/annually (ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12, sec. 6601); municipality sets fee 
with certain restrictions (tit. 12, sec. 6671) 
See Gear/Boat Licenses Section 
$15 (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, sec. 83); 
may be issued to a person or a vessel (ch. 130, 
sec. 80); penalty - $10 - $1,000 and/or 3 years 
imprisonment (ch. 130, sec. 8�) 
No commercial industry 
See Gear/Boat Licenses Section 
$35 for digger's permit, $25/acre for shellfish 
grower, minimum fee $5 (N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW 
sec. 13-0311 [Consol.]) 
See Gear/Boat Licenses Section; ,exception for
individuals over 65 and harvesting for three 
years, $5 license for some methods (REGUL. 1, 
sec. 5 ( d)) 
$100 for resident less than 65; $1 for resident 
65 and over (R.I. REGUL. 8.01) 
















1/2 bushel up to 10 by area (CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. sec. 26-267, 270, 276, 284, 285)
Open fishery (Rick Cole, Div. of Fish &
Wildlife, 7/30/92)
Regulated by municipality (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 12, sec. 6671)
No more than 30. bushels if using diving apparatus
(MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. sec. 4-1015.1); daily 
catch limit: shaft tongs - 15 bushels/license
not to exceed 30 bushels/boat; patent tongs -
15 bushels/license not to exceed 30 bushels/boat;
dredge - 150 bushels/boat; power dredging in
designated waters (Somerset County) - 12 bushels/
licensee not to exceed 24 bushels/boat (MD. 
REGUL. 08.02.04.07)
No daily catch limit (Kevin Creighton, Div. of
Mar. Fish., 7/31/92)
No commercial industry
No bushel limit (Bruce Helgren, Div. of Fish,
Game and Wildlife, Admn. of Mar. Fish., 7/30/92)
No limit (Charles DeQuillfeldt, Div. of Mar. 
Res., Bureau of Shellfisheries, 7/31/92)
No specific section on commercial limit
3 bushels/day/license (R.I. GEN. LAWS 
sec. 20-6-10, REGUL. 8.04)
Existing regulations for daily catch limits in
specific areas but not used due to lack of
production (Eric Barth, Fish. Mgmt. Div., Va.















Administered by towns (John Volk, Aquaculture 
Div., 7/24/92) 
None (Rick Cole, Div. of Fish & Wildlife,· 
7/30/92) 
No license required for any person for personal 
use (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, sec. 6302) 
Not required for residents. (MD. NAT. RES. CODE 
ANN. sec. 4-1004(a)); may not take for non­
commercial purposes while on board vessels where 
other is engaged in commercial oystering, may not 
take between 3 p.m. and sunrise or on Saturdays 
or Sundays after 12 p.m.; methods of taking: 
hand, rake, shaft, tong, or diving (MD. REGUL. 
08.02.04.02) 
Any town shall have area prohibited to commercial 
taking available to any inhabitant with permit; 
permits required by town shall not allow taking 
of shellfish of a certain size at a certain 
season; may require 1 year of residence prior to 
application (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, sec. 
52) 
$12.50 resident license fee (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
sec. 211:62a); no fee for residents over 68 
(sec. 211:62aa); complimentary non-resident 
licenses for residents of states that provide 
reciprocal privileges for paraplegics and 
disabled veterans (sec. 214:13b, 214:13c) 
No recreational license (Bruce Helgren, Fish, 
Game & Wildlife, Admn. of Marine Fisheries, 
7/30/92) 
State does not require license; towns may have 
license requirements (Charles DeQuillfeldt, 
Div. of Mar. Res., Bureau of Shellfisheries, 
7/31/92) 
No license needed if under limit and all 
regulations obeyed (PRFC Art. I, sec. 5(b)) 
Not required for resident (R.I. GEN. LAWS sec. 
20-6-1 REGUL. 8.01); $15.50 for non-resident









RECREATIONAL LIMITS (for own consumption} 












Open fishery (Rick Cole, Div. of Fish & Wildlife, 
7/30/92) 
1/2 bushel (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, sec. 
6601); local ordinances can further restrict 
limits (tit. 12, sec. 6671) 
1 bushel (MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN., sec·. 4-1004) 
Shall not exceed 1 bushel of any or all shellfish 
caught in one week, but town/city may require 
maximum with approval of department (MASS. GEN. 
ANN. ch. 130, sec. 52). 
Recreational limit - 1 bushel, unshucked (Cheri 
Rodgers, Marine Fis. Div., Dept. of Fish and 
Game, 7/31/92); 1 bushel/day by hand or tongs 
except July/August (N.H. REGUL. FIS.605.01); 
taking oysters in excess of limits provided by 
regulation; each 1/2 bushel in excess of legal 
limit shall be separate offense (N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. sec. 211:64); $1 agent's fee on each license 
(sec. 211:15) 
No bushel limit (Bruce Helgren, Fish, Game and 
Wildlife, Admn. of Mar. Fish., 7/30/92) 
2 pecks of oysters (N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW 
sec. 13-0311 [Consol.]) 
1 bushel by shaft tongs, by hand, or by diving 
and no other means (PRFC REGUL. 1, sec. 5(b)) 
1/2 bushel (R.I. GEN. LAWS sec. 20-6-1, REGUL. 
8.04); penalty - $50 per 1/2 bushel fine and 
costs, and/or 30 days imprisonment (sec. 20-6-9); 
non-resident limit - 1 peck (sec. 20-6-10, 
REGUL. 8.04); penalty - $100/bushel over limit 
and/or 30 days imprisonment (sec. 20-6-10) 
1 bushel/day; penalty - misdemeanor (VA. CODE 
ANN. sec. 28.1-120) 
b 
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SIZE LIMITS (from public lands) 
CONNECTICUT 3 year old oyster (John Volk, Aquaculture Div.,
7/24/92)
DELAWARE 3 inches from hinge to mouth from public
tonging areas (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, sec. 2104)
MAINE 3 inches (ME. REGUL. 14.15 European oyster)
MARYLAND 3 inches for marketable oyster (MD. NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. sec. 4-1001); shipment of oysters less
than 3 inches prohibited outside state (sec.
4-1015); 4 inches if diving for non-commercial
use (MD. REGUL. 08.02.04.02)
MASSACHUSETTS 3 inches at longest diameter (MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 130, sec. 69); penalty - $5 to $50
and/or 30 days imprisonment (ch. 130, sec. 69)
HEW HAMPSHIRE No commercial industry/no size limit
HEW JERSEY 3 inches from hinge to mouth except in noted
areas (N.J. STAT. ANN. sec. 50:3-15.1); less than
10% undersized allowed (sec. 50:3-16.18)
HEW YORK No size limit (5 inch width and length in
Brookhaven) (Charles DeQuillfeldt, Div. of
Mar. Res., Bureau of Shellfisheries, 7/31/92)
POTOMAC RIVER 3 inches (PRFC REGUL. 11, sec. 2(f))
FISHERIES
COMMISSION 
RHODE ISLAND 3 inches measured parallel to long axis (R.I.
GEN. LAWS sec. 20-6-11, REGUL. 8.02); penalty -
$10-$50 per 15 shellfish and subje?t to
forfeiture if percentage of undersized oysters
is greater than 10% of catch (sec. 20-6-11)
VIRGINIA 3 inches (VA. REGUL. 450-01-0035); 2 -1/2 inches
in James River (VA. REGUL. 450-01-0035);
on Eastern Shore only allows buyers/sellers to









SEASON/TIME OF DAY LIMITATIONS 
July 20 - September 20; illegal in natural beds
and specified areas; fine not greater than $100
or more than 30 days imprisonment or both; may
use tongs in staked specified areas (CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. sec. 26-232); taking between sunset
and sunrise illegal; fine of $100 to $500 or not
more than 60 days imprisonment or both (sec.
26-228) 
Illegal on Sundays and between sunrise and
sunset for commercial purposes (DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 7, sec. 1904)
September 15 through June 14 except for
aquaculture (ME. REGUL. 14.10 European oyster)
Illegal on Sundays; may not land oysters earlier
than 1 hour before sunrise and not later than 2
hours after sunset (MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
sec. 4-1008(a)); seasons: November 1 through
March 31 for tongs and diving, November 1 through
March 29 for commercial dredging but not allowed
between 3 p.m. and sunrise, except dredge boats
until sunset, not allowed on Saturdays and
Sundays (MD. REGUL. 08.02.08.13); during closed
season a person may take seed oysters marked by
stake for not longer than one month in any year;
may be sold only to lessees of private oyster
grounds (sec. 4-1009)
No closed season (Kevin Creighton, Div. of Mar.
Fish., 7/31/92)
oysters shall not be taken through ice or in
areas posted as closed; no person shall at
any time sell or take for sale oysters from
waters under the jurisdiction of the state










Depends on date, place, and gear; illegal between
sunrise and sunset (N.J. STAT. ANN. sec.
50:2-11); dredge and powered boats in designated
areas from 6 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., May through June,
Monday through Friday (sec. 50:3-6); seasons by
area - above SW line: May 1 - June 30 (sec.
50:3-8); below SW line: September 1 - June 30
except lessee of oyster grounds to protect
oysters with permission (sec. 50:3-11); closed
season: June 30 - September 1 with exceptions
described by area (sec. 50:3-15); Areas 2,3
between 6 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. on days of the week 
except Saturday and Sunday, October 1 - end of
April (sec. 50:3-16.19); no person shall possess,
sell or offer for sale oysters taken from any
natural oyster bed in Delaware River, Delaware
Bay, or Maurice River Cove except from May 1 -
June 30 (sec. 50:3-9)
Illegal from sunset to sunrise (N.Y. ENVIR.
CONSERV. LAW sec. 12-0309 [Consol.]); no season,
but towns may set seasons (Charles DeQuillfeldt,
Div. of Mar. Res., Bureau of Shellfisheries,
7/31/92)
Handscraping - Monday through Thursday during
March; Monday, Wednesday, Friday during
November and December from 8 a.m. to noon in
designated areas (PRFC REGUL. 11, sec. 2(a)(2));
illegal on Saturdays and Sundays from 3 p.m. EST
or 4 p.m. EDT to sunrise; tonging season October
1 through March 31 (PRFC REGUL. 11, sec. 2(b))
September 15 through May 15 (R.I. GEN. LAWS 
sec. 20-6-2, REGUL. 8.03); penalty - $50 to $500
and costs per offense (sec. 20-6-2, REGUL.
8.03); may be taken sunrise to sunset (sec.
20-6-23); penalty - not less than $100 and/or
3 years imprisonment and forfeiture of boat
(sec. 20-6-23)
Depends on gear and location, illegal from sunset
to sunrise and on Sundays (VA. CODE ANN. sec.
28.1-139.1); shaft tongs and hand tongs season -
seed area: October 1 through July 1; other areas:
October 1 through June 1; patent tongs season:
October 1 through March 1; Commissioner may set
alternate date anywhere patent tongs are not
prohibited earlier than June 1 and no later than
November 1 (sec. 28.1-82)
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GEAR/BOAT LICENSES 
COHNECTICUT Vessels must be licensed for commercial taking 
from natural shellfish beds; captain and crew 
must be residents for 1 year; sale of 
licensed vessel to non-resident forfeits license 
(CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 26-212) 
DELAWARE Public tonging area license $50 for residents; 
$500 for non-residents; must harvest from public 
tonging areas (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, sec. 2108); 
vessel license required to harvest or transplant 
in either natural or leased beds - $50 for 
residents; $500 for non-residents; vessel must 
have oyster harvesting license (tit. 7, sec. 
2107) 
MAINE No specific section on gear/boat licenses 
MARYLAND License for diving, tonging or handscraping -
$50; dredge boat - $250; power dredge in 
addition to diving, tonging or handscraping fee -
$50; annual surcharge to catch oysters for sale 
$300 to be used for oyster repletion (MD. NAT. 
RES. CODE ANN. sec. 4-701) 
MASSACHUSETTS Special permits for taking contaminated shellfish 
to be used for bait - $10 (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 130, sec. 83); towns regulate boat licenses 
(Kevin Creighton, Neil Churchill, Div. of Mar. 
Fish., 7/31/92) 
HEW HAMPSHIRE No commercial industry to regulate 
HEW JERSEY vessels used for oysters in Delaware Bay, 
Delaware River or Maurice River Cove require 
license (N.J. STAT. ANN. sec. 50:3-1); council 
fixes fee based on gross tonnage (sec. 50:3-2); 
vessel must be owned wholly by residents of state 
(sec. 5p:3- 3); spec�al licenses required i� Area 
1 for taking shellfish from natural shellfish 
beds (sec. 50:3-16.5); in Areas 2, 3 must have 
vessel license requiring inspections (sec. 
50:3-16.14); license fee fixed by council not 
exceeding $4/ton on gross tonnage (sec. 
50: 3-16.7); minimum $25 Area 1 (sec. 
50: 3-16.7); minimum $50 - Area 3 (sec. 
50: 3-16.16) 
MEW YORK None required (Charles DeQuillfeldt, Div. of 







License for tonging (hand or power assisted) -
$50 (PRFC REGUL. 1, sec. 2(f)(l)); vessel must
have oyster tonging tags - $5; vessels rigged to
use hand tongs additional $25 (PRFC REGUL. 1,
sec. 2(f)(2)); handscraping vessel license -
$100; 1 license per vessel; 1 handscrape aboard
vessel (PRFC REGUL. 1, sec. 2(f)(3)); each person
aboard vessel licensed for handscraping - $100
(PRFC REGUL. 1, sec. 2(f)(4))
$2 registration fee for boat (except for
dredging) (R.I. GEN. LAWS sec. 20-6-6)
License tax per person for hand/ordinary tongs -
$10; patent tongs - $35; penalty - misdemeanor
(VA. CODE ANN. sec. 28.1-120); dredge or scrape -
$50; permit for private grounds $3; registration
of boat $1; penalty - felony, fine $100 to $1, 000 










May use power dredge on private grounds: use
of excavators where no natural oyster beds have
been for 10 years with permit (CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. sec. 26-215): no device operated other than
by hand for hoisting/operating dredges: no dredge
or contrivance weighing more than 30 pounds or
with a capacity of more than 1-1/2 bushels except
upon private designated grounds (sec. 26-215):
penalty - $25 to $50 for each day, second offense
- $50 to $200 and/or 30 days imprisonment (sec.
26-216): dredging prohibited in designated areas
(sec. 26-264, 265, 270): penalty - $25 to $100
for each day and/or 6 months imprisonment (sec.
26-265)
Not more than 2 hydraulic patent tongs/boat in
public tonging area (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, sec.
2104)
No specific section on gear restrictions
Certain waters to be used exclusively by hand
tongers (MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. sec.
4-1015.l(c)): specified areas reserved for hand
tonging except scooping, dredging, or hand
scraping may be permitted when watermen are
denied access due to icing conditions (MD. REGUL.
08.02.04.09): patent tong heads restricted in
specific counties (sec. 4-1010): patent and hand
tonging limited within certain areas (sec.
4-1011): dredging restricted to specific areas
(sec. 4-1012): all submerged lands of state not
leased for cultivation or designated dredging
territory reserved for tongers exclusively (sec.
4-1013)
Towns regulate (Kevin Creighton, Neil Churchill,
Div. of_Mar. Fish., 7/31/92)









Cannot use power boats to take shellfish from 
natural grounds (N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. sec. 
50:2-10); except in designated areas, licensed 
boat may carry one or two dredges (sec. 50:3-6); 
Shinnycock rake permitted in Area 1, rake not to 
exceed 60 pounds (sec. 50:3-16.4); except in 
Delaware Bay no dredge permitted with bag or 
pocket, drag or scrape on natural oyster beds 
under tidal waters and Atlantic seaboard; hand 
power dredges permitted in specifically 
designated natural oyster grounds (sec. 50:4-2); 
no dredge more than 54 inches across or 5 feet 2 
inches in width or greater than 21 inches from 
center of cross bar or any bag which contains 
more than 17 rows of 2 inch rings or rings 
less than 2 inches in diameter or any bag the 
area of which measures more than 5 feet around or 
any dredge weighing more than 190 pounds (sec. 
50:3-16.20 for Areas 2,3 of Delaware Bay; sec. 
50:3-7 for areas above SW line); no vessel 
propelled wholly or in part by steam, naphtha, 
gasoline, electricity or other mechanical power 
shall take shellfish from natural beds except as 
specifically provided in 50:3-6 and 50:4-2 (sec. 
50:2-10); hand tongs only in specified areas with 
exceptions for patent tongs and/or dredges during 
May and June (sec. 50:3-14) 
No rakes or tongs except: hand operated tongs, 
teeth not less than 1 inch apart in rakes and 
basket having bars not less than 15/16 inch 
apart; rakes and tongs having wi�e.netting o� 
other material between them prohibited; permits 
as deemed necessary for use of stick dredge (N.Y.
ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW sec. 13-0309 [Consol.]) 
1 handscrape aboard vessel (PRFC REGUL. 1, sec. 
2(f)(3)) 
No speri fic section on gear restrictions 
Gear depends on place, season; patent tongs 
restricted by use area (VA. CODE ANN. sec. 
28.1-83); patent tongs not.less than 100 poundsand teeth not less than 4 inches (sec. 28.1-84) 
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PROHIBITED GEAR (not including aquaculture} 
CONHBCTICUT No dredge with chain bag having rings of less 
than 3/4 inch diameter or net bag with mesh 
smaller than 2 inches from knot to knot; penalty 
;or �iolation - not more than $50 and/or 30 days 













No hydraulic dredge or suction on natural oyster 
grounds or public tonging areas unless with 
consent of department (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, 
sec. 2104) 
No specific section on prohibited gear 
Prohibited in certain areas (see Gear 
Restrictions) 
Regulated by towns (Kevin Creighton, Div. of 
Mar. Fisheries, 7/31/92) 
No specific section on prohibited gear 
No vessel propelled wholly or in part by 
mechanical power shall take oysters in Delaware 
River, Delaware Bay, and their tributaries 
without first removing propeller or wheel from 
the drive shaft; except licensed vessel with not 
more than 2 dredges may be propelled wholly or in 
part by steam, naphtha, gasoli�e! electricity, or
mechanical motor power in specific areas from 
6 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. (excluding Saturdays) during 
May and June (N.J. STAT. ANN. sec. 50:3-6) 
No dredge or scrape or other device operated by
power or by boats propelled by motor or other
mechanical means (N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW
sec. 13-0309 [Consol.]) 
No dredge or patent tongs (PRFC REGUL. 11, sec.
l(d)); no sail dredging (REGUL. 1, sec. 2(f)(l))
No dredges, rakes, or other apparatus operated
mechanically or hauled by power boats (R.I. 
GEN. LAWS sec. 20-6-7) 










SEED OYSTER REOUIREMEHTS 
Shellfish.spawning beds determined; not more than10 acres in any one town; fine of not more than 
$500 and/or 3 months imprisonment for going 
upon or over for taking or dredging (CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. sec. 26-220); taking or gathering 
seed oysters that have not attained 3 years 
growth in channels of Mianus River or the 
Greenwich cove is prohibited; penalty for 
violation is fine of not more than $50 (sec. 
26-234) 
Illegal to bring seed oysters into state from 
outside with intent to transplant without 
permission of department (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, 
sec. 2110); unlawful to take seed oysters without 
authorization from natural oyster beds; penalty 
for violation is a minimum fine of $2, 000 
(tit. 7, sec. 2102) 
Departmental program of shellfish reseeding 
may be carried out in cooperation with municipal 
and joint shellfish conservation programs (ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, sec. 6675) 
Prohibits shipment of oysters less than 3 inches 
outside of state (MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. sec. 
4-1015); may sell no more than 50% of se�d
oysters in excess of 1 million bushels; 
aquaculture seed areas may be established but no 
more than total aggregate of 90 acres in state; 
seed oysters produced there for sale to resident 
of state with lease or license; expenditures 
from seed areas shall not exceed $200, 000 
annually; county oyster propagation committee 
for each county to establish aquaculture 
seed areas (sec. 4-1103); fee for moving oyster 
seed : o to 5 miles - 75 cents/bushel; 5.1 to 
30 miles - 97 cents/bushel; over 30.1 miles -
($1.08/bushel; over 50.1 miles - $1.60/bushel 
(MD. REGUL. 08.02.08.08); handling and 
planting of shell - 25 cents/bushel (MD. REGUL.
08.02.08.09)
Unlawful to take seed oysters without permit;
penalty for violation fine of $5 to $50 or
30 days imprisonment (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 130, sec. 69) 
No person shall transplant oysters or take 
eggs or larvae or take sp�t.without_written 
permission; does not prohibit practice known 









Oyster management program for section E in 
Delaware Bay and taking of seed oysters from 
state's natural oyster beds (N.J. REGUL. 7:25A-
1.1); season determined for taking of seed 
oysters in specific areas; daily harvest from 
7 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. Monday through Friday (N.J. 
REGUL. 7:25A-1.9); seed oysters of any size shall 
not be sold and taken out of state exce�t for 
methods of aquaculture approved by commissioner 
(sec. 50:2-12) 
No specific section on seed oysters 
Seed oyster harvest on Church Point from 
4/6/92 sunrise to sunset until 4/17/92 (PRFC 
REGUL. 11, sec. 3(b)) 
No specific section on seed oysters 
Commissioner may close, open, or restrict 
the manner/method of taking in any area to 
protect/promote the growth of oysters and 
may establish seed beds and plant shells or 
take other restorative measures (VA. CODE ANN.
sec. 28.1-85); permit required to buy or carry
oysters less than 3 inches o�t of state from
specified areas; penalty - misdemeanor (sec.
28.1-97); unlawful to take seed oyste�s fr?m
public beds for 12 months after planting without














No specific section on culling 
Dredged - north of East line, cull immediately; 
culled oysters must contain less than 20% shell 
and o�her materials; tonged - culled oysters must 
contain less than 5% shell and other materials 
(DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, sec. 2104); all shells 
must be thrown back on grounds or beds from which 
they were taken after culling (tit. 7, sec. 2104) 
No specific section on culling 
For natural bar, return all shells, stone, 
gravel, slag, and oysters less than 3 inches 
whether or not attached to marketable size 
oysters; department by rule may permit retaining 
marketable oysters to which non-marketable ones 
adhere so closely making it impossible to remove 
without destroying the smaller oysters; culling 
to be completed before any oyster is deposited in 
hold or bottom or boat (MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
sec. 4-1015(a)); after culling, possession may 
not include combined total of greater than 5% 
oysters less than 3 inches and cultch (sec. 
4-1015(b); must cull oysters while catching for 
non-commercial use and return every shell to the 
bar less than 3 inches and not greater than 5%; 
diving for non-commercial purposes culling size 
is less than 4 inches (MD. REGUL. 08.02.04.03) 
Unlawful to contain 75% seed oysters (less than 
3 inches) (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, sec. 69) 
No specific section on culling 
Must cull immediately after emptying tongs or 
dredges (N.J. STAT. ANN. sec. 50:2-7); 3 bushels 
shall not contain more than 15% of shells and 
other materials (sec. 50:2-8) 
For sanitary purposes, dead or broken oysters 
must be thrown out (Charles DeQuill�eldt! 
Div. of Mar. Res., Bureau of Shellfisheries,
7/31/92) 
within 15 minutes after legal time where taken; 
oysters less than 3 inches, even if attached to 
larger oyster, plus all empty �hell� must.not begreater than 5%; penalty for violation - if 
charged must dump overboard or post cash bond 




Culled oysters cannot contain more than 10% 
undersized (R.I. GEN. LAWS sec. 20-6-11) 
Culling required (VA. CODE ANN. sec. 28.1-124); 
unlawful to buy, sell, or possess oysters under 










Program to purchase shell or cultch material 
for deposit on state shellfish beds {CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. sec. 26-237a); shellfish fund 
created for this program from harvesting 
revenues (sec. 26-237b) 
See Culling Requirements
Shellfish fund - 38-1/2% of all license and 
transportation fees to be paid into fund for 
restoration and development (ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, sec. 6651); a municipality may by vote 
of legislative body adopt, amend, or repeal 
shellfish conservation ordinance (tit. 12, 
sec. 6671) 
3 areas of 10 acres of submerged land shall be 
set aside for oyster propagation research 
(MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. sec. 4-llA-7); $300 
annual surcharge for catching oysters for sale to 
be used only for oyster repletion (sec. 4-701); 
program to encourage return of oyster shell 
resources to state waters, may use Fisheries
Research and Development Fund to purchase shell 
(sec. 4-1019.1); department is required to 
restore natural oyster bars yet, may close no 
more than 30% of natural oyster bars in state in 
any one year (sec. 4-1103) 
state cooperates with coa�tal cities/to�ns to 
increase supply of shellfish and exterminate 
their enemies; money spent by state may be equal 
to 1/4 sum of work done by_city/toWi:1; director
may enter into cohtracts with agencies (federal 
or private) for carrying out research (MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 130, sec. 20) 
All money for licenses and fines goes into a










Oyster cultch program to purchase and plant not 
less than 40% of previous year's harvest (N.J. 
REGUL. 7:25A-4.1); fees collected from all 
harvesters at landing - 35 cents/bushel, reviewed
annually for oyster Cultch Fund (N.J. REGUL. 
7:25A-4.2); oyster shells returned to state 
shall be returned to respective oyster planters 
and shall be planted or spread upon natural 
oyster beds at expense of planters (N.J. REV. 
STAT. ANN. sec. 50:3-20.16); annual survey to 
determine locations and amounts of shells to be 
returned to natural beds (sec. 50:3-20.20); all 
money received for license fees and in lieu of 
shells shall go toward purchase of shells and
oysters to maintain beds and to establish and
maintain oyster sanctuaries (sec. 50:3-20.21) 
No specific section on replenishment 
No specific section on replenishment 
A percentage of fees collected from licenses
shall be used for protection, cultivation, and
management of shellfish (R.I. GEN. LAWS sec.
20-6-25) 
All taxes collected shall be paid into a
Public oyster Rocks �eplenishment Fu�d for
replenishment, planting, and replanting (VA.
CODE ANN. sec. 28.1-93) 
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Al� commercial harvesters, producers, or 
shippers must have a license (CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. sec. 26-192c) 
Pe:mit needed for processing, but no fee 
(Rick Cole, Div. of Fisheries and Wildlife, 
7/30/92) 
$130 for wholesale seafood license for buying 
selling, processing, shipping, or transporting; 
$26 for each supplemental license (ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, sec. 6851); $51 for retail 
seafood license (tit. 12, sec. 6852); $155 for 
shellfish transportation license; $51 for each 
supplemental license for additional vehicles 
(tit. 12, sec. 6855); shellfish certificate 
(sanitation) for seafood license holder or 
shellfish transportation holder may include 
buying, selling, shipping, transporting, shucking 
or other processing; activities will be 
specifically stated on certificate; may issue a 
depuration certificate which requires methods, 
sanitation records, labelling, public health 
(tit. 12, sec. 6856) 
$150 to buy, process, pack, resell, and market 
(MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. sec. 4-701); 
must have license if business or buy more 
than 25 bushels/year (sec. 4-701) 
IIASSACHUSETTS Must have wholesale dealer's permit; must be 
approved by director and hold permit to shuck 
or pack or repack shucked shellfish; penalty 
for violation, fine not less than $10 or greater 
than $50 and/or 30 days imprisonment (MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 130, sec. 80) 
MEW HAMPSHIRE $150 for non-resident wholesaler licen�e.for 
first facility; $50 for each extra facility 
(N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. sec. 211:49a-a); $25 for 
resident wholesaler license for first facility; 
$10 for each extra facility (sec. 211:49c) 
MEW JERSEY License required for oyster shucking and 
planting and to be a dealer (N.J. STAT. ANN. sec. 
50:3-20.11); $100 for shucking house or to be a 
dealer (sec. 50:3-20.13) 
MEW YORK No specific section �n sh�pping, processing, 







$50 license fee for buyer if buy more than 
25 bushels/year (PRFC REGUL. 1, sec. 2(g)) 
License required for shellfish buyers, 
regulations issued by director, must buy from 
licensed fisherman; must buy legal shellfish 
(R.I. GEN. LAWS sec. 20-6-24) 
$50 fee for business; $25 fee to buy from boat 













TAXES (not including 110St licenses which 
are referred to as taxes) 
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Shellfish grounds within waters of state shall be 
taxed in all respects as real estate in towns 
with meridian lines of such grounds and no other 
tax or rental shall be laid or collected (CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 26-250) 
15 cents/bushel of harvested seed oysters; not 
charged until harvested so as not to pay for dead 
seed oysters (Rick Cole, Div. of Fish & Wildlife, 
7;31/92) 
No specific section on taxes 
30 cents/bushel inspection tax for oysters 
shipped out of state; $1/bushel severance tax for 
oysters within state natural oyster bars 
(exclusive of Potomac River); all taxes go to 
Fisheries Research and Development Fund to be 
used for replenishment; increase as of July 1, 
1982 to be used solely for oyster seed program; 
minimum of 5% to specific counties (MD. NAT. RES. 
CODE ANN. sec. 4�1020); assessment and penalty of 
not more than 10% of amount due plus 1/2 of 1% 
for each month unpaid for non-payment of taxes 
(sec. 4-1020(e)) 
No special taxes except by towns (Kevin 
Creighton, Div. of Mar. Fisheries, 7/31/92) 
No specific section on taxes 
35 cents/bushel goes to cultch fund (N.J. REGUL. 
7:25A-4) 
No surcharge other than regular sales/property 
taxes (Charles DeQuillfeldt, Div. of Mar. Res., 
Bureau of Shellfisheries, 7/31/92) 
50 cent�/bushel inspection tax paid by buyer when 
unloaded (PRFC REGUL. IV, sec. 1); penalty for 
non-payment - misdemeanor (REGUL. IV, sec. 2) 
No specific section on taxes
VIRGINIA 
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20 cents/bushel export or out-of-state tax on 
all oysters taken from public oyster grounds and 
shipped unshucked out of state; not applicable 
to sales to PRFC (VA. CODE ANN. sec. 28.1-89); 
purchasers, planters, packers, importers, or 
shippers shall pay an inspection tax of 3 cents/ 
bushel (sec. 28.1-87); tax dependent on when 
selling; penalty for non-payment is misdemeanor -
tax plus interest plus 15% (sec. 28.1-95); 
license taxes for shucking or packing oysters 















Harvesters must keep accurate records of amount
harvested from beds seeded by state and pay a
seed oyster assessment of 10% of retail value 
(CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 26-237c) 
Must report catch from natural oyster beds to 
department (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, sec. 2109) 
Holder of shellfish certificate must record 
and report takings, purchases, processing, sales, 
shipping, and transporting (ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, sec. 6856) 
Everyone packing or dealing in any fish resource 
shall keep accurate records of every detail of 
the business (MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. sec. 
4-206); every purchase involving the buying and 
selling of shells shall be reported (sec. 
4-1019); records required by licensed oyster 
dealer for every catch purchased: oyster sales 
and export tax certificate and oyster tax report
(MD. REGUL. 08.02.08.04) 
Owner of every boat and fishing device shall 
submit annual report on catch; refusal or false 
report leads to suspension of license and fine 
of not less than $10 or more than $100 (MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, sec. 33); shellfish must
be clearly marked with source of supply, date, 
permit held; dealer must keep record of markings 
on labels (ch. 130, sec. 82) 
Every licensee must file annual report showing 
number, value and species (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
sec. 212:31) 
Records required from all dealers receiving
oysters harvested from Delaware Bay (�.J. REGUL.
7:25A-4-.5); operators of oyster shucking
houses must provide monthly statements on all
oysters purchased (N.J, REV. STAT. ANN. sec.
50:3-20.19) 
No specific section on reporting requirements
All persons involv�d m�st �eep daily records; 
penalty for violation is misdemeanor (PRFC REGUL. 
IV, sec. l(a)); weekly reports from b�at 
operators of vessels with oyster tonging, hand 
scraping tags (REGUL. 11, sec. 4); weekly reports 




No specific section on reports 
Purchasers, planters, packers, importers of 
shucking stock, or shippers must keep accurate 
records including: number of bushels before 
shucking, from whom purchased, number of bushels 
and dollars per bushel and, if from private 
grounds, what general area (VA. CODE ANN. sec. 
28.1-87); buyers must keep records of all oysters 
taken from public grounds (sec. 28.1-92); annual 
reports from all oyster handlers showing amount 
of oysters actually shucked or packed or sold in 
















No specific section on riparian rights 
Cannot lease within 1,000 feet of natural 
shoreline at mean high water, therefore, 
riparian rights are not an issue (Rick Cole, 
Div. of Fish & Wildlife, 7/30/92) 
To lease in municipality must have agreement of 
every riparian owner whose land to low water mark 
will be used (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, sec. 
6072) 
Lawful occupant has exclusive rights if water
surface at mouth is 300 feet or less at mean 
low water; all rights extend only to middle of 
creek, cove or inlet; wharf owners have right to 
oysters below wharf or structure; (in 2 counties
only, riparian owners have right to oysters
within 5 feet of structure) (MD. NAT. RES. CODE 
ANN. sec. 4-llA-16) 
Exclusive right of ownership and control of fish 
to riparian owners of ponds; no specific 
reference to riparian rights of coastal onwers
(MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, sec. 28) 
No specific section on riparian rights 
No specific section on riparian rights 
No specific section on riparian rights
Maryland is owner of Potomac River bed_ an� �at7rs
to low water mark of southern shore; V1rg1n1a is
owner of bed and waters southerly from low water
mark as laid out citizens of Virginia haveI 
• 
certain riparian rights (Potomac River Compact
of 1958, Preamble) 
No specific section on riparian rights
VIRGINIA 
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Any owner of land bordering on an oyster growing 
area of the commonwealth with shorefront of 
205 feet at low water mark, who has not had as 
much as 1/2 acre assigned him or whose lease has 
terminated and is not to be renewed, may apply 
for planting grounds to the commission which 
shall assign to him ground not exceeding 1/2 
acre within his riparian waters 
(VA. CODE ANN. sec. 28.1-108); $25 fee (sec. 
28.1-109); lawful owner shall have exclusive 
right to use any creek, cove, or inlet that runs 
through his lands, is less than 100 yards in 
width at mean low water and is within limits of 
his lawful survey; exceptions by area (sec. 
28.1-116); rights of riparian owners to build 
bulkhead or wharf out to navigable water and is 
not a lessee or riparian holder of suitable 
bottom, shall give lessee or holder of grounds 
12 months notice (sec. 28.1-118) 
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LIMITED ENTRY REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO THE OYSTER INDUSTRY 
COHHECTICUT No specific section on limited entry
DELAWARE No specific section on limited entry
MAINE No specific section on limited entry
MARYLAND Must register 2 years prior to issuance of
new license (MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. sec. 4-703);
notwithstanding 4-703(b) and (c), the department
shall issue new licenses authorizing catches of
oysters for sale to anyone who submits affidavit
stating that for at least 10 years in aggregate
that person obtained a tidal fishing license
(sec. 4-703(2); only effective until July 1,
1992)
MASSACHUSETTS No specific section on limited entry
HEW HAMPSHIRE No commercial industry
HEW JERSEY No new oyster licenses authorized by N.J.
STAT. ANN. sec. 50:3-1 shall be issued except
for those validly licensed in the previous
year (N.J. REGUL. 7:25A-l.5)
HEW YORK No specific section on limited entry
POTOMAC RIVER No specific section on limited entry
FISHERIES
COMMYSSIOR 
RHODE ISLAND No specific section on limited entry









Taking from closed area, misusing tag or license
mis�abel�ing shipments or deliveries, failing
to identify shipments or deliveries, or failing
to surrender license upon request: fine not less
than $50 or greater than $1,000, or three times 
market value of shellfish involved if less than
$1,000, or imprisonment of not more than 12 
months; defacing or removing posted sign: fine
of not more than $500 or 6 months imprisonment
(CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 26-192f) 
With exceptions for specific infractions - $25
first offense, $100 each offense thereafter; 
may have license revoked for period determin
ed
by department (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, sec. 1
912)
Any conviction of a marine resource law s
hall be
grounds for suspension of license (ME. 
REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, sec. 6351) 
Aquaculture penalties - first offense
 fine of
not more than $500 plus court costs; 
second 
offense fine of $1,000 and/or impris
onment 
of not less than 12 months plus cou
rt costs
(MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. sec. 4-12
01); with
exceptions for specific infractio
ns, point 
scale system is used - the more p
oints, the
greater number of days of suspe
nsion of 
license (MD. REGUL. 08.02.13.0
3); power
dredging outside somerset count
y - first.offense
fine of not less than $250; sub
sequent fine of 
not more than $500 and revocat
ion of power 
dredging license (sec. 4-120l
(b)) 
Conviction for any violation
 - suspension of
license - 1 month for first
 offense, 3 months
for second offense, 1 year f
or any subsequent
offense; violation of any p
rovision of chapter
130 - fine of not less than
 $10 or more than 
$1,000 or imprisonment of 
not more than l_month
or both; violation of any 
rule or regulation -
fine of not less than $10
 or more than $1,000 
(MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch
. 130, sec. 2) 










Violation of act - fine of $100 to $3, 000 for 
first offense; $200 to $5, 000 for any subsequent 
offense unless commission has established 
alternate penalty for specific offenses; 
Commissioner of Environmental Protection with 
approval of Marine Fisheries Council may set 
penalty schedule for specific offenses (N.J. 
STAT. ANN·. sec. 23: 2B-14) 
Penalties vary depending upon offense;
for example, the possible penalty for 
harvesting
from uncertified lands is a misdemea
nor with a 
fine ranging from $200 for a first o
ffense (or
market value of fish) or not less t
han 30 days in
jail to $1, 000 fine (N.Y. ENVIR. 
CONSERV. LAW 
sec. 71-0921 [Consol.])
First offense - fine of not more
 than $500; 
first or second offense for des
truction/theft 
of seafood or gear, fine of not 
more than 
$1, 000 or imprisonment of not 
more than 1 year
or both upon arrest and convic
tion; may 
confiscate boat/gear used (PRF
C REGUL. 1, sec.
6(a)) 
No specific section on penal
ties
No specific section on penal
�iesf p�n�lties are 
cited within statutes regard
ing 1nd1v1dual laws
















STANDARDS FOR MEASURING A BUSHEL 
No specific section on bushel measure 
2,100.42 cubic inches, struck bushel 
(Dave Baird, Dept. of Agri., Div. of Weights 
and Measures, 7/30/92) 
No specific section on bushel measure 
2,800.7 cubic inches, iron circular tub having 
straight sides, straight solid bottom, drainage 
holes no longer than 1 inch; 1/2 bushel - 15 
inch top, 13 inch bottom, 17 inches diagonally; 
bushel - 16-1/2 inch bottom, 18 inch top, 21 
inches diagonally; bushel and 1/2 - 18 inch 
bottom, 19 inch top, 24 inches diagonally; 
3 bushels - 22 inch bottom, 24 inch top, 29.26 
inches diagonally; even measure to top (MD. NAT. 
RES. CODE ANN. sec. 4-1018) 
No specific section on bushel measure 
No specific section on bushel measure 
Standard 2150.42 cubic inches, but modifications 
have been proposed (Bruce Helgren, Div. of Mar. 
Res., Bureau of Shellfisheries, 7/30/92) 
Standard bushel (Charles DeQuillfeldt, Div. of 
Mar. Res., Bureau of Shellfisheries, 7/30/92) 
1/2 bushel - 15 inch top, ;3 inch bottom, 17 inch 
from inside chine to top diagonally; bushel -
16-1/2 inch bottom, 18 inch top, 21 inches 
diagonally (PRFC REGUL. 11, sec. 2(3)(a)) 
No specific section on bushel measure 
3003.9 cubic inches; 1/2 bushel - 15 inch top, 
13 inch bottom, 17 inches diagonall¥; bushel -
18-1/2 top, 17 inch bottom, 21-1/2 inches 














STATUTORY SOURCES AND DATE
Connecticut General Statutes Annotated, 
1992 Supplement 
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Delaware Code Annotated, 1991 Supplement 
Maine Revised Statutes Annotated for use in 
1990-91 
Maryland Natural Resources Code Annotated, 1991; 
1991 Regulations 
Massachusetts General Laws Annotated, 1991 
New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated, 1991; 
1990-91 Regulations 
New Jersey Statutes Annotated, 1991 Supplement; 
1990 Regulations 
New York Consolidated Laws Service Annotated 
Statutes with Forms, 1991 Supplement 
Potomac River Fisheries Commission Regulations 
effective January 1, 1992 
General Laws of Rhode Island, 1991 Supplement 
Virginia code Annotated, 1991 cumulative 
Supplement 
STATE REGULATION OF MODERN OYSTER AQUACULTURE 
IN THE NORTHEAST UNITED STATES 
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Introduction 
Aquaculture has the potential to conflict with the rights 
of riparian landowners and the free and common fisheries of the 
state. "rn the context of aquaculture, it is important to address 
coastal jurisdictions and riparian rights. 
Coastal Jurisdictions
In most cases, states have ownership and jurisdiction 
over a three-mile coastal strip seaward of mean water levels
subject to federal supremacy with regard to navigation, commerce, 
and defense. In states that adhere to common law, private 
ownership stops at the mean high water mark and the state owns
b 124 . 125 126 eyond it (e.g., Rhode Island, Connecticut, Maryland, 
New York, 127 and New Jersey)128. some states have departed from
common law concepts and recognize the division between private






See, State v. Ibbison, 448 A.2d 728 (1982).
Conn. Gen. stat. Ann. sec. 22a-94(b). 
See, Hirsch v. Dept. of Natural R�sources. 288 Md, 95,
98-99, 416 A.2d 10, 12 (1980); Caine v. Cantrell, 279 Md.
392, 396, 369 A.2d 56, 58 (1977); V u b v 
Indus. Park, 261 Md. 470, 475, 276 A.2d 61, 64 (1971).
See, Tiffany v. oyster Bay, 209 NY 1, 102 N.E. 585 (1913);
Fulton Light. Heat. and Power co .• v. stat
e, 200 NY 400, 94
N.E. 199 (1911). 
See, O'Neill v. state Highway Department, 5
0 NJ 3o7,
323-324, 235 A.2d 1, 9-10 (1967). 
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Hampshire,129 Maine,130 Delaware,131 and Virginia)132. Although
some cases suggest that certain grants only extent to the high 
water mark, the line of extreme low tide is generally the 
boundary between public and private lands in Massachusetts.133
Riparian owners (whether in a state where high water or low water 
is the division) have been given certain rights beyond the low 
water mark that accrue to them as natural advantages of adjacency 
to the water. In Maine a riparian owner must give his consent 
for oyster cultivation in front of flats or shore. In Virginia, 
an upland owner whose shore frontage is at least 105 feet has a 
statutory right to .5 acre of oyster growing territory in front 
of his property. The state, however, or the municipality in some
cases, has responsibility for allocating oyster culture areas in







1647 Colonial ordinance In: Whittlesey, Law of the.seashore,
Tidewaters and Great Ponds in Massachusetts and Maine 
(193 2); see also, Nudd v. Hobb§, �7 NH 524 (1845)-
See, Gerrish v. Proprietors of union Wharf, 26 Me.
 <13
Shep.) 384, 395 (1847). 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, sec. 4518. 
Va. Code Ann. sec. 62.1-2. 
See, Boston v. Richardson, 105 Mass. 351, 353, 359-360
(1870); Tappan v. Burnham, 90 Mass (8 Allen) 65, 71-72 
(1864); commonwealth v. city of Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gra
y)
451, 478 (l857); see also, Frankel, Law of Seashor
e, Waters,





Mean high water (Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. sec. 
22a-94(b) 
DELAWARE Mean low water (Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, sec. 4518) 
MAINE Mean low water (Gerrish v. Proprietors of Union 
Wharf, 26 Me. (13 Shep.) 384, 395 (1847)) 
MARYLAND Mean high water (Hirsch v. Dept. of Natural 
Resources, 288 MD 95, 98-99, 416 A.2d 10, 12 
(1980) Caine v. Cantrell 279 Md. 392, 396, 
369 A.2d 56, 58 (1977); Van Ruymbeke v. 
Patapsco Indus. Park, 261 Md. 470, 475, 
276 A.2d 61, 64 (1971)) 
MASSACHUSETTS Extreme low tide (Boston v. Richardson, 105 
Mass. 351, 353, 359-360 (1870); Tappan v. 
Burnham, 90 Mass. (8 Allen) 65, 71-72 (1864); 
Commonwealth v. City of Roxbury, 75, Mass. 
(9 Gray) 451, 478 (1857); see also, Frankel, 
Law of seashore, waters, and Water Courses, Maine 
and Massachusetts (1969)) 
NEW HAMPSHIRE Mean low water (1647 Colonial Ordinance, see,
Whittlesey, Law of the Seashore, Tidewaters
and Great Ponds in Massachusetts and Maine
(1932); see also, Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 NH 524
(1845)) 
NEW JERSEY Mean high water (O'Neill v. state Highway
Department, 50 NJ 307, 323-324, 235 A.2d 1,
9-10 (1967)) 
NEW YORK Mean high water (Tiffany v, oyster Bay, 209
NY 1, 102 N.E. 585 (1913); Fulton Light. Heat




Mean high water (�t,ru.s;_.::t.....r.___.i..l>Us.:-.,,,;:� 
728 (1982)) 
448 A. 2d 
Mean low water (Va. Code Ann. sec. 62.1-2) 
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Leasing Prograa 
All of the states have statutes which address on-bottom
shellfish leases. With the exception of Connecticut, New Jersey,
Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, the remainder of the states
have statutes that specifically allow for off-bottom culture.
Leases may be allocated based on a competitive bid (Connecticut,
New York), on a first come basis (Virginia, Maryland), at the
discretion of the agency (Rhode Island), or based on preference
for riparian owners or local fishermen (Maine).
Most statutes prevent natural oyster growing areas from 
being leased for cultivation. Prohibitions include the lease of
local areas where substantial adverse effects would be caused to
natural shellfish (Massachusetts); productive areas that support
significant hand raking and/or tonging harvesting (New York);
natural beds, shellfish grounds within 1, 000 feet of mean high
water, and other.specified locations (Delaware); areas of the
waterfront reserved for riparian owners and areas of shellfish
beds set aside for navigation projects (Virginia); and areas in
conflict with coastal zoning statutes or ordinances (Maine).
Size, Duration, Rent, and Residency Require•ents
The maximum size of the area that a person can initially 
lease varies from five acres in Maine to a two hundred fifty acre
tract in Virginia. The maximum total area that a person can
lease over time varies from two hundred acres in Maine to five
thousand acres in Chesapeake Bay waters of Virginia. Delaware's
leases are of one-year duration. Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, Connecticut and New York have leases of up to ten years;
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Maryland and Virginia up to twenty years (in Virginia, twenty
years if leased prior to 1980, ten years after 1980); and New
Jersey up to thirty years. In some states, such as New Jersey,
the size and rent are not stated but rather are specified by the
agency.
Annual rents per acre vary from seventy-five cents for
residents holding leases in the Chesapeake Bay waters of Virginia
to $11.50 for non-residents in Delaware. In New York rent is not
less than one dollar per acre per year and an additional one
hundred dollar per year permit is required for purchasing and
possessing marine organisms for culture purposes.
Residence is required in Maryland, Massachusetts, New
York, New Jersey, and Virginia, and is not required in Maine, New
Hampshire and Rhode Island. Delaware and Connecticut only grant
leases to residents of states which grant leases to the residents
of their respective states.
Application Fonas and Processes 
State laws vary on the specifications required on
application forms. Maine's laws require that applications
include a map of the location, the species to be cultured, the
projected impact, degree of exclusive use needed, written
permission of riparian owners whose lands may be used, and the
addresses of known riparian owners. New Hampshire has similar
requirements and stresses the compatibility with other natural
resources and present or potential public uses of the
area.




In addition to the requirements specified in application 
forms, aquaculture projects need to comply with procedures that 
allow for the incorporation of public concerns into the process. 
In New Hampshire, the applicant has to notify all riparian and 
upland abutters prior to filing the application. In 
Massachusetts and Virginia, persons opposing a permit have thirty 
days before the lease is assigned to file protests. 
Massachusetts law specifies that the agency may impose conditions 
tending to protect the interests involved or to deny the 
application. Virginia law gives the agency the authority to 
reject an application if not in the public interest or if 
interfering with established fishing rights. In New York, all 
other necessary state and federal permits have to be obtained 
before the issuance of an on-bottom or off-bottom permit. 
Written authorization of the owner of the underwater lands on or 
above which culture is planned is also required. New York, as 
well as Massachusetts, have permits that exempt cultured 
shellfish from size restrictions applicable to the fishery. In 
Massachusetts this exemption also includes season restrictions. 
In Connecticut and Maine, public hearings are required prior to 
granting a lease. In Connecticut, within local jurisdictions, 
designation of grounds for planting and cultivating oysters and
other bivalves are made by local authorities after a public
hearing has been held. In Maine, unreasonable interference with
navigation, fishing, or other uses, or conflict with coastal zone
statutes or ordinances can determine whether a lease should be
granted. In addition, Maine may impose other conditions and 
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limitations to encourage compatible use with other activities, 
but the exclusive rights of the lessee have to be preserved to 
the extent to carry out the lease purpose. If more than one 
person applies to the same area, the preference is first to the 
agency, second to the riparian owner, third to the local 
fishermen, and fourth to the riparian owner within one hundred 
feet of the lease. 
The following tables offer compari
sons of state and
commission statutes relevant to: 
- aquaculture leasing residency requirements;
- aquaculture lease/prohibitions/conditions;
- aquaculture lease size;
- aquaculture lease duration;
- aquaculture lease fees/per
mits;
- rights of lessee regardi
ng aquaculture;
- on and off bottom culture;
aquaculture gear (dredging);
- marine hatcheries; and
- aquaculture penalties.
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AQUACULTURE LEASING RESIDENCY REOUIREMENTS 
CONHECTICOT No lease for shellfish grounds is granted to a 
resident of a state which does not lease shellfish 
gro�nds to residents of Connecticut (unless non­
resident was granted a lease prior to 10-1-85) 
otherwise leases are granted under the same te;ms 
and conditions for residents and non-residents 
(CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 26-194) 
DELAWARE No issuance of leases to residents residing 
in those states which do not issue licenses to 
Delaware residents; if licenses are issued, 
the fees and restrictions are also reciprocal 
(DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, sec. 1917) 
MAINE No laws addressing residency requirements 
MARYLAND Leases granted only to state residents (MD. 
NAT. RES. CODE ANN. sec. 4-llA-05); special 
non-resident license in Somerset County 
for tonging on leased land by permit; $25.00 
license fee (sec. 4-llA-13) 
IIASSACHUSETTS Five years residency for leasing permits is still 
on the books but towns handle leases; only 
need proof that lessees lives within town borders 
(MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, sec. 55 and Kevin 
Creighton, Div. of Mar. Fisheries, 7/31/92) 
NEW HAMPSHIRE Licenses for aquaculture issued to qualified 
individuals, institutions, or corporations; no 
apparent residency requirement (N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. sec. 211:62-e) 
NEW JERSEY No lease shall be granted to any person who, 
at the time of granting, is not a resident of 
the state (N.J. STAT. ANN. sec. 50-1-25) 
NEW YORK Individual must be a resident for at least one 
year prior to lease application (N.Y. ENVIR. 
CONSERV. LAW sec. 13-0301 [Consol.]) 
RHODE ISLAND No laws addressing residency requirements 
VIRGINIA An application for the lease of oyster planting 
grounds may be made by any resident of the common­
wealth or any corporation chartered under the laws 
of the commonwealth for the purpose of oyster 
culture and oyster business provided at least 
60% of any stock of the corporation is wholly 
owned by residents of the commonwealth (VA. CODE





AQUACULTURE LEASE PROHIBITIONS/CONDITIONS 
M�y not plant or cultivate shellfish if it interferes 
with established right of fishing (CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. sec. 26-204); beds may not infringe 
upon free navigation or drawing of seines in any 
place customarily used for seine fishing (sec. 
26-249); prior determination of all natural
shel�fis� beds must be made within any town upon 
application (sec. 26-258); to plant or cultivate 
oysters in waters within town's jurisdiction, must 
apply to town shellfish committee or selectmen 
(sec. 26-240); must show certificate from town 
clerk that ground has not been previously 
designated (sec. 26-242); grants are validated 
by state or town authorities if not designated as 
natural oyster ground (sec. 26-239) 
No leases may be granted (exception - scientific 
research) for shellfish grounds within 1, 000 feet 
of natural shoreline (mean high water), natural 
oyster beds, or specified areas until a shellfish 
survey completed and shellfish management plan 
approved (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, sec. 1905) 
In any area within a shellfish conservation 
program, any lease more than 2 acres must be with 
consent of municipal officer; if not leased, it 
reverts back (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, sec. 
6072); municipal leasing of areas in intertidal 
zone to extreme low water mark for shellfish 
aquaculture - total area under lease not more than 
1/4 of all municipal intertidal zone open to taking 
of shellfish (tit. 12, sec. 6673); commission may 
grant lease if it does not interfere with 
ingress/egress of riparian owners! navigation,
fishing, lease sites and surrounding areas must 
support ecologically significant flora and fauna; 
applicant demonstrates available sou7ce of 
organi�ms to be_culture� for l
e�se_site; lease does
not interfere with public use within 1, 000 feet of 
municipal, state, or federal lands.or docks_(ti�.
12, sec. 6072(7a-f)); preference given to riparian 
owners of intertidal zone, fishermen who
traditionally fish in or near lease site, 7iparian






Department can lease oyster grounds to residents of 
state; corporations or joint stock companies cannot 
lease oyster grounds with exceptions written for 
4-H clubs and colleges and universities
restrictions on acreage by area/county (sec.
4-11-05); must utilize leased land, not less than
25 bu. during 1 yr. of 3 yr. period no matter the
amount of land (sec. 4-llA-07); cannot transfer
lease to non-resident (sec. 4-llA-09)
Director of the Division of Marine Fisheries 
may issue written permit authorizing possession 
of fish at any size/season for purposes of 
propagation or in connection with aquaculture in 
which fish are kept separate from natural stocks of 
same species (MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 130, sec. 
17B); city council or selectmen may grant a license 
to any person to plant, grow and take shellfish and 
plant cultch to catch shellfish seed, provided such 
operation has no adverse effect on natural beds 
or any area then, or two years previously, 
closed for municipal cultivation (ch. 130, sec. 
57); annual report required of shellfish planted, 
produced, and marketed; if total falls below market 
value of $100/acre within first two years of lease 
or below $250/acre for any 3 consecutive years 
thereafter, license shall be forfeited and premises 
revert to city or town (ch. 130, sec. 65); cannot 
dig, take, or carry shellfish from licensed waters 
1/2 hour before sunrise or 1/2 hour after sunset 
(ch. 130, sec. 68); town has control of shellfish 
grounds (Neil Churchill, Div. of Shellfish, 
7/31/92) 
Terms decided by director but cannot interfere 
with natural anadromous fish runs; public hearing 
must be held; must notify riparian owners (N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. sec. 211:62-e); application for 
license must include species, description of 
project, location, and notific�tion of intent to 
riparian owners (N.H. REGUL. F�s.1213.03); (on�y 1 
individual is currently culturing oysters but is 
unable to harvest them because they are in polluted 
waters); (Sheri Rodgers, Fish & Game Dept., Mar.
Fisheries Div., 7/31/92) 
Shell Fisheries council may lease any lands of 
state under tidal waters for exclusive use by






Department cannot lease lands within 500 feet of 
high water mark (N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW sec. 
13-0301 [Consol.]); must have all necessary permits 
required by other state/federal law (sec. 13-
0316(2)); towns have control over smaller grounds 
and state has control over larger grounds {Charles 
DeQuillfeldt, Div. of Marine Resources and 
Bureau of Shellfisheries, 7/31/92) 
Application for aquaculture permit must contain 
location, amount of submerged land and water 
column, description of action taken, method, 
and species (R.I. GEN. LAWS sec. 20-10-4); must 
not have an adverse affect on adjacent marine 
life or on vitality of indigenous fisheries (sec. 
20-10-5); must meet performance requirements 
(sec. 20-10-8); emergency closing if aquaculture 
activity is causing or likely to cause immediate 
damage to marine life or environment (sec. 
20-10-14) 
Bottoms which may be leased are those lands in excess 
of what is already assigned or reserved for riparian 
owners; the residue of the beds of bays, rivers, 
creeks, and shores of the sea other than those 
within lands limits of navigation projects 
authorized by Congress and those required for 
disposal of materials incidental to maintenance; and 
those, other than natural beds, which may be occupied 
and leased by commission {VA. CODE ANN. sec. 28.1-
109(1)); must show usage prior to renewal (sec.
28.1-109(12)); exception for riparian rights and
rights above bottom (sec. 28.1-109(15)); lessee
must show usage prior to renewal (sec.
28.1-109(12)) 
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AQUACULTURE LEASE SIZE 
CONNECTICUT Decided by state (John Volk, Director, Conn. 
Aquaculture Division, 7/30/92) 
DELAWARE Tracts a minimum of 50 acres and a maximum of 100 
acres (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, sec. 1906) 
MAIRE Maximum size of tract is 5 acres: maximum amount 
under one tenant is 150 acres: no single lease may 
be more than 100 acres (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
12, sec. 6072) 
MARYLAHD Restrictions by area/county not less than 5 acres 
or greater than 500 acres: in Chesapeake Bay not 
less than 1 acre or greater than 30 acres: in 
Tangier Sound and other areas not less than 1 
acre or greater than 100 acres (MD. NAT. RES. CODE 
ANN. sec. 4-llA-05) 
MASSACHUSETTS Applicant requests size (Neil Churchill, Div. of 
Shellfish, 7/31/92) 
MEW HAMPSHIRE Terms decided by director (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
sec. 211:62e) 
MEW JERSEY Established by council (N.J. STAT. ANN. sec. 50:1-
27) 
MEW YORK No plot less than 50 acres for bottom culture and 
no plot less than 5 acres for off-bottom culture 
(N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW sec. 13-0301 [Consol.]) 
RHODE ISLAND Variable (R.I. GEN. LAWS sec 20-10-4)
VIRGINIA No single lease tract assignment (except in Chesapeake
Bay) shall exceed 250 acres: no applicant afte� . .  
receiving as much as 250 acres shall apply again within 
·6 months· the total maximum permissible assigned 
acreage is 3,000 acres outside of Chesapeake Bay













AOUACULTURB LEA$B DURATION 
Leasing of shellfish grounds from state for 
period not longer than 10 years; towns may 
also grant leases (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 
26-194) 
Expires yearly (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, sec. 1916) 
20 year leases (MO. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. sec. 
4-llA-07) 
Not longer than 10 years (ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, sec. 6072) 
Not longer than 10 years (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 130, sec. 57, 68n); renewed yearly (Neil 
Churchill, Div. of Shellfish, 7/31/92) 
No laws governing duration; terms governed by 
director (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. sec. 211:62e) 
Not longer than 30 years (N.J. STAT. ANN. sec. 
50:1-27) 
Ten year term (N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW sec. 
13-0301 [Consol.]) 
Permit for aquaculture not �o exceed 1� years
and lease is for same duration as permit (R.I. GEN.
LAWS sec. 20-10-3) 
20 years prior to 1980; 10 years after 1980 













Selectmen or Shellfish committee may esta
blish
fees (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 26
-245) 
taxed at 2% of valuation of shellfish gr
ounds
(sec. 26-208) 
90 cents/acre for residents; $1.50/acr
e for
non-residents previously renting gr
ounds; 
$11.50/acre for non-residents lea
sing new
grounds; $17.25 per corner (survey
 related); if
more than 1 applicant, highest bi
dder (DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 7, sec. 1907)
Annual municipal fee not less 
than $1.00/acre
(ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12
, sec. 6673); others
not less than 50 cents/acre (t
it. 12, sec. 6072);
$250 filing fee and $25 annu
al fee for special 
license (tit. 12, sec. 6074)
 
$300 fee for application to
 lease submerged lands
(MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. 
sec. 4-llA-06); rental 
rate for submerged lands 
leased from state is 
$3.50/acre/year (MD. REG
UL. oa.02.oa.06) 
Each licensee shall pay 
city/town annual fee of
not less than $5/acre or
 greater than $25/acre 
(MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 130, sec. 64); state
fee of $10 per permit f
or lease (Neil Churchil
l,





 a permanent, annual fe
e of
1% of fiscal year net
 profits not to exceed
 $500;
application fee - $5




cil (N.J. STAT. ANN
. sec. 50:1-
27); 50 cents/acre 
(Bruce Helgre�, Di�. 
of 
Fish & _Wildlife, Ad
mn. of Mar. Fisherie
s, 7/31/92)
Lease to highest b
idder; rental not le
ss than
$1/acre for state 
owned lands (N.Y. EN
VIR. CONSERV.
LAW sec. 13-0301 
[Consol.]); $100 ann
ual permit fee








fee and cost of �u
rvey preparation
and copy of plat; 
cost of recordin9 e
ach plat; 




Bay; not less tha
n 75 cents/
acre or set by VMR













RIGHTS OF LESSEE REGARDING AOUACQLTURB
Person who plants or cultivates oyste
rs in
legally designated place shall own t
hem with
exclusive rights (CONN. GEN. STAT. AN
N. sec.
26-249)
Exclusive shell fishery rights (DEL. CODE ANN.)
tit. 7, sec. 1908)
Municipality may establish con
ditions and limits
on lease (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 12, sec. 6671);
no specific section on rights
of lessee
Exclusive ownership; may t
ake at any time:
sunrise, sunset, Sunday (MD
. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
sec. 4-llA-11)
Exclusive rights (MASS. G
EN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130,
sec. 63); within 10 feet
of racks (ch. 130,
sec. 68)
Determined by director
(N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. sec.
211:62e)
Exclusive use (N.J. ST
AT. ANN. sec. 50:1-23)
Exclusive right of le
ssee (N.Y. ENVIR. CONSE
R.
LAW sec. 13-0316 [Con
sol.])
Exclusive right (R.I
. GEN. LAWS sec. 20-1
0-6)
Chattel real (VA. CO













ON AND OFF-BOTTOM CULTURE 
Off bottom culture is not addressed; it 
would be handled on a case-by-case basis (John Volk, 
Div. Chief, Aquaculture Div., 7/30/92) 
Only addresses lands beneath waters, not off­
bottom culture (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, 
sec.1905) 
Lease in, on, or under coastal waters f
or
aquaculture or scientific research (ME
. REV. STAT.
ANN., tit. 12, sec. 6072)
Submerged lands (MD. NAT. RES. COD
E ANN, sec.
4-llA-05); does not address off-b
ottom culture;
two years ago legislation for off
-bottom culture
was introduced and defeated (Chris
 Judy, Fisheries
Div., 7/30/92)
City council or selectmen may 
grant to any person
a license or period not to exce
ed 10 years to 
plant, grow and take shellfis
h and to plant cultch
to catch shellfish seed in, u
pon or from specific 
portions of flats or land u
nder coastal waters 
(MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1
30, sec. 57); selectmen
may grant aquaculture lice
nse to grow 
shellfish by means of rack
s, rafts, or floats in
waters (ch. 130, sec. 6
8A) 
Not addressed 
Submerged lands (N.J. S




 culture (N.Y. ENVIR. CONS
ERV.
LAW sec. 13-0316 [Cons
ol.]) 
Off-bottom and bottom 
culture; Coastal Resources
Management council ma
y lease submerged land a
nd 
the water column to p
erson with aquaculture 
license (R.I. GEN. L
AWS sec. 20-10-6) 
Bottom culture; can
not interfere with rig
ht of
fishing in waters a
bove (VA._C?








AQUACULTURE GEAR (Dredging) 
CONNECTICUT Prohibitions regarding use of power dredge on
natural beds do not apply to private grounds
(CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 26-215)
DELAWARE Gear is not specifically address
ed
MAINE Special license issued by comm
ission for
aquaculture which may exempt
person from laws
regarding time, place, size,
amount, manner of
taking (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. t
it. 12, sec. 6074)
MARYLAND Any manner as long as follo
ws provisions of law
(MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. s
ec. 4-llA-13)
MASSACHUSETTS Aquaculture license issu
ed by selectmen which
contains conditions of le
ase (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 130, sec. 68A)
HEW HAMPSHIRE Determined by director (
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
sec. 211:62e)
HEW JERSEY Dredge is allowed (B
ruce Helgren! Di
v: of
Fish & Wildlife, Admn
. of Mar. Fisheries, 7/31
/92)
HEW YORK Any kind of mechanica
lly harvested gear all
owed
(Charlie DeQuillfeld




RHODE ISLAND Gear is not specif
ically addressed
VIRGINIA Dredging and scrap
ing on lands greate
r than
3 acres is allowed
(except at night and
on Sundays)








Commission on Environmental Protection controls 
all hatcheries other than for shellfish (CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. sec. 26-3); shellfish hatcheries are
controlled by Department of Agriculture, Division 
of Aquaculture; there are currently no shellfish 
hatcheries (John Volk, Div. Chief, Aquaculture
Div., 7/30/92) 
Marine hatcheries are not specifically addressed 
Must have a lease and municipal approval if over 
2 acres (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, sec. 6072) 
Permit required from department for aquaculture
facility (MD. REGUL. 08.02.14.04); aquaculture
permits issued for 5 years (MD. REGUL. 
08.02.14.09) 
MASSACHUSE'rl'S
One small hatchery exists for oyster spat (Neil
Churchill, Div. of Shellfish, 7/30/92) 
HEW HAMPSHIRE License required for propagation for sale (N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. sec. 212:25); may be caught, 
killed, sold, given away or shipped alive from 
premises if identified (sec. 212:28) 
HEW JERSEY Marine hatcheries are not specifically addressed 
HEW YORK Permit required; $100 annual fee; can.sell toother hatcheries if less than legal size (N.Y. 
ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW, sec. 13-0316 [Consol.]) 
RHODE ISLAND coastal Resources Management council may issue
permit for aquaculture facility (R.I. GEN. LAWS
sec. 20-10-3) 
VIRGINIA Experimental hatchery for 9. �igas, therefo�e, 
restrictions noted under pe�mit for non�n�tive
species; otherwise, hatc�erie� not speci�ically 
addressed (Eric Barth, Fisheries Mgmt. Div., Va. 









Owner of shellfish grounds or franchise must give 
statement of property value for taxation; fine not 
more than $500 (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 26-207); 
i; taxes are not paid for more than 5 years, shell­
fish grounds revert back to state; (sec. 26-211); fine 
for stealing oysters not greater than $300 or 1 year 
imprisonment; if committed during night season, 
not greater than $500 or 1 year imprisonment (sec. 
26-225); any person who applies for and procures 
any designation of a place for planting oysters 
for the purpose of assigning the rights he/she may 
acquire for profit or speculation, and any 
person other than owner, lessee, or authorized 
committee who stakes out or encloses grounds in 
navigable water for planting/cultivating oysters 
shall be fined not more than $50 (sec. 26-230); 
towing dredge or contrivance without permission of 
owner or lessee in a manner that it comes in 
contact with any ground or shellfish not less than 
$50 or 30 days or both and 1 year forfeit of right 
to fish in state, second offense not more than 
$100 or 60 days or both (sec. 26-231) 
Penalty for falsification of reports is revocation 
of lease and fine of not less than $100 and no more 
than $2,500 to be determined by estimated fees owed 
department (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, sec. 1910); $25 
for first offense, $100 for each offense thereafter 
and possible revocation of permit or license (tit. 
7, sec. 1912) 
Lease reverts back to state if terms violated 
(ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, sec. 6072) 
For violation of any of aforementioned statutes:
first offense is a misdemeanor with a fine of not 
less than $500; second offense is a_fine of not
less than $1,000 and/or 1 year imprisonment; other
more specific penalties also apply (MD. NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. sec. 4-1201); suspension or revocation of
license (sec. 4-1207) 
License is forfeited if lease terms violated 
(MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, sec. 64) 
No specific section on penalties 
No specific section on penalties 
Land reverts to state if owner defaults on taxes 




Aquaculture occurring in excess of permit - 1 year 
or fine of not more than $500 or both and possible 
forfeiture of all works; interference with aquaculture 
permit or species in aquaculture area - 1 year or 
fine of not more than $500 or both and possible 
forfeiture of all implements used to cause damage 
(R.I. GEN. LAWS sec. 20-10-16) 
Lease reverts back to state if payment d�linquent 
or use inappropriate (VA. CODE ANN. sec. 28.1-109) 
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INTERNATIONAL, FEDERAL, REGIONAL, ANO STATE POLICIES 
REGARDING THE INTENTIONAL INTRODUCTION OF NON-NATIVE SPECIES 
Introduction 
The intentional introduction of non-native species is 
governed by international, federal, regional, state, and, in rare 
instances, local authorities. Depending upon which entity is 
involved, the roles vary from advisory to development and 
enforcement of policy. The following section introduces the 
different levels of jurisdiction and policies that influence the 
introduction of non-native species. 
International
The International Council for the Exploration of the Seas 
(ICES), the European Inland Fisheries Advisory Committee (EIFAC) 
(a regional commission of the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO)), and the International Animal Health Code of the Office 
International des Epizootics (OIE), are three international 
agencies which address the issue of introduction of non-native
species. The influence these entities possess varies from 
country to country because international guidelines do not have
the force of law, but rely on political influence for 
effectiveness. For example, the codes of practice developed by 
EIFAC and OIE contain guidelines which each member country is 
96 
free to accept, modify, or re ject any or all parts.134
The ICES Working Group on Introductions and Transfers of 
Marine Organisms, which is made up of representatives from each 
member country, convenes annually to consider proposed and 
ongoing introductions and modifications of codes.135 The first
section of the ICES Revised Code requires the Working Group to
provide recommendations to the country considering a new 
introduction. These recommendations call for the country to
examine the species, habitat, and organisms associated with the
introduction and to provide that information to the Working 
Group. The Working Group analyzes the information and 
provides advice . In the next stage, the ICES Revised Code
requires the involvement of appropriate authorities from the
country in question to consider the introduction (for example, 
the need for it and interactions with native species). Before a
final determination is m�de, possible impacts and past 
introductions involving that species are assessed and
analyzed.136 once a species has been chosen, brood stock is
required to be quarantined for a sufficient time to allow
adequate evaluation of its health status and any effluents of the




de Kinkelin, P. and Hedrick, R.P. 1991. ''In�erna;ional 
Veterinary Guidelines for the Transport of Live Fish or 
Eggs." Annual Review of Fish oisease5, PP· 
27-4o. 
ICES Revised Code, 1990. 
ICES Revised Code, 1990. 
Fish 
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generation or later generations be introduced. Communications 
with ICES continue throughout the process.137 For introductions
and transfers already in process, ICES recommends the inspection 
of shipments upon arrival and the development of an established 
brood stock. Quarantine and disinfection of effluents is 
encouraged.138
During the 1980s, three memoranda of understanding 
indirectly addressing concerns over the introductions of non­
native species were signed. The Food and Drug Administration, in
l986, entered into a memorandum of understanding with
Austrailia139 and, in 1987, with Korea
140 which restrict those
countries to offer, as export to the United States, only fresh 
frozen products. Fishery conservation concerns over the 
introduction of exotic, infectious organisms into fishery stocks 
are cited as the reason for this restriction. Certification of 
foreign shellfish dealers exporting to the United states is 
normally· limited to those dealers shipping fresh frozen products. 
The remaining memorandum of understanding was entered into with 
Chile in 1989.141 This most recent memorandum allows the
exportation of live shellfish to the United states and requires
that all shipping containers of live and fresh-shucked shellfish






ICES Revised Code, 1990. 
ICES Revised Code, 1990. 
Fed. Reg., Vol. 51, No. 216,
Fed. Reg., Vol. 52, No. 111, 
Fed. Reg., Vol. 54, No. 115,
11/7/86, p. 40518.
6/10/87, p. 21999. 
6/16/89, p. 25627.
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the form of a 'NOTICE TO RECIPIENTS'. This prohibits live
shellfish from being relayed into U.S. waters for any purpose, 
prohibits live shellfish from being held in wet holding and 
storage systems where water could transport undesirable organisms
into the environment, and prohibits waste shell material from 
being discarded into waste treatment or disposal systems whereby 
improperly treated water or waste could contaminate marine
environments . 
Federal
The following federal laws are those which have the most 
impact on the issue of introductions. 
The Lacey Act 
The passage of the Lacey Act occurred in 1900, making it 
one of the first federal wildlife laws.
142 The act, in
essence, attempts to conserve wildlife by regulating commerce. 
It originally contained two parts. The first part outlawed the
interstate trafficking of birds and other wild animals (fur­
bearing mammals and migratory birds ) illegally killed in their
state of origin.143 The second part prohibited the import of
injurious animals and still operates towards that purpose 
today.144 The original
°




The Lacey Act was named after its ?r7ator, Con9ressman 
Lacey, who was careful not to prohibit the taking of 
wildlife because at the time, the states had ownership and
control over it. 
1
Legislative Historr, P= L· 97-79. 
Bean, M.J. Evolution of National Wildlife Law, En
v. Def.
Fund, Praeger Publ., 1983, P· 107. 
Legislative History, P.L. 97-79. 
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interest or protection of agriculture and horticulture.145 Fish
were regulated separately under the 1926 Black Bass Act. 
Originally that act referred to the illegal taking, purchase, 
sale, or possession of black bass but was later expanded to 
include all fish. The Lacey Act and the Black Bass Act Both acts 
were later amended to include fish or wildlife illegally taken in 
a foreign country. until the repeal and rewriting of most of the 
Lacey Act in 1981, the two acts co-existed, performing 
essentially the same function. 
The 1981 Lacey Act amendments combined the two acts and 
gave them more enforcement power by raising the civil and 
criminal penalties. Today, the first section of the revised 
Lacey Act appears as Chapter 53 of Title 16 of the United States 
Code, sections 3371-3378 entitled, "Control of Illegally Taken 
Fish and Wildlife." It declares that it is unlawful to "import, 
export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any fish, 
Wildlife� or plant taken, possessed, transported, or sold in 
violation of any law, treaty, or regulation of the United States
or in violation of any Indian tribal law" as well as violation of
any state or foreign law.146 The above section also requires the
marking of containers in accordance with existing commercial
Practices. The marking of containers, was one of the few parts
of the Lacey Act to be relaxed as a result of the 1981
145. Bean, M.J. Evolution of National Wildlife Law, Env. Defense
Fund, Praeger Publ., 1983, P· 107.
146· 16 USCA sec. 3372.
amendments. 147 In contrast, to increase the enforcement ability
of the act, the maximum civil penalty was doubled to $10,000 and 
one years imprisonment, and the maximum criminal penalty was 
increased to $20,000 and five years imprisonment.148
The section of the Lacey Act which addresses the 
importation of injurious wildlife appears in Title 18 of the 








importation of a few specific species, but more importantly gives 
! 
the Secretary of the Interior the authority to further regulate 
any "wild mammals, wild birds, fish (including mollusks and 
crustaceans), amphibians, reptiles or the offspring or eggs of 
any of the foregoing.11 149 The noteworthy absentees are plants,
which are regulated under the federal Plant Pest Act.
150
Created under the authority of the Lacey Act Title 50 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations, section 16.13, entitled
"Importation of live or dead fish, mollusks, and crustaceans, or
their eggs," is the section pertinent to the introduction of
Crassostrea gigas. It is here that the authority over
introductions is delegated to the individual states. No "live
fish, mollusks,· crustacean, or any progeny or eggs thereof, may
be released into the wild except by the state wildlife





Bean, M.J. Evolution of National Wildlife Law, E
nv. Defense
Fund, Praeger Publ., 1983, P· 113. 
Legislative History, P.L. 97-79. 
18 USCA sec. 42. , • 
7 USCA sec. 147(a), 149, 150(aa), 150(JJ).
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or by persons having prior written permission from such 
agency."151 The above organisms include those "fish, mollusks, 
crustacean, or progeny thereof" that are not listed as being 
injurious in Title 50 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 
16.13. In addition, it does not require a permit for importation 
into the United states but only a written declaration with the 
District· Director of Customs at the port of entry.152
In 1973, the Department of the Interior proposed that all 
foreign wildlife be considered injurious. It also proposed that 
it would create a 'clean list' of those species considered low 
risk and allowed to be imported without a permit. Protests from 
the pet trade community, and the increased difficulty the change 
would have placed on research institutions importing the animals 
153 for study, helped to defeat the proposal. 
Under section 16.13 of Title 50 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, a state has the authority to introduce those species
it chooses unless the species is on the injurious list. Since
151. 50 CFR sec. 16.13. 
152. 50 CFR sec. 16.13. 
153. Bean, M.J. EE�v�o�l�u�t�1�· 0Qn�Qo�f�N�aut�i�o�nwa�l�W�i�l�d�l�i�f�e�L�a=w
, Env. Defense
Fund, Praeger Publ., 1983, P· 113. 
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C. gigas already exists in the United States and is not an exotic
species as def�ned by Executive Order 11987, states have the 
authority to introduce it. 
Executive Order 11987, Exotic Organisms 
Executive Order 11987, signed in 1977 by President
Carter, addresses the issue of exotic organisms "in furthe
rance
of the purposes of the Lacey Act"
154 and the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended.
155 It calls for
the restriction of the importation and exportation 
of exotic
species by executive agencies (exotics being def
ined as all
species of plants and animals not naturally occ
urring, either
presently or historically, in any ecosystem o
f the United
States.) Since the territories of the Unite
d States are included
within the definition of the United States
, introductions could
occur anywhere within those areas without 
consideration of
Executive Order 11987. Thus, an introdu
ction of
originating in the state of Washington w
ould not be restricted,
yet an introduction from adjoining bord
ers of Maine and Canada
would be restricted.
The Executive order, the inten
t of which was to
strengthen the Lacey Act, has actually 
weakened it by its
definition of exotics (or use of the 
word 'exotics' verses
'nonindigenous'). It also stipulat
es that federal funds for
exports of exotics which are to be 
introduced into a foreig
n
154· 18 USCA 42 15 
sec. . 
5. 42 USCA sec. 4321, et seg.
103 
country be restricted. In section three, the Executive Order
delegates to the Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with
the Secretary of Agriculture and other agency heads, the
authority to create regulations to implement the order. To date,
no regulations have been promulgated.
The Honindigenous Agyatic Nuisance Prevention and control 
Act of 1990 
The Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control 
Act of 1990156 was developed·subsequent to the invasion of the 
zebra mussel into the Great Lakes via the release of ballast 
water. Much of the act addresses this introduction and its
eradication. Although ballast water was the mode of introduction
which led to the act, and is also the one referred to and
regulated, the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and
Control Act does not limit itself to this vector of introduction.
Its purpose is to prevent the unintentional introduction of
aquatic nuisance species no matter what the mode of introduction
and to fund research for studies involving zebra mussel
introduction and aid states in prevention control. In contrast
to Executive order 11987, the act addresses nonindigenous species
(verses exotics), defining nonindigenous species as "any species
or other viable biological material that enters an ecosystem
beyond its historic range."
157 
i�6· 16 USCA sec. 4701-4751.
?. 16 USCA sec. 4702.
104 
Section 4722 of Title 16 of the United States Code 
provides for the creation of an aquatic nuisance species program 
to be led by a Task Force which will develop a program to prevent 
unintentional introductions of aquatic nuisance species. Since 
intentional introductions are a pathway to unintentional ones, 
they should also fall under this act. Intentional introductions, 
however; are only mentioned in a small section of the act 
(section 4727 of title 16, United States Code Annotated) and 
include those introductions resulting from the accidental release 
from aquaculture facilities.
158
Section 4727 of Title 16 of the United States Code 
Annotated, entitled "Intentional Introductions Policy Review," 
requires that the Task Force (in cooperation with state, 
regional, and local entities) "identify and evaluate approaches 
for reducing the risk of adverse consequences associated with 
intentional introductions of aquatic organisms." In order to 
fulfill 'its duties, the Task Force formed the Intentional 
Introductions Policy Review committee which is currently
Preparing a draft document on the issue to be submitted to
Congress. once evaluated by congress, the report could lead to
the development of new.policy and regulations addressing
intentional introductions.
159
The Endangered species Act 
158. Intentional Introductions Policy Review Options Paper, 1992.159. Intentional Introductions Policy Review Options Paper, 1992.
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The Endangered Species Act
160 
would only affect an
introduction of a non-native species if the species itself were 
endangered or if the introduction might affect an endangered 
organism. Those species which are not yet on the list but are 
awaiting evaluation are also protected as "each federal agency 
shall confer with the Secretary on any agency action which is 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any species 
proposed to be listed."161
The National Environmental Policy Act CNEPAl 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
162 
could
affect the issue of nonindigenous oysters if the federal
government were involved with the introduction. The Act requires
that federal agencies file environmental impact statements to be
included with proposals for legislation and other major federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment. This forces the agencies not only to identify the
probable·adverse environmental effects of the project, but also
to look at the alternatives.
160. 16 USCA sec. 1531-1544.
161. 16 USCA sec. 1536(a)(4).
162. 42 USCA sec. 4321-4370.
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Regional 
Potomac River Fisheries couission CPRFCl 
In order for a non-native species to be introduced into 
the tidal portions of the Potomac River, a majority of the
commission members from the states of Virginia and Maryland (four
out of six members) would have to agree.163 Since actions such
as leasing and the use of dredges or patent tongs require the
authorization by joint action of the legislatures of Virginia and
Maryland, it is likely that the introduction of c. gigas would
also require joint action of the Virginia and Maryland
legislatures. Maryland has taken a position against the
introduction of Crassostrea gigas.
Atlantic states Marine Fisheries commission CASBFCl 
The Atlantic states Marine Fisheries Commission 
{ASMFC) shall have power to recommend to the 
states party hereto the stocking of the waters 
of such states with fish and fish eggs, or 
joint stocking by some or all of the states 
party hereto, and when two or more of the 
states shall jointly stock wa�ers: the 
commission shall a1� as coord1nat1ng agency . 4 
for such stocking. 
The above underlined section could be interpreted to 
indicate that the ASMFC_has control over joint stocking of
Waters. This could apply to the intended open water experiments
involving crassostrea gigas by New Jersey and Virginia making the
ASMFC the coordinating agency. Whether this was the intention of
163, Va Code A c 28.1-103, Article IV.16 • nn. se . 4. Va Cod A c 2a.1-202, Article IV.• e nn. se . 
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the paragraph is unclear but it bears investigation since the 
ASMFC Interjurisdictional Shellfish Transport Committee has 
issued the following position statement discouraging the open 
water testing of c. gigas. 
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POSITION STATEMENT 
ASMFC Interjurisdictional Shellfish Transport Colllrittee 
Both_c. virginica and c. gigas have similar environmental 
r7quir�ments and life history characteristics. Growth rate of Q..,_ 
�1gas is known to be greater than c. virginica reaching a three­
in�h marketable size in about eighteen months in temperate 
climates. Placement of c. gigas in open waters during conditions 
�hat are conducive to successful spawning constitutes a species 
introduction. Spawning of C. gigas is suppressed by temperatures 
belo� �o degrees c. and salinity less than 15 ppt. These 
con�itions are not optimum for c. gigas growth and not an 
environment which sustains infections by MSX and Dermo diseases. 
There appears to be no compelling reason for overboard exposure. 
The �ommittee affirms its position that no open water testing of 
Q. g1gas be conducted until a sociopolitical decision is made to
ac?ept the introduction of c. gigas to the East Coast of the
U�ited States. The workshop on Ecology and Management of�
g�ga� identified the potential of this species to replace�
v1rginica in East Coast estuaries.
�his decision requires a technically complete environmental 
impact statement and an economic risk assessment based on a plan 
for introduction and commercial use. These documents are to be 
reviewed by the ASMFC Interjurisdictional Shellfish Transport 
Committee, ASMFC Advisory Committee, and approved by ASMFC by 
vote. 
The Committee's recommendation for testing of C. gigas is that
· • . all testing of c. gigas be conduc�ed in clo�ed �ystems, 
hatcheries with no discharge to the environment, in microcosms,
a�d.through the use of pumped ambient water with.subsequent 
disinfection and no discharge to the natural environm�nt. AnASMFC Shellfish Transport committee me�b�r should be �nvolved in
the experimental studies and all facilities and experim7ntal 
study plans should be reviewed and approved by the Committee.
APPROVED: SPRING 1992 
State 
1rg1n1a - Virginia Marine Resources commissionV
• • • • • • • 
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The laws pertaining to the introduction of non-native
marine species are found under Title 28.1, Virginia Code
Annotated,' section 28.1-183.2 entitled, "Importing fis
h or
shellfish for introduction into waters of state." I
n general,
the state of Virginia prohibits the importation of
 fish or
shellfish with the intent to introduce them into
 state waters
unless either: 1) the species is on the Commis
sion's approved
list and originates from a state or water 
also on the approved
list; or 2) if the person importing the spe
cies receives written
permission from the commissioner. In eith
er case, a written
notification containing such information
 as species, origin,
quantity, destination, and time frame 
of the introduction must be
submitted to the Commissioner thirty 
days prior to the
importation. The concurrence of the 
Director of the Virginia
Institute of Marine science is requi
red prior to the addition or
removal of a species from the appro
ved list of species or to
 add
or delete a state or water from the
 approved list of states
 or
waters. The VMRC had given approv
al for open water test
ing of
sterile crassostrea gigas to sc
ientists at the Virgin
ia Institute
of Marine science. The experimen
t, which was to be pe
rformed in
conjunction with scientists from
 New Jersey has bee
n temporarily
abandoned due to the death of t
he test subjects.
Maryland - Maryland 
pepart:;aent of Natur
al Resources
The state of Maryland 
defines native spec
ies as "any
species of fish which histori
cally has lived, g
rown, and
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reproduced, in Maryland's waters."
165 Naturalized species refer
to those species, while not native, have "lived, grown, and 
reproduced in Maryland for more than ten years."166 Non-native 
species are those which are neither native nor naturalized. 167 In
terms of the importation of shellfish, a permit is required and 
will only be issued after proof is provided to the Department of 
Natural Resources that the shellfish in question will not be 
harmful to Maryland shellfish.
168
Maryland is against the introduction of non-native
species. It forbids aquaculture of non-native species that would
be released into unconfined waters or contaminate the ecosystems
Of n t · . . 169
 
C t 
· · · · 
a 1ve or naturalized species. rassos rea v1rg1n1ca is
the only species of oyster approved for aquaculture. 
170
Under section 4-llA-12 of Maryland's natural resources 
code, only c. virginica may be planted, cultivated, sown, or
protected. section 4-743 entitled, Quarantine of Shellfish,
states that the Department may prohibit by regulation the
importation of any shellfish, and quarantine any area within the
165. Md. Regul. .08�02.14.03.
166. Md. Regul. .08.02. 14.03.
167. Md. Regul. .08.02. 14.03.
168. Md. Regul. .08.02.08.01.
169. Md. Regul. .08.02. 14. 10.
170. Md. Regul. .08.02. 14.07.
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state populated by any destructive diseases, deleterious genetic 
characteristics, dangerous parasites or other biological threat. 
This statement could even be interpreted to apply to transgenics 
and hybrids. 
Delaware - Department of Natural Resources and 
Environmental control. Division of Fish and Wildlife 
In order to plant a species of oyster other than h 
virginica, the prior approval of the Department of Natural 
Resources and Environmental Control is required. In addition, 
section 2110 of the Delaware statutes declares it unlawful to 
bring seed oysters into the state without the written permission 
of the Department.
New Jersey Department of Envirorunental Protection and 
.Energy
Article 6 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated contains 
those laws pertaining to the planting of foreign oysters or
shellfish. Section 50:1-34 states that:
no oysters native to, or bought directly or indirectly 
from any foreign country or any other.state sha; 1 be 
planted or lodged in the waters of th�s �tate without 
written permission issued by the commission7r, after
notice to the council, for each separate shipment. 
The application should. include the species, its most recent
location, origin, and the native country of the species in
question. If approved, the above information must accompany each
shipment (via tagging or on the billing statement).
Prior to granting permission, the nature, species,
quantity, proposed location, and the condition of the oysters
must be inspected and/or examined. If it is the opinion of the
112 
commissioner that the introduction will not be harmful to the 
native oyster or its industry, that shipment will be allowed 
under specified conditions.171
In practice, the introduction, and associated
information, is considered by one of the two New J
ersey shellfish
councils, depending on the location of the propose
d introduction
(i.e. the Delaware Bay or the Atlantic Ocean). 
The appropriate
council then makes recommendations to the Dire
ctor. The
application passes through the Shellfish Tran
sport Committee en
route to the Director. The Director then pa
sses it to the
Co , . 
. t 172
mm1ss1oner who may exercise a veto or ap
prove 1 . 
Hew York - Department of 
Environaental conservatio
n
Under New York law "in no case sh
all oysters other than
the species crassostrea virginica be pla
nted or transplanted in









Introductions of fish, wild
 birds, wild quadrupeds,
reptiles, and amphibians are regula
ted by the Department of
Environmental Protection. shellfi
sh, however, are under
 the
. . lt 
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N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 50:1-3
5. 
Personal communication, Gail 
Critchlow, Dept. of
Shellfisheries, 7/2/92. 
N.Y. Envir. conserv. Law se
c. 13 -0323 (Consol.]. 
. . 
Co G St t Ann sec. 2
6-55; personal communi
cation,
nn. en. a • · · 7/24/92) 




Under Chapter 491, entitled State Shellfisheries, 
Connecticut addresses the issue of introducing an oyster other 
than the native eastern oyster. Section 26-224, entitled 
"Deposit of injurious substances in tidal waters or on oyster 
ground. Penalty," states that if a person willfully and knowingly 
deposits any oyster other than the species [Crass]Ostrea 
virginica" in tidal waters on oyster grounds, they will be fined 
up to $200 or receive six months in jail for each bushel of non­
native oyster deposited. This is also the same section which 
penalizes for the deposit of diseased oysters. Section 26-224a 
states that the Commissioner of Agriculture will adopt 
regulations regarding the import of shellfish from outside of 
Connecticut and requires prior notification to the Commissioner 
of the intent to import.
Rhode Island - Department of the Environment. 
Enviroaental Management Branch. Cfish and Wildlife Division)
It is a Department policy not to permit the introduction
of nonindigenous species nor to permit the importation of any
out-of-state seed oysters. There is one island, Block Island,
Whose waters do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Department
Where the importation of� virginica from Connecticut was
175 allowed against the advisement of the Department. 
Rhode Island statutes 20-10-5 and 20-10-12 involve the
Procedures for approval of aquaculture and the need for a p
ermit
175 Per 1 • t'on p Ganz Dept. of Coast
al Fisheries,· sona communica 1 , • , 
7/1/92. 
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to possess, import, and transport a species involved in
aquaculture. Section 20-10-5 requires the review of the
Commissioner of the Environmental Management Branch to de
termine
that the activities (including that of the species used
) will not
harm native fisheries or adjacent marine life. The C
ommissioner 
has authority under 20-10-12 to regulate the posses
sion, import,
and transport of those species used in aquaculture.
Massachusetts - Division of Marine 
Fisheries
It is the general policy of Massachusetts 
to prohibit the
introduction of exotic or nonindigenous species 
yet state
statutes give the Division the authority to i
ssue permits and set
the conditions of the introduction. These pe
rmits and conditions
are considered equal in power to regulation. 
A special permit is
required to "plant, transplant or introduce 
for the purpose of
transplating seed or adult oysters, into an
y waters or into any
shellfish areas within the commonwealth."
 It is doubtful that�
� would presently be considered for
 introduction in the state
of Massachusetts since in this same pub
lication,
des?ribed as an unwanted species.
176
Hew Hampshire -· Fish and Gge nepa
rtment
is 
Although New Hampshire does 
not have a commercial
industry and very few miles of coastl
ine, an introduction in
to
state waters is still a possibility
 and likely to affect
 its 
176. 322 CMR sec. 3.03; H
ickey, J. Michael. Re
 ional A
Concernin the Im ortat ·on 
of Shellfis , 1990
, P· 
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neighboring states. Under the New Hampshire Code of 
Administrative Rules, the Director is authorized to prohibit 
importation of any organism into "any waters under the 
jurisdiction of the state if deemed injurious to resources of the 
state.11
177 
New Hampshire statute 207 :15, entitled "Releasing Fish 
and Wildlife," states that it is illegal to introduce any "living 
fish, the fry or eggs thereof" without a permit from the 
Executive Director. Under 207 :14a, the Executive Director does 
have the authority to exempt certain species from the permit 
process. 
Maine - Department of Marine Resources 
Title 12, section 6071 of Maine's statutes prohibits the 
importation of live marine organisms without a· permit issued by 
the commissioner. Permits will only be issued if the organism in 
question is not deemed dangerous to indigenous marine life or its 
environment. A hearing will be held prior to issuing a permit 
for a nonindigenous organism which has not previously been 
considered. 
Maine also has a pathology program designed to improve 
the pathological assessment of shellfish to be introduced into 
state waters. Maine's oyster industry is dominated by the 
culturing of the non-native oyster, Ostrea edulis. This also 
178 
applies to stock to be exported. 
177. N.H. Regul. Fis.703.02.
178. Me. Rev. stat. Ann. tit. 12, sec. 6075.
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The following table offers a comparison of state and 






P�rmit :equi:ed f�r importing, possessing, or 
liberating live fish (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
s�c. 26-55)f permit required to transport live
fish for which a closed season is provided· 
penalty �or �iolation - $10 to $200 and/or' 
60 da¥s imprisonment (sec. 26-57); knowingily 
and willfully depositing or assisting in 
depositing any shellfish imported from another 
state and infected with communicable diseases or 
a�y oyster other tha� ostrea virginica in any 
tidal waters or dumping any material but that 
used in oyster beds; penalty for violation - not 
more than $200 or less than 6 months 
imprisonment for each bushel or fraction of 
material (sec. 26-224); Commissioner of 
Agriculture makes regulations as to "standards
and procedures for the depositing of shellfish 
imported from outside the state"; must be from an 
approved hatchery (sec. 26-224(c)) 
Unlawful to unload oysters taken from state
waters at any facilities outside state (DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 7, sec. 2111); all oysters taken from 
natural oyster beds must be deposited on leased 
shellfish grounds or on public tonging areas
(tit. 7, sec. 2112); prior written permission is
required from department in order to bring seed 
oysters into state for planting (tit. 7, 
sec. 2110) 
Permit required to import or introduce into
coastal waters any live marine organism if it 
will not endanger indigenous marine life or 
environment; penalty for violation i� emba�go or 
destruction if found of unsound quality, filthy, 
decomposed, or putrid substance, poisonous or
deleterious to health, or unsafe (ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. t�t. 12, sec. 6071); pat�ology pro9ram to
increase assessment of shellfish stock introduced 
for culturing purposes, culturing facilities and 
shell stock to be exported (tit. 12, sec. 6075) 
Department may adopt rul7s and regulation� 
prohibiting the importation of any shellfish
(MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. sec. 4-?43); 
permit required to import shellfish from waters
outside of state (MD. REGUL. os.02.os.01); 
importing shellfish prohibited except for �hose 
for replanting under DNR program; all_ s�erile 
shellfish must be from "a source certified by 
the appropriate agency" (sec. 21-346) 
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MASSACHUSETTS Import laws of shellfish for consumption 
(MASS._GEN. L�WS ANN. ch. 130, sec. 81); 
otherwise policy of Massachusetts is to 
issue pe1;111�ts for importatio� and specify t�e conditions of those permits (J. Michael 
Hickey, Senior Marine Fisheries Biologist, 
Div. of Mar. Fisheries, 1990 Regional Aspects 
Concerning the Importation of Shellfish, p. 3) 
HEW HAMPSHIRE $10 permit required for importing and releasing 
living fish, fry or eggs, and living wild animals 
(N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. sec. 207:14); prior to 
release, fish must be examined and certified by 
approved pathologist (sec. 211:63a) 
HEW JERSEY No oysters from other countries or states allowed 
without written permission; application shall 
state species, location from which they were 
immediately taken, original source, country to 
which they are native (N.J. STAT. ANN. sec. 
50:1-34); inspection and examination of species, 
location, and condition of oysters required prior 
to issuance of permit to plant oysters from 
outside of the state (sec. 50:1-35); charges -
sum necessary to defray cost of inspection, 
examination, and certification of foreign oysters 
(sec. 50:1-36) 
HEW YORK Shellfish from outside state shall not be 
transplanted without permit (N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. 
LAW sec. 13-0321 [Consol.]) 
POToMAc RIVER No specific section on Import/Export Requirements FISHERIES 
COMMISSION 
RHODE ISLAND Rules and regulations governing permits, taking, 
possession, sale, importation of plant or animal 
species used in aquaculture; penalty for 
violation is fine not greater than $500 and/or 
1 year lmprisonment; plant or animal may be 
forfeited (R.I. GEN. LAWS sec. 20-10-12) 
VIRGINIA Permit required to carry out of state any size or 
kind of oysters taken from the natural rocks, 
beds or shoals (VA, CODE ANN. sec. 28.1-89, 
28.1�96); importing for intent to place in waters 
must come from approved sta�es and_wa�ers, and bean approved species, and gain permission of 
Commissioner (sec. 28.1-183.2) 
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INTERHATIONAL TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND 
MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING SHELLFISH SANITATION 
Introduction 
An analysis of international treaties and agreements 
pertaining to the oyster industry is difficult due to the nature 
of official United States government publications. Although all
such agreements are to be assigned a unique number by the state 
Department, published in pamphlet form and then bound in annual 
volumes, since the early 1980's the State Department has been 
unable to provide timely and/or comprehensive publication of 
executive agreements. In 1989, for example, the State Department
was just completing publication of the 1984 Treaties and
International Acts series pamphlets. Furthermore, by regularly 
issuing blank numbers, the state Department makes it more
difficult to determine how many treaties remain unpublished. In
addition, a regular source of unofficial publications that
appeared monthly in Department of state Bulletins ceased with the
December 1989 issue.179 Even when supplemented by non­
governmental indexing services, any assessment of U.S.
international agreements must then allow for a degree of
uncertainty based upon the unavailability of accurate
documentation.
Treaties and Agree•ents 
179. Kavass M u s International Treaties T??�y: UnpublishedI • • • 89 111-V and Unnumbered Treaties Index, 19 , P· 
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A thorough search of official and supplemental indices in 
relevant subject areas (including oysters, shellfish, fish, 
fisheries, marine resources, conservation, and importation) 
reveals that most State Department treaties and agreements 
pertain to fishing rights in off-shore, coastal waters and 
limited geographic areas. The remainder of these subject areas 
are restricted to specific species of international concern. 
State Department referenced agreements pertaining 
specifically to the oyster industry are only three in number: a
1948 exchange of notes between Canada and the United States 
governing the sanitary certification of Canadian shippers in 
compliance with a manual of recommended practice approved by both 
the United States Public Health Service and the Canadian
Department of National Health and Welfare; 180 a 1962 agreement
with Japan requiring application of sanitation principles to the
production of all fresh or frozen shellfish intended for shipment
between ·the two countries and determined by the principles
adopted by the u.s. Public Health service;
181 and a 1972
agreement with the Republic of Korea again requiring compliance
With United states policies as determined by the National
Shellfish sanitation Program and applying to the production of
all fresh or frozen shellfish intended for shipment between the
two countries.182 None of these agreements does more than make
180- 6 Bevans 472.181· 13 UST 2452.182· 23 UST 3696.
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reference to United States Public Health Service policies or 
manuals and none provides definition of 'fresh' or 'frozen.' 
Agreements with relevance to the oyster industry seem to 
have been most often entered into as memoranda issued by the Food 
and Drug Administration. In 1974, the FDA published a list of 
all international agreements it had entered into since 1948 and 
noted that in the future the texts of all such agreements would 
be published in the Federal Register.
183 A background note to a 
1986 memorandum clarifies that all shellfish sanitation is 
administered by the FDA in cooperation with the states under the 
National Shellfish sanitation Program (NSSP).184 At the time of
the notice of intent to publish, the FDA had entered into two
formal agreements relevant to the shellfish industry. One with
Japan is described only as relating to sanitary control of
certain shellfish and a second with Canada is described as
I 
concerning cooperative efforts toward sanitary control of the 
shellfish industry.185 These agreements may very well be the
aforementioned Department of state agreements with Japan and 
Canada because no further details or dates were provided. It is 
unlikely that they are either more detailed or differ much in 





185. F d e .
No. 139, 10/3/74, p. 35697.Reg. Vol. 39, 
No. 216, 11/7/86, p. 40518.
::i: ��i: �!: No. 139, 10/3/74, p. 35697.
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The FDA has made public seven memoranda of understanding 
since the 1974 notice between the United States and other 
countries which are relevant to the oyster industry. In each 
case, a corresponding agency in the foreign country, under 
consideration, is recognized as an active participant in the NSSP 
and is required to comply with NSSP policies and procedures for 
harvesting, processing, transporting, and labelling shellfish. 
Background notes stress that the NSSP is considered the mechanism 
for insuring uniform sanitation and administrative guidelines for 
the importation of all shellfish into the United States. 
The earliest memoranda of understanding are with Iceland 
in 1978,186 New Zealand in 1980,




89 These memoranda allow the respective
countries to offer for export to the United States both fresh and
frozen shellfish. The term 'fresh frozen' is frequently used,
yet, in no cases are the terms 'fresh', 'frozen' or 'fresh
frozen' ·defined. Each memorandum requires compliance with the
NSSP guidelines and sometimes also with the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetics Act the u.s. Public Health Service Act, the U.S.' 
Fair Packaging and Labelling Act, and/or other relevant
statutes. concern for human health is the primary consider
ation
in each as is indicated by the required testing of 
samples for
indicator bacteria or pathogens, heavy metals and 
contaminants,
186- 30 UST 2873.
187• 32 UST 4545.
188. 30 UST 3764.
189· 34 UST 1527.
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as well as a requirement that harvesting take place only in areas 
that meet NSSP approved water quality and marine biotoxin 
standards. 
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FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS REGARDING SHELLFISH SANITATION 
Introduction 
"In the world of seafood, molluscan shellfish represent 
the single greatest hazard to health.11190 The National Shellfish
Sanitation Program (NSSP) has its basis in the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act. There is a 
current emphasis to�ards increasing the effectiveness of the NSSP 
demonstrated by increased federal funding. Thomas J. Billy, 
Director of the Office of Seafood within the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), summed up the motivation for this new 
commitment to quality seafood when he stated, 
[w]e are past the time to continue to tolerate improperly 
classified harvesting waters; the illegal �arve�ting of 
shellfish; the bad name that unsafe shellfish gives to 
the rest of the seafood industry; and the continuing push 
and shove between t�91states, the industry and the Federal government. 
National Shellfish Sanitation Program
As outlined in the FDA FY91-92 Seafood Plan, the National 
Shellfish sanitation Program consists of two major programs: the
Voluntary certification program and the mandatory inspection
program. 
1) The volunta�y certification program is co­
administered by the FDA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
190. 
191. 
Billy, Thomas J., Director, office.of seafood, �o
 the NFI
46th Annual convention, Board of Directors Meeti
ng, New 
Orleans, LA, 11/2/91. 
Bill Th J Di'rector Office of Seafood, 
to the NFIy' omas . ' ' . t M t. g New 46th Annual convention, Board of Direc ors e
e in , 
Orleans, LA, 11/2/91. 
us 
Administration. This program provides an FDA mark to indicate 
participant status; the FDA 'seal of approval' is considered an 
extra assurance of quality in shellfish marketing. This program 
currently is in the process of expansion. This expansion will 
include efforts to certify and approve foreign inspection 
programs, the development of a retail inspection program, and the 
development of a molluscan shellfish certification program which 
will track the shellfish from harvest waters to marketplace. 
2) The mandatory inspection program is administered by
the FDA and is responsible for the inspection of all shellfish
processors to insure compliance with standards of biological 
quality, decomposition standards, and to inspect against economic 
violations (water glazing, mislabeled products, illegal color 
additives and phosphate inclusion). current efforts in the 
expansion of this program include the development of tests and
standards for heavy metal contamination in shellfish.
'The current seafood program plan addresses four control
points: water, domestic industry, imports, and consumption. Each
of these control points are further broken down into
subcategories: potential hazards, traditional program, and
current actions.
The waterborne potential hazards include bacterial
contamination (especially in raw or under-cooked molluscan
shellfish), viruses (largely from sewerage in the water and
 its






The traditional programs include the cooperative
state/federal/industry NSSP. The traditional NSSP has addressed
the issues of guidelines for growing waters and inspection of
processors and shippers. Recommendations to the NSSP are made by
the Interstate Shellfish Sanitation Council (ISSC). Current
efforts are being made to increase cooperation between the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the independent
state agencies in order to increase the efficiency of state
patrol activities. The NSSP also provides technical assistance
to the state agencies, sets baseline levels for contamination and
sponsors research in the continuing development of better testing 
methods and increased knowledge of possible contaminants, and 
their effects.
Recently conflicts were uncovered between the ISSC and 
the FDA regarding proposed changes for the NSSP 'Manual of
Operations'. These concerns were identified, discussed, and
resolved at national meetings in May and July of 1992. The
Shellfish sanitation Branch of the FDA was able to present and
support twenty-seven issues intended to toughen the NSSP,
including the establishment of uniform safety criteria,
sanitation issues and {ncreased sanctions for non-compliance.
Conflicts with the rssc were resolved in the planned revision of
the 'Manual of Operations'. These revisions will occur according
to the following format: Parts r and II of the current 'Manual
 of
Operations' will be condensed into one concise volume (schedu
led
to be available in the Fall of 1992). Additionally, a
 task




of the 'Manual of Operations' as a 'Model Ordinance' which will
serve to be a simplified synopsis of the compliance section of
the Manual. These updates in administrative procedures should
 be
completed in the next three to four weeks.
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Current actions include: the completion of a
 review of
all shellfish growing areas and a 100% level of ins
pection of all
shellfish processors in the country; the devel
opment of new
standards of contamination for shellfish and the
 development of
procedures to test for the presence of specif
ic viral and
bacterial contaminants. Further actions i
nclude a survey of all
federally regulated waters for the presence
 of natural toxins and
the updating of all seafood inspectors on 
current regulations.
The plans for the domestic indu
stry include additional
safeguards against time/temperature 
abuse, microbiological
contamination (after reaching the pr
ocessors), chemical
contamination (processor induced), 
botulism, and economic
adulteration. These hazards will be
 controlled by increase
d
mandatory inspection levels. In the 
retail arena, the FDA
currently is attempting to increas
e its support role f
or the
state and local inspection program
s.
Those state agencies re
sponsible for the san
itation of
shellfish are represented below, 
in table form, in or
der to
facilitate comparisons by the 
reader. The first 
table
The second
illustrates the agencies invol
ved with sanitatio
n.








table emphasizes the _agency responsible for enforcement. The 
final table depicts state laws relevant to the sanitary 














STATE SANITATION REGULATION AGENCIES 
Department of Agriculture/Aquaculture Division with 
assistance from the Department of Health and local 
health agencies and Town Shellfish Commissions
(CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 26-192e; 19a-96) 
Department of Natural Resources and Environmental 
Control - Division of Fish and Wildlife with the 
Delaware State Board of Health and empowered 
to "prevent and control the spread of 
all diseases that are dangerous to the public 
health;" no specific code to address seafood or 
shellfish (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, sec. 1902a; tit. 
16 sec. 122-3 a,b,f,j) 
Department of Marine Resources (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 1, sec. 71, 72) 
Department of the Environment and the Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene (MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN.
sec. 4-1106, 1109) 
Department of Fisheries, Wildlife and Environmental 
Enforcement, Division of Marine Fisheries and/or 
the Department of Public Health with the Department 
of Environmental Protection (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 130, sec. 74) 
Director of Fish and Game (the sale, inspection, and 
processing of marine species), the Advisory Council 
on Shore Fisheries, Department of Health and Human
Services (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. sec. 211:62, 211:60-
61, 211:63a) 
Department of Environmental Protection and Energy,
State Department of Health (N.J. STAT. ANN. 
sec. 8:13-1.2, 58:24-1) 
Departm�nt of Environmental Conservation (N.Y.
ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW sec. 13-0101, 13-0307, 13-0319
[Consol.]) 
Marine Fisheries council, Department of Health
(R.I. GEN. LAWS sec. 20-3-2e, 42-35-3b, 21-14-2)
state Health commissioner and Commi�s�oner of
Marine Resources shall enforce proyisions and
regulations and examine all shellfish at an
y 
















STATE SANITATION ENFORCEMENT 
Commissioner of Agriculture appoints power to 
Shellfish Police (as deputies), also local 
enforcement agencies (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 
26-206, 19a-100) 
Officers of the Division of Fish and Wildlife and/ 
or Officers of the Board of Health and/or any 
other "peace officers" (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 
sec. 122-3, tit. 7 sec. 1902a, 1907) 
Marine Patrol Officers (Dept. of Marine Resources) 
and any Sheriff's Deputy or Wildlife Warden (ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 sec. 6025) 
Natural Resources Police Force (MD. NAT. RES. CODE 
ANN. sec. 4-1205) 
Division of Law Enforcement of its [department's] 
determination (MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 130, sec. 
74) 
Conservation Officers have authority granted to 
Public Health Officers and Agents for the purposes 
of enforcing laws pertaining to marine organisms 
(N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. sec. 143:4, 143:20, 143:23-28) 
Division of Shell Fisheries, "right to arrest on 
view" (N.J. STAT. ANN. sec. 50:1-13) 
Conservation Officers (N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW sec. 
13-0101, 13-0307 [Consol.]) 
Enforcement duty of director appointed and powers
of agents of director (R.I. GEN. LAWS sec. 21-14-11,
21-14-13, 21-14-14) 
Grants power to officers for enforcement under
authority of state �ealth Commissioner and 
commissioner of Marine Resources (VA. CODE ANN.















SANITARY CERTIFICATION OF GROUNDS/CLOSINGS 
Inspection and certification of oyster grounds; 
regu�ar .and emergen?Y closings responsibility ofCommissioner of Agriculture and consultation from 
Commissioner of Health (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 
26-192c, 26-192e) 
No laws to address sanitary closings of oyster 
(shellfish) grounds
Inspection, certification, and closing of beds, 
including emergency closings (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 12, sec. 6172) 
Inspection and closure of beds (MD. NAT. RES. CODE 
ANN. sec. 4-742) 
Inspections, closings, and emergency closings 
(MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 130, sec. 74-74A) 
Emergency closing of grounds - Department of 
Health and Human Services (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
sec. 211:63a) 
Inspection, certification, and emergency closing 
of beds - Department of Health (N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. 
sec. 58:24-1 through 58:24-7) 
Sanitary surveys to pe�i?dic�lly c�eck orster 
grounds to insure certification - including 
emergency closings (N.Y. ENVIR. CONSERV. LAW 
sec. 13-0307 [Consol.]); shellfish �hall not be
treated by processes known a� drinking, 
floating, plumping, or swelling; may be 
retained in water (sec. 13-0309) 
Closings, emergency clo�ings by Marine Fisheries 
council; emergency closings by Department of 
Health _(R.I. GEN. LAWS sec. 20-3-5, 42-35-3b) 
Provides for the examination of 9rounds,
condemnation, and emergency closing of oyster 
grounds (VA. CODE ANN. sec. 28.1-176, 28.1-177,
28.1-178) 
FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS IMPACTING THE NORTHEAST 
UNITED STATES OYSTER INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
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From a legal perspective, fisheries management, 
particularly the management of migratory species, raises 
questions about federal and state governmental relationships. 
The history of fisheries management in the United states 
illustrates a continued tension between the regulatory authority 
of the states and that of the federal government. The management 
of the oyster fishery, virtually devoid of migratory issues 
outside of oyster spawning capabilities, would presumably pose 
fewer conflicts over regulatory jurisdiction. That, however, 
has not been the case. In fact, considerable Supreme Court
jurisprudence regarding states' rights over marine resources
involves oysters.
193
The Basis for state Authority: The Fiction of state ownership
I 
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The Concept of OWnership 
The early jurisprudence went so far as to speak of 
"ownership" of marine resources, and gave states reason to 
believe ownership was vested solely in them. In the seminal case 
of Martin v. Waddell,
194 
the United States Supreme Court held 
that the dominion and property in navigable waters, the fish 
therein, ·and the submerged lands beneath were owned by the state 
in trust for the state's citizens. In that case, an individual 
claimed ownership of oyster beds beneath navigable waters in New
Jersey. He based his claim on a series of succeeding conveyances 
of the beds originating with royal charters granted by King
Charles II to his brother, the Duke of York, in 1664 and 1674. 
The Court found that the King held the country granted by the 
charter only in his regal character, as representative of the
nation. Furthermore the charter was executed for the purpose of 
I 
establishing a colony and the King manifested no intention in the
letters-patent to grant any individual exclusive right to the
fishery. Rather, the King intended the Duke his heirs and
assigns to stand in regal shoes, holding the property in trust
for the colony.· The American Revolution, the court held, vested
that public trust in the states, subject only to whatever rights
were surrendered to the federal government by the Constituti
on.
194• 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
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Thus, the Court held that the state of New Jersey "owned," in 
public trust for its citizens, the submerged lands involved and 
the navigable waters over them, including "shell-fish" and 
"floating fish." 
In 1845, the court took the opportunity to determine, in 
part, what rights were surrendered to the federal government by 
the Constitution. In Pollard's Lessee v. Hagen,195 the Court was
asked to decide the effect of a stipulation concerning navigable 
waters in the congressional act admitting Alabama into the Union. 
The Court ruled that the act conveyed no more power to the 
federal government than the government possessed over navigable 
waters in other states. Moreover, the court held that the
Constitution never granted to the United States the shores of 
navigable waters or the soils beneath navigable waters. Instead, 
those lands were reserved for the states. 
Energized by these decisions empowering the states with 
ownership, the states developed statutes to protect their
resources. In the face of challenges, the states defended on the
basis of their ownership and the courts continued to uphold
states' rights even in light of potentially conflicting federal
196statutes and constitutional strictures. In
for instance, the supreme court upheld a Maryland statute
Prohibiting the taking of oysters by any method other tha
n
tonging where enforcement of the statute resulted in t
he seizure
195. 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
196. 59 U.S. 71 (1855).
135 
of a federally licensed vessel. Specifically, a boat owned by a
Pennsylvanian was impounded by the sheriff of Anne Arundel County 
for dredging oysters in Maryland waters of the Chesapeake Bay. 
The vessel's owner argued that the statute was repugnant to the
constitutional provisions of the Commerce Clause,
197 Admiralty
Clause,198 and the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
199 The
Court focused on the statutory issue, essentially a question of 
pre-emption: may a state impose its own statutory requirements 
in conflict with the federal enrollment and licensing laws? In
resolving the issue, the court returned to its prior holdings in
Martin v. Waddell and Pollard 's Lessee, that each state 
exclusively owns whatever soil is below the low water mark al
ong





this soil is held by the state, not only su
bject
to but in some sense, in trust for, the en
joyment
of certain public rights, among which is 
the 
common liberty of taking fish, as well 
as shell-fish 
and floating fish. [citation omitted ] 
The St�te holds
the propriety of this soil for the con
servation of 
the public rights of the fishery the
reon, and may 
regulate the modes of that enjoyment
 so as to prevent
the destruction of the fishery. In
 other words, 
it may forbid all such acts as wou
ld r�nder the 
public right less valuable or de
str?Y it altoge�her.
This power results fr�m �he _ow�er
ship of the soil, 
from the legislative Jurisdictio
n of the State over 
it, and fro� its gyty to preser
ve unimpaired those 
Art. I, sec. a, u.s. Const. gives 
Congress the power to 
regulate comerce with foreign nat
ions, among the several
states and with Indian tribes. . .. 
Art III 2 us Const. dec
lares that the Judicial. , sec. , • • f 
powers of the united states shall
 extend to cases o 
admiralty and maritime jurisdict
ion. . . 
Art IV 2 us Const. stat
es that citizens o� �ach 
state sha��
c
be �ntitiea to all pri
vileges and immunities of
the several states. 
I 
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public uses for which the soil is held.200 (emphasis
added). 
In light of this right of ownership and duty, the Court found the 
Maryland statute valid despite its interference with the federal 
enrollment and licensing process. The state statute, according 
to the Court, was designed 
to prevent the destruction of oysters within the 
waters of the State, by the use of particular 
instruments in taking them. It does not touch 
the subject of the common liberty of taking oysters 
save for the purpose of guarding it from injury, to 
whoms�ever �01may belong, and by whomsoever it maybe enJoyed. 
The Court specifically declined to address a number of crucial, 
related issues, including the ability of a state to exclude non­
residents from its fisheries, the ability of the federal 
government to grant foreigners the right to partake of a state's 
fisheries, and the general limits of the trust upon which a state 
holds the resources or its power to define and control that 
trust. 
The Court was forced to decide the validity of a statute 
barring non-residents from a state's fisheries in the 1876 case
of Mccready v. virginia.202 Mccready was a Maryland resident
fined five hundred dollars for violating a statute prohibiting
non-residents from catching or planting oysters in Virginia
waters. The court ruled that a state's title to the beds of all 
tide-waters within its jurisdiction are held subject only to "the 





paramount right of navigation, the regulation of which, in 
respect to foreign and inter-state commerce, has been granted to 
the United States.11
203 
The Court went on to say:
There has been . . . no such grant of power over 
the fisheries. These remain under the exclusive 
control of the State, which has consequently 
the right, in its discretion, to appropriate 
its tide-waters and their beds to be used by 
its people as a common for taking and 
cultivating fish so far as it m2�
4
be done 
without obstructing navigation. 
The Court thus rejected McCready's argument that 
the statute violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
205
That clause, the Court found, does not invest citizens of one
state with any interest in common property of the citizens of
another state. "The planting of oysters in the soil covered by
water owned in common by the people of the state," the Court
reasoned, "is not different in principle from that of planting
corn upon dry land held in the same way." The purposes of both
are the same and "if the state . . .  can grant to its own
citizens the exclusive use of dry lands, we see no reason why it
may not do the same in respect to such as are covered by
water."206
The Court also _rejected McCready's Commerce Clause
argument on grounds that no commerce was implicated under 
the
facts of the case. There was only cultivation of oyste
rs at
203. 95 U.S. 3 95 (1876).
204. 94 U.S. 3 95 (1876).
205. Art. IV, sec. 2, U.S. Const.
206, 94 U.S. 3 96 (1876).
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issue, not the transportation of commodities. That is, in the 
Court's view, oysters did not become commodities subject to free 
trade under the Commerce Clause until they were harvested or 
otherwise put into trade. 
The Supreme Court perpetuated the concept of state 
ownership throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. In Manchester v. Massachusetts,207 for example, the
Court again upheld enforcement of a state statute prohibiting 
certain fishing methods against a federally licensed vessel. The
Massachusetts statute at issue banned particular techniques for 
netting fish in Buzzard's Bay. Arthur Manchester was found in 
violation of the statute for purse seining menhaden. The Supreme 
Court reiterated its prior position that as to the regulation of
commerce or navigation (which also finds its basis in the federal
government's right to regulate commerce) the authority of the
United States is paramount, but otherwise the states have
authority. Hence, there was no conflict created by the statute
that served to pre-empt state authority, including the federal
enrollment and licensing laws. under the principles enunciated
in Smith v. Maryland, the Massachusetts statute was not repugnant
to the Constitution or the laws of the United states.
208
The Manchester court, however, did begin marking the
Parameters of a standard by which the validity of state statutes
Should be measured. The court upheld the Buzzard's Bay fishing
��7- 139 U.S. 240 (1891).
S. 139 U.S. 263 (1891).
139 
statute on grounds that 1) it was confined to waters within the
state's jurisdiction, 2) that it was passed for the preservation
of fish, and 3) that it did not discriminate in favor of
Massachusetts residents and against citizens of other states.209
These grounds continue to bear heavily on the test for evaluating
the validity of state fishery regulations.
Importantly, the Manchester Court specifically declined 
to address whether or not Congress had the power, presumably 
under the Commerce or Admiralty Clauses, to pass legislation 
usurping the state's control over the fishery within the marginal 
sea. The Court hinted that such authority existed when it stated 
that in the absence of affirmative action by Congress, such as 
its action to assert control over ship pilots in state waters, 
the right to control such fisheries must remain with the 
state.210The implication was that congress could usurp control
over states' marginal seas through affirmative actions to do so.
The concept of state ownership of wildlife resources 
P h t. t 
211 er aps reached its height in Geer v. connec 1cu In .G.e.il, 
at least partially on the basis of states' rights to limit use of
game it owns, the court upheld a Connecticut statute prohibiting
the transportation out of state of game killed within
Connecticut.
The supreme court unmasks ownership as a r,egal ficti
on
���: 139 U.S. 265 (1891).
2 
139 u.s. 266 (1891). 
overruled by Huahes v. Oklahoma, 9911. 161 U.S. 519 (1896), - � -
s.ct. 1727 (1979). 
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State regulatory authority under the guise of ownership 
began waning in 1919. That year in Missouri v. Holland,212 the
Supreme Court blocked Missouri's attempt to enjoin federal 
enforcement of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Missouri argued 
that the federal statute, a result of an international treaty, 
violated rights reserved to the state of Missouri under the Tenth 
�mendment and violated Missouri's pecuniary rights in migratory 
birds within its boundaries. The argument asserted that the 
federal government, on the basis of the cases cited above, did 
not have authority to regulate intra-state game management 
directly. Furthermore, the federal government could not do 
indirectly, under its constitutional treaty-making powers what it 
could not do directly. The court rejected that argument with a
212. 252 U.S. 416 (1919) •
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particular sympathy for the national interest in the exercise of 
federal regulatory authority to preserve migratory resources 
where states either cannot or will not act to affect that 
preservation.213
Here a national interest of very nearly the 
first magnitude is involved. It can be protected 
only by national action in concert with that of 
another power. The subject-matter is only 
transitorily within the state and has no permanent 
habitat therein. But for the treaty and the statute 
there soon might be no birds for any powers to 
deal with. We see nothing in the Constitution that 
?ompels the Govern,I�t to sit by while a food supply
is cut off . . . .  
Clearly, at least with respect to migratory wildlife that 
constitute food sources, the court found a basis for federal 
intervention. Whether the same rationale applies to oysters, 
which are virtually non-migratory and on which there is an ever 
smaller reliance as a food source, is a speculative proposition. 
In the first place, because oysters are non-migratory, 
exploitation or failure to preserve the resource by one state 
carries a fixed risk to whatever national interest exists in the 
national oyster fishery. That is, failure by one state to
Preserve the oyster fishery does not jeopardize the national
oyster fishery except to the extent that it makes other states'
oysters more valuable and thus subject to greater fishing
Pressures. secondly, oysters grow on subaqueous bottoms which,
as we have seen, traditionally fall within the regulatory purview
213. 252 U.S. 435 (1919).




of the states. Although the Holland Court said that "[i]t is not
sufficient to rely upon the States," it was referring
specifically to reliance upon state preservation of migratory
fowl where "[ t]he reliance is vain."215 The Court went on to say
"were it otherwise, the question is whether the United States is
forbidden to act.11 216 That is, if the reliance on the states
were not · in vain, the issue of the federal government' s right to
intervene would be in question. There should be minimal risk in
national reliance· on a particular state preserving an 
economically important non-migratory resource. Reliance likely 
would not be in vain. Therefore, the federal government' s right 
to intervene in a state ' s preservation of its oyster fishery is
questionable. 
To reiterate, the court based its decision largely on the
migratory nature of the game at issue in Holland. Indeed, the
ability and natural tendency of the protected birds to migrate
provided· the ammunition for the court to attack the concept of
state ownership.
No doubt it is true that as between a State and 
its inhabitants the state may regulate the
killing and sale of such b�rds, but.it does not
follow that its authority is excl�sive of 
paramount powers. To put the claim of the St�te 
upon title is to lean upon a slender reed. Wild 
birds are not in the possession of any?ne ; and 
possession is the beginning of ow�ershi�- The 
whole foundation of the stat7' s .rights �s the
presence within their jurisdiction of birds that 
215. 25 2 U.S. 435 ( 1919). 
216. 25 2 U.S. 435 ( 1919). 
I 
yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in 
anoth217state and in a week a thousand milesaway. 
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In 1948, a series of South Carolina statutes imposing 
different licensing and shipping burdens on resident and non­
resident shrimpers gave the Supreme Court yet another opportunity 
to impinge upon the concept of state ownership. One statute 
required non-residents to pay $2,500 to license each shrimp boat, 
as opposed to a $25 per boat licensing fee for in-state 
residents. Another statute required shrimp boats fishing within 
South Carolina's three-mile marginal sea to dock, unload, pack, 
and pay state taxes in a south Carolina port before shipping and 
transporting the shrimp to another state. Non-resident shrimpers 
sued to enjoin enforcement of the statutes on grounds that they 
violated the constitutional provisions of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. south Carolina, in turn, argued that its 
ownership of the shrimp in its marginal sea insulated the state 
from operation of the clause. 
In Toomer v. witse11,
218 the court found that there was
no conflict between south Carolina's regulatory scheme and any
assertion of federal authority. Thus, given the state's
sufficient interest in'the shrimp fishery within its marginal
sea, it could exercise its police powers to preserve and regul
ate
that fishery within the parameters of the Constitu
tion. The
Court held, however, that the discrepancy betwee
n resident and
217. 252 U.S. 434 (1919).
218. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
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non-resident �icensing fees violated the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause. Likewise, the court held that the statute 
requiring all shrimp boats to dock and ship from South Carolina 
ports imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce violative of 
the Commerce Clause.219 Most importantly the Court stated: "the
whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but 
a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its 
people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the 
exploitation of an important resource.11 220 
The Court's approach to state ownership in Toomer, if not 
a complete rejection of the traditional basis of state regulatory 
authority, at least signaled a serious threat. The threat to 
state regulatory authority imposed by Toomer was particularly
potent as applied to, once again, migratory living resources.
The Court distinguished the statutes in Toomer from the statute
in Mccready v. Virginia on grounds that 1) the
related· only to oysters, which "would remain in Virginia until
removed by man," whereas the Toomer statutes involved "free
swimming fish which might migrate through the waters of several
states,11 221 and 2) the Mccready facts apply to inland waters,
Whereas Toomer involved south Carolina's control over the
marginal sea.222
219. Art. I, sec. 8, u.s. Const.
220. 334 U.S. 4 02 (1948).
221. 334 U.S. 4 01-4 02 (1948).
222. 334 U.S. 4 01-4 02 (1948).
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In the historical description of the jurisprudence of 
state versus federal regulatory authority, perhaps the key 
distinction relates to a state's interest in, rather than 
ownership of, living marine resources. The Holland Court pointed 
out that the concept of state ownership of wildfowl was a fiction 
because, with respect to migratory species, states lack the 
crucial indicia of ownership -- possession. The presence of a 
school of fish in a state's waters does not vest the state with 
ownership, only an interest in the preservation of that school 
for the use of its citizens. The means by which that state 
asserts its interest must be based on preservation and not simply 
on exclusion of non-residents or on the benefits to its own 
economy to the detriment of interstate commerce. 
The courts also drew a distinction between inshore and 
offshore waters. with respect to waters outside of each state's
jurisdictional boundaries, the state's approach to regulation had
been to steer clear of interference with affirmative regulatory
actions by congress. The authority upon which to regulate
inshore waters remained somewhat unclear.
Stemming from the very earliest cases, the court's also
continued to observe some distinction, though not always stated
this way, between shellfish and floating fish. This was largely
a distinction between non-migratory and migratory marine
resources. Because states had possession of subaq
ueous lands,
the states also came closer to owning resources, su
ch as




The Revival of state ownership 
After the Supreme Court had all but eliminated the 
concept of ownership from the state's vernacular, Congress passed 
the Submerged Lands Act (SLA) in 1953.223 The Act vested in
states "title to and ownership of . . .  natural resources" within 
the states' navigable waters and the lands beneath them.224 On
the one hand, the act specifically reserved to the federal 
government all powers previously observed stemming from "the 
constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national 
defense, and internatlonal affairs.11 225 On the other hand, the 
act granted states the "right and power to manage, administer,
lease, develop, and use" the natural resources, including fish,
Shrl.. . . 1 l'f 
226mp, oysters, and other marine anima 1 e. 
Not only was this return to the concept of ownership a 
reversal of the direction taken by the courts, so to was the
notion that if there was ownership of resources in the
territorial sea at all that it was held by the states. The
Supreme Court had already intimated that the federal government
had primary, if not exclusive, authority over the marginal sea.
In Skiriotes v. Florida, 2
27 dealing with the application of
Florida criminal law to'the offshore sponge fishery, the Court
held that the exercise of state criminal jurisdiction to preserve
223. 43 USCA sec. 1301-1315.224. 43 USCA sec. 13ll(a).225. 43 USCA sec. 1314(a).226. 43 USCA sec. 1301.227. 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
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marine resources in offshore waters was permissible absent
conflict with any act of Congress. There, too, the Court must
have been implying that Congress had pre-emptive authority if i
t
chose to exercise it. 
Even more forcefully, in united States v. California
,228
the Court found that the federal government was t
he first and
only governmental body to claim the right to con
trol the three­
mile marginal sea. Thus, the federal governmen
t and not the
state of California controlled the regulatio
n of oil drilling off
the California coast. Returning to its d
ecision in Skiriotes,
the Court clarified that the permitted 
application of state
criminal jurisdiction in that case was 
limited to the legitimate
exercise of state police powers to re
gulate the conduct of
states' citizens absent conflicting 
federal law. In essence, not
only did Skiriotes imply a right o
f federal pre-emption, it
strictly limited the exercise of s
tate police powers at sea
.
Despite these supreme
 court decisions, Congress
painted with a broad brush, swee
ping the spectre of sta
te
ownership back into the picture. 
At least, that is what Ea
st
Coast states argued in 1969 in 
a controversy with th
e United
States over ownership and right
s to oil resources i
n the three­
mile marginal sea and beyond. 
That case reached t
he Supreme
. 229 Th 
Court in 1975 in the case of Qn
ited states v. Maine.
e 
Court reaffirmed its decision
 in United states y. Cal
ifornia
228. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
229. 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
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explaining that Congress in fact "embraced rather than
repudiated11 230 the underpinnings of the California case.
Specifically, the Court concluded that the congressional grant of
state authority in the SLA was "in no wise inconsistent with 
current paramount national power.11
231 Instead, the grant was
made in recognition that the California case held that the United 
States had power to decide in the first instance who could 
regulate natural resources within the marginal sea. Therefore, 
Congress merely granted riparian states some rights to the 
resources subject to the paramount powers of the United States. 
United States v. Maine thus asserted that the grant of state 
authority in the SLA was limited by the primary authority of the 
federal government on national sovereignty grounds. 
230. 420 U.S. 524 ( 1 975).
231. 420 U.S. 524 ( 1 975).
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State Rights After Douglas v. Seacoast Products,
Inc. and the Fishery conservation and Management Act of 1976
Two events significant to questions of states' rights
over living marine resources occurred in the mid-1970's. First,
in Douglas v. Seacoast Products. Inc.,232 the Supreme court again
rejected the notion that the SLA revived state ownership of
resources that the states never owned in the first place.
Second, Congress passed the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act (FCMA),233 which created a comprehensive federal scheme of
fisheries management, yet left states with virtual autonomy over
their territorial waters. In Douglas the court concluded that
Congress did not intend to give states absolute free reign over
live territorial natural resources any more than it intended
states to have absolute authority over oil or min�ral resources
under the SLA. That issue was decided by the Court in United
States v. Maine. Douglas addressed the validity of two Virginia
statutes. one statute restricted the issuance of commercial
fishing licenses to u.s. citizens and the other prohibited non­
residents of Virginia from catching menhaden in Virginia waters
of the Chesapeake Bay. seacoast Products owned and operated
federally licensed ves�els previously qualified to fish in
Virginia waters. As a Delaware subsidiary of a British
corporation, the company was adversely affected by both statutes.
Seacoast Products challenged the state statutes on grounds that
232. 431 U.S. 265 (1977).233. 16 USCA sec. 1801-1882.
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they were pre-empted by federal enrollment and licensing laws and
that they violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Supreme Court avoided the constitutional issue,
deciding the case instead on the pre-emption argument. The Court
relied heavily on Gibbons v. Ogden,
234 which invalidated
discriminatory state regulation of shipping as applied to
federally licensed vessels in the "coasting trade." The only
distinction between vessels licensed in Gibbons and those
licensed in Douglas was the purpose for which they were licensed. 
In Gibbons the vessels were licensed in the "coasting trade" and 
in Douglas, Seacoast Products' ships were licensed in the 
"mackerel fishery" (which was interpreted to cover menhaden). As 
in Gibbons, where the court held that states must allow federally
licensed vessels to engage in the trade for which they were
licensed, the Douglas court held that Virginia must allow non­
resident vessels to take fish from Virginia waters because those
vessels ·were licensed for that purpose. In short, non-resident
Vessels licensed for fishing were entitled to the same privileges
as v· · • 235 1rg1n1a vessels. The court concluded that the Virginia 
statutes were in conflict with federal law and must fall under
the Supremacy Clause. The court further explained that this
236decision was consistent with smith v. Maryland and Ukl���CX& 
Y.., Massachusetts,
237 which together "spelled out the negative
234. 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
235. 43 1 U.S. 281 (1977).
236. 18 How. 71 (1855).
237. 139 U.S. 240 (1891).
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implication of Gibbons: that States may impose upon federal 
licensees reasonable, non-discriminatory conservation and 
environmental protection measures otherwise within their police 
powers."238
Importantly, the Douglas decision is rooted in Congress' 
authority to regulate the taking of fish in state waters.
Federally licensed vessels are entitled to the privilege to do
that for which they were licensed because they were granted that
right by a body with authority to do so -- Congress. This is
where Douglas departs from early Supreme Court jurisprudence on 
the interplay between state and federal authority to regulate 
natural resources in state waters. Never before had the Court
expressly stated the existence of a federal power to pre-empt
state regulatory authority over in-shore waters. The Court
founded the notion on the Commerce Clause.
While appellant may be correct in arguing that 
at earlier times in our history there was some 
doubt whether Congress had power under the 
Commerce Clause to regulate the taking.of fish 
in state waters there can be no question today 
that such power
1
exists ���re there is some effect 
on interstate commerce. 
Nevertheless, a state may still mandate non-discriminatory, non­
conflicting conservation· regulations legitimately within the
scope of their police powers.
Virginia argued that congress intended only that federal 
licenses would allow non-resident vessels to navigate Virginia
238. 431 U.S. 277 (1977).239. 431 U.S. 281-282 (1977).
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waters and not to take fish therein. As noted, the court 
dismissed that argument. Virginia resorted, in turn, to the SLA, 
arguing that it and prior Supreme Court precedent240 recognized 
state ownership rights in fish swimming in state waters. Because 
the state owned the fish, Virginia contended, it could exclude 
federal licensees from taking them. The Court dismissed this 
argument as well: 
The SLA does give the States "title," "ownership," 
and "the right and power to manage, administer, 
lease, develop, and use" the lands beneath the 
oceans and natural resources in the waters within 
state territorial jurisdiction. [citation omitted] 
But when Congress made this grant pursuant to the 
Property Clause of the Constitution [citation 
omitted], it expressly retained for the United 
States "all constitutional powers of regulation 
and control" over these lands and waters "for 
purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, 
and international affairs. [citations omitted] 
Since the grant of the fishery licenses was made 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause power, [citation 
omitted] the Submerged ���ds Act did not alter 
its pre-emptive effect. 
The Court thus established that Congress has authority, under the 
commerce power, to pre-empt state regulation of natural resources 
in state waters and that it had done so under the federal 
licensing statute. Those statutes, moreover, were not in 
conflict with the SLA.
240. 
241. 
See,�, Mccready v. Virginia, 94 u.s. 
("there has been . . .  no . .  • grant of
391, 395 (1877) 
power over the 
remain under the fisheries [to the United states]. These
exclusive control of the state • • · "); 
Massachusetts, 139 u.s. 240, 258-60 (1891); Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 u.s. 519 (1896). 
431 U.S. 283-284 (1977). 
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The Court went on to amplify its position on state 
ownership of resource, reiterating that the ownership language of
the early Supreme Court cases "must be understood as no more than
a 19th-century legal fiction.11 242 "Under modern analysis," the 
Court stated, "the question is simply whether the state has 
exercised its police power in conformity with the federal laws 
and Constitution.11 243 In essence, then, the proper analysis for 
determining the scope of a state's authority under the SLA or 
similar statute must be virtually the flip side of the analysis 
for determining federal authority under the Commerce Clause.244
Although the Douglas Court characterized the validity of 
state regulation as a matter of conformity with federal laws slllii 
the Constitution, the court seems to feel more comfortable 
rejecting state regulations that conflict with a statute passed 
under the Commerce clause rather than rejecting it on Commerce 
Cl 245 ause grounds alone. Apparently, for federalism and
separation of powers purposes, the court would prefer that 
Congress offer a clear expression of its intent on the extent to 
Which state regulatory authority is pre-empted. 
The second event of major significance during the mid-





431 U.S. 284 (1977). 








3 �;, (;.:�e<;;�:rictions imposed by theee oug as a ' 
:n alone may well be less than the Commerce Clause standi g d by congress pursuant to pre-emptive reach of statutes passe 
the power."). 
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year prior to the Douglas decision. Not only did Congress fail 
to provide a clear expression of its intent to pre-empt state 
regulatory authority, Congress expressly provided for the 
preservation of state rights. 246 Perhaps this was done in the
absence of the Douglas Court's declaration of federal pre-emptive 
power in preference for a clear expression of Congressional 
intent to pre-empt. Without going into extensive detail, the 
legislative history of the Act reveals that a significant, if not 
overriding, concern, however, was the preservation of states' 
rights. Importantly, even the original House bill, which readily 
allowed pre-emption of state authority within the three-mile 
territorial sea, did not infringe state authority over "internal
waters.11 247 Basically, congress modeled the FCMA after the SLA, 
but provided a very limited right to pre-empt state regulation
Within the three-mile territorial sea. However, given the
Supreme Court's decision in Douglas, holding that the SLA
Preserved federal authority to protect fishery resources 
fundamental to interstate commerce, it seems clear that Congress
could have gone further under its commerce Clause powers had it
Chosen to do so,. federalism concerns notwithstanding.
246. 
247. 
See 16 USCA sec. 1856(a) ("nothing.in this_ch�pt�r �hall be
construed as extending or diminishing the.Jurisdiction or 
authority of any state within its boundaries.'') . . 
See Report of the House committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries to Accompany H.R. 200, H.�. Rep: No .. 445,_94th
Cong., 1st sess. {1975), reprinted in Legislative History of
FCMA of 1976, at 1102 (1976). 
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For purposes of pre-empting state oyster regulations, the
FCMA is not what the Douglas court had in mind when it expressed
a preference for statutory pre-emption grounds. Section
1856(b) 248 provides for federal pre-emption only if two
requirements are met. First, a state regulatory action or 
inaction must be deemed to substantially and adversely affect the
implementation of the [federal] fishery management plan. With 
respect to the oyster industry, this test is easily met. But the 
second requirement simply cannot be met. Specifically, fishing 
in a fishery covered by the plan must occur "predominantly within 
the [197-mile] fishery conservation zone and beyond." That is, 
most of the oyster harvesting would have to occur outside the 
state's three-mile territorial sea to be subject to federal pre­
emption under the FCMA. No northeastern state, or any other, 
could match those criteria. This is not surprising inasmuch as
Congress aimed to control the taking of migratory fish, not
shellfish. 
To recap, the supreme court has negated the previously 
powerful state ownership basis for state authority to regulate 
oystering. The court also has declared that whatever state 
authority exists may be'pre-empted to the extent that a state's 
actions or inactions threaten interstate commerce or conflict 
with federal laws. The court has likewise stated that pre­
emption due to conflict with federal laws passed under the 
248. 16 USCA sec. 1856(b).
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commerce power is more strongly grounded than pre-emption based 
on the Commerce Clause alone. Yet, even the FCMA, the most 
comprehensive federal· fishery management law, does not provide 
either the pre-emption mandates or the threat of pre-emption 
necessary to create uniform and coordinated state shellfish laws. 
Parting Thoughts on the state ownership Theory 
In the century between its decision in Mccready v. 
Virginia, holding that each state "owns the beds of all tide­
waters within its jurisdiction 11249 and its decision in Douglas v.
S 250 eacoast Products. Inc., the supreme court moved 
substantially to circumscribe the concept of state ownership and 
to erode state regulatory authority. Yet the Court, even since 
Douglas, has refused to strip the ownership concept of all 
meaning. 
. . . 251 In Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Garne Cornm1ss1on, the
Supreme Court applied the ownership concept to reject a non­
resident's Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge to Montana 
hunting·laws. The court backed away slightly from its indictment 
of ownership as a legal fiction: 
the fact that the state's control over wildlife
is not exclusive and absolute in the face of
federal regulation in certain federally
protected �ntere�ts_does n?t 
cornpe� the
conclusi�g2that i
t is meaningless in their
absence. 
249. 94 U.S. 391, 394 (1877).
250. 4 31 U.S. 265 (1977).
251. 4 36 U.S. 371 (1978).
252. 436 U.S. 386 (1978).
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At least one lower federal court, faced with these
somewhat conflicting or ambiguous messages from the Supreme
Court, decided that "the dilution of the ownership theory has
been such that in the court's analysis of a statutory scheme,
ownership of a natural resource is but one factor that the Court
must consider in determining whether a state has exercised its
police power in conformity with federal laws and the
Constitution.11 253 In that case, the Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia stated that if a state's
statutes are to prevail, they must satisfy the standards of the
several applicable constitutional clauses at issue, as well as
avoid conflict with federal statutes. The court concluded that 
Virginia statutes denying non-resident operators of federally 
licensed fishing vessels the right to commercially harvest crabs 
in state waters violated federal licensing statutes and the
Privileges and Immunities clause of the Constitution.
·Although the court in the Tangier sound case found that
the Commerce clause was inapplicable, normally the Commerce
Clause plays an essential role in any case where state regulation
affects non-residents. This is true even if the statute on its
face treats residents and non-residents equally but where the
statute nevertheless has a discriminatory effect. such was the
case in Atlantic Prince. Ltd. v. Jorling
254 where the court found
253. 
254. 
Tangier sound watermen's Assoc. v. Douglas
, 541 F.Supp.
1287, 1294 (E.D. va. 1982).
710 F.Supp. 893 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
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that a New York statute prohibiting boats longer than ninety feet 
from fishing in New York waters had a discriminatory effect on 
non-residents. New York was unable to show that the length limit 
served a legitimate local purpose of environmental protection 
rather than economic protectionism. The court thereby struck 
down the statute. 
The point is that a valid state regulatory statute, in 
addition to avoiding conflict with federal statutes, must be 
rationally related to preservation of resources held in trust by 
the state, particularly where it is perceived to discriminate 
against non-residents. 
Two other major federal cases helped describe the scope 
of state regulatory authority. In Hassan v. Town of
Easthampton,255 a newcomer to the state of New York challenged
the constitutionality of a town ordinance which required one year 
of residency as a condition to obtain a shellfish license. The 
crux of.his claim was that the one-year residency requirement 
violated equal protection and infringed upon a fundamental right 
to travel by acting as a disincentive to relocate and pursue 
one's vocation� The court treated the residency requirement and 
the one-year waiting period as distinct and independent pre­
requisites. only the durational requirement, said the court, was 
constitutionally suspect as burdensome on the right to travel. 
Finding the plaintiff's right to travel fundamental, the court 
255. 500 F.Supp. 1034 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
applied strict scrutiny review to test the validity of the 
ordinance: 
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whe�e ... an ordinance requires one year of 
residency as a condition to obtaining a commercial 
shellfishing license, the classifications established 
by the ordinance have sufficient impact upon the 
exercise of the fundamental right to interstate 
travel to trigger a stri�;6scrutiny standard of theequal protection review. 
The court said that under this standard, such a restriction would 
be struck down unless the jurisdiction could "overcome its heavy 
burden of justification and show that the ordinance promotes a 
compelling state interest."257 The court concluded that, as a 
matter of law, the town's conservation interest was not 
sufficiently compelling to overcome strict scrutiny review. 
Furthermore, even if the town had shown to the court's 
satisfaction that its conservation interest was compelling, the 
ordinance would still be unconstitutional if the town could 
achieve the conservation goals through measures less intrusive to 
. . 't' 258 constitutionally protected activi ies. 
This case also addressed the ownership concept from a 
different angle. In determining whether the durational 
requirement did in fact violate the plaintiff's constitutional 
rights, the court addressed as a preliminary matter the 
legitimacy of the delegation of regulatory authority to town 
trustees. The court concluded that the delegation was clearly a 
256. 500 F.Supp. 1014 (E.D. N.Y. 198�
).
257. 500 F.Supp. 1041 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) · 258. 500 F.Supp. 1042 (E.O.N.Y. 1980 ·
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valid exercise of authority under state law. The New York state 
legislature delegated regulatory power over the taking of 
shellfish to towns which owned underwater lands within their 
borders. Where the cases previously discussed concern the 
concept of state ownership of underwater lands, in this case 
legal title to underwater lands within the town's borders was 
vested in the town. The town, in turn, allowed the trustees to 
hold the title for the benefit of the townspeople. Thus, the 
public trust doctrine applied principally between the town 
trustees and the townspeople rather than between the state and 
all citizens of the state. Furthermore, the town board's ability 
to pass a shellfish ordinance hinged on the trustees making 
application for the regulation. The court found this delegation 
of public trust and regulatory authority valid. The court only 
found that the specific ordinance imposing the durational 
requirement for a shellfish license was invalid because it overly 
burdened the constitutional right to travel and because there was 
no evidence of less intrusive means to promote the town's 
conservation interests. 
In Healey v. Bendick,259 a wholesale shellfish buyer
challenged the legitimacy of the central elements of Rhode 
Island's statutory and administrative marine resource management 
program. Specifically, Healey charged that the Department of
Environmental Management (DEM) and the Marine Fisheries Council
259. 628 F.Supp. 681 (O.R.I. 1986).
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(MFC) implemented various restrictions in openings and closings 
of shellfish beds to artifically support the price of local 
shellfish. Rather than alleging that the state agencies involved 
lacked authority to undertake the openings and closings or to 
enact specific restrictions, Healey alleged that the agencies, 
along with the Rhode Island Shellfishermen's Association, 
conspired to erect barriers to entry designed to keep up the 
price of shellfish. 
Because the defendants were state agencies, the court 
dismissed the antitrust allegations. With respect to the 
Commerce Clause, the court found that the agencies' actions 
burdened interstate and intra-state commerce alike on an equal 
basis. Although the regulatory actions burdened Healey's 
business, they did not unduly favor intra-state commerce over 
interstate commerce. Any effect on interstate commerce, the 
court held, was "incidental."
260 
Additionally, Healey claimed that the state statute 
delegating authority to the defendant agencies was essentially
standardless and that it therefore violated due process for
vagueness. He also argued that the delegation was overly broad.
The court rejected both'claims. It found that the delegation did
not give either agency "unbridled or ambiguous authority bereft
of procedural standards or substantive definitions such a
s would
260. 628 F.Supp. 691 (D.R.I. 1986).
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make it necessary to guess at the law's mandated and intended 
application . • • •  "
261
Under Healey, then, an unlawful delegation of regulatory 
authority to an agency would apparently result in "unbridled or 
ambiguous authority bereft of procedural standards or substantive 
definitions" as to leave the average person at a loss as to how 
it operates. Moreover, the exercise of authority under that 
delegation must comply with the strictures of the Commerce 
Clause. Nevertheless, on the facts of Healey. these requirements 
leave lawfully empowered agencies broad discretion. The agencies 
involved in Healey imposed numerous regulations strictly limiting 
shellfishing, yet meeting the court's approval. 
Further Constitutional and statutory Considerations 
Based on the foregoing analysis, obviously the Commerce 
Clause seems to provide the most leverage for federal control of 
inshore as well as offshore fisheries. Nevertheless, as the 
Tangier •Sound case illustrates, federal litigation over a host of 
other constitutional provisions and federal statutes arguably 
promotes federal judicial and regulatory jurisdiction on those 
bases. 
The Admiralty clause 
The constitution provides for federal jurisdiction over
. . d' t· 11
262 F "all cases of admiralty and maritime Juris 1c ion. or 
purposes of the oyster industry, this clause is generally invoked
261. 628 F.Supp. 692 (D.R.I. 1986).
262. Art. III, sec. 2, U.S. Const.
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only when damage to oysters, oyster beds, or oystering equipment
(boats) has occurred. Frequently, the defendant in such cases is
the federal government where a plaintiff seeks damages under





and the suits in Admiralty Act.
265
In 
Carr v. United states,
266 
for instance, an oyster grower 
proceeded on the above theories to recover damages to his oyster 
beds. The damage was occasioned by dragging operations conducted 
by a U.S. vessel in search of a downed aircraft. Interference 
with oyster harvesting and cultivation, traditional maritime 
activities, meet the situs and nexus test in order to give a 
f d l 
. . . d. t
. 267 
e era court admiralty Juris ic ion. Although the Admiralty
Clause primarily grants federal jurisdiction, it has the
potential to act in a legislative fashion to the degree that
uniform treatment of admiralty activities is required. Thus, to
the extent that fishery activities constitute admiralty
activiti€s, the Admiralty Clause may provide authority for
federal legislation. 
The Foreign Affairs Power 
The constitution also vests in the fe
deral government
t t k. 







28 USCA sec. 1346. 
46 USCA sec. 781-790. 
46 USCA sec. 741-752. 
136 F.Supp. 527 (1955). . .
Moore v. Hampton Roads sanitation
1030 (4th Cir. 1976). 
Art. II, sec. 2, U.S. Const.
pist. commis., 557 F.2d 
164 
species that cross national waters, the federal government is in 
a better and more authoritative position to seek agreements with 
foreign nations. It is the United States, after all, and not the 
states individually, which is "a member of the family of 
nations," according to the Supreme Court in the United states v, 
Californi·a.269 Th · · · e international migration of marine resources,
like the migration of fowl in Missouri v. Hollanct,
270 is a
distinctly national interest, demanding "national action in 
concert with that of another power. 
to rely on the states.11
271 
. . .  it is not sufficient 
For the sake of this project, this concern is limited 
both geographically and, in a practical sense, by the non­
migratory nature of oysters. Canada likely would be the only 
foreign power affected. The only states likely to confront 
Canada over such issues are those contiguous to the border and 
hosts to oyster habitat. That narrows the focus to Maine. If 
Maine were unwilling or unable to control a migration of oyster 
spawn into Canadian waters, or if Maine took affirmative actions 
to introduce a non-native species that threatened the Canadi n 
fishery, the federal government's foreign affairs powers would b 
invoked. 
Miscellaneous Federal statutes 
269. 332 U.S. 19, 29 ( 1947).
270. 252 U.S. 416 ( 1920).
271. 252 U.S. 435 ( 1920).
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Many of the federal statutes that could affect regulation 
of the oyster industry have not been the subject of enlightening 
litigation. Litigation over at least two statutes is, however, 
worth mention: 
The Lacey Act 
The federal statute most applicable to the deliberate 
release uf non-native species is the Lacey Act.272 The Lacey Act
basically serves as an enforcement umbrella covering laws, 
treaties, and regulations of the United States and of the states 
individually. The act makes it unlawful to import, export, 
transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any fish, 
wildlife, or plant taken or possessed in violation of federal or 
state statutes or regulations. Executive Order No. 11987 
clarified that the act aims to "prevent the introduction of 
exotic species in the natural ecosystem of the United States 
.
. . . "273 Importantly, the order defines exotic species as
"all species of plants and animals not naturally occurring, 
either presently or historically, in any ecosystem of the United 
States."274 It also defines introduction as the "release,
escape, or establishment of an exotic species into a natural 
ecosystem. ,,275 The act; then, seeks to enforce as a federal
violation any intentional or unintentional release of an exo ic
species that constitutes a violation of other federal or state
272. 16 USCA sec. 3371-3373. 
273. Exec. Order No. 11987, 3 CFR 116 (1978�
·
274. Exec. Order No. 11987, 3 CFR 116 (1978) 
· 
275. Exec. Order No. 11987, 3 CFR 116 (1978 
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regulations. But b d f' · , Y e 1n1ng exotic as it does, the Executive
Order tends to limit the act's scope,· i't regards the United
States as a single ecosystem which the act aims to protect from 
foreign organisms. 
The leading case in this area involves the violation of a 
Maine statute prohibiting the importation of live bait fish.
276
In Maine v. Taylor, a bait dealer was indicted under the Lacey 
Act for importing live bait fish in violation of a Maine law 
aimed at protecting the state's wild fish populations from 
parasites and non-native species. The bait dealer moved to 
dismiss the indictment on the ground that the Maine statute 
unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce. Despite 
arguments in the lower courts that the Maine statute was 
protectionist, that the statute provided no protection of wild 
fish populations from shipments of non-bait fish, that nothing 
prevented fish from simply swimming into Maine from neighbor'ng 
states, ·and that less restrictive means could provide adequate 
protection of local interests, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the statute. 
Significantly, the court found that the Lacey Act did not
intend to lessen the ordinary standard of review for Commerce
Clause issues as they apply to state wildlife protect
ion laws.2
77
But the court held that the statute did serve 
a legitimate local
purpose and that the purpose could not merely
 be served as well
276. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (
1986).
277. 477 U.S. 139 (1986).
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by available nondiscriminatory means. The decision hinged on the 
"substantial uncertainties" surrounding the effects that bait 
fish parasites and non-native species would have on Maine's wild 
fish populations. 
The Endangered Species Act 
The Endangered Species Act278 is potentially a statutory 
barrier to the introduction of a non-native breed of oyster, if
that is indeed the way to revive the northeast oyster industry.
To trigger the act, however, there must be identified a 
threatened or endangered species that would suffer further danger 
of extinction due to the introduction of the non-native oyster or 
related parasites into the habitat. The Endangered Species Act 
facilitates a process in which the Fish and Wildlife Service 
verifies the status of the species as threatened or endangered, 
determines its critical habitat, and implements federal 
protection of that habitat against activities that would pose 
further deleterious effects on the species. such banned 
activities routinely include the introduction of exotic 
organisms.279 As the supreme court noted in Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill, 280 the noted snail darter case, the impetus
for the Endangered species Act came in large part from a growing
278. 16 USCA sec. 1531-1543· 
t d Wildlife and Plants· 279. See,�, Endangere� and Threa enechub to be a Threaten�dFinal Rule to Determine t�e son�t
r� 
1 Habitat Fed R S · d t o terrnine its Cri ica , • 
eg. 
pecies an o e 
(L' t'ng the Possible Vol. 51, 4/30/86, P·.160� 2 is� Their Parasites as aIntroduction of Exotic Fishes an 
Threat to the Sonora Chub). 
280. 437 U.S. 153 (1973). 
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recognition of the importance of maintaining natural genetic 
variation: 
As we homogenize the habitats in which 
the�e plants and animals evolved, and as 
we increase the pressure for products that 
the¥ a�e in a position to supply (usually 
unwillingly) we threaten their -- and our 
own -- genetic heritage . ... from the 
most narrow possible point of view it is 
in the best interests of mankind t� 
minimize the losses of genetic variations. The 
reason is simple: they are potential 
resources. They are keys to puzzles which 
we cannot solve, and may provide answers 
to ques��£ns which we have not yet learned 
to ask. 
The National Environmental Policy Act 
Finally, to the extent that the federal government 
participates in any oyster fishery project, the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)282 poses another hurdle. NEPA 
requires specific preliminary evaluations and reports in advance 
of such federal actions. A long line of cases recite time and 
again that NEPA's purpose is to ensure that federal agencies take 
into account the environmental consequences of their projects 
before they decide to undertake them.283 Language in the act
directs federal agencies to look, in particular, at the effects 
on genetic diversity posed by such acts as the introduction of 




473 u.s. l78 (1973) quoting H.R. Rep.
 No. 412, 93rd Cong.,
1st Sess. 4-5, 1973). 
42 USCA sec. 4321. 
see,�, Sansom committee v. Lynn, 
366 F.Supp. 1242 (E.D.
PA. 1973). 
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specific issue as yet, a federal district court case from Vermont
sheds some light on NEPA's ramifications.
In Elliot v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
284 an
environmental group sought to enjoin the Fish and Wildlife
Service from releasing chemical lampricides to control the
population of sea lampreys in the Lake Champlain ecosystem. The
group alleged that "the loss of biological diversity and
stability which will result from the lampricide project cannot be
predicted." Further, the group claimed, "[a]ny loss of
biological diversity which results will deplete the resiliency of
the Lake Champlain ecosystem."285 The group �lso alleged
technical violations of NEPA reporting requirements. 
Nevertheless, the court rejected the group's efforts to 
enjoin the project. The court found that the group had failed to 
prove the threat of irreparable injury. Although the court left 
open the exact standard of proof required for such a showing, it 
did hold·that violations of the procedures required by NEPA do
not by themselves constitute irreparable harm sufficient to
J·u t. f . . . 1 · f 
286 
s 1 y inJunctive re ie . Rather, the court held, the
alleged harm must stem from the government action sought to be
enjoined and must be of'the sort that the statutes r�lied upon
287 are designed to avert. Thus, in that case, significant damage
to the overall ecology of the lake or harm to threaten
ed or
284. 747 F.Supp. 1094 (D.VT. 1990).
285. 747 F.Supp. 1101 (D.VT. 1990).
286. 747 F.Supp. 1100 (D.VT. 1990).
287. 747 F.Supp. 1100 (D.VT. 1990).
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endangered species might have constituted irreparable injury in 
the required sense. The plaintiffs, though, failed to show 
sufficiently that such injury was likely to occur. 
STATE COURT DECISIONS IMPACTING THE NORTHEAST 
UNITED STATES OYSTER INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
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The following cases comprise a survey of state and
federal jurisprudence identified by the states in which they
arose. The major federal cases were discussed in the foregoin
g
section� The federal cases included in this section were n
ot
included in the previous section because they do not c
arry the
import of the federal cases previously covered. Th
e coastal
states obviously generate more oyster related l
itigation than do
inland states. Even among the coastal stat
es, those with a
history of a sustainable oyster industry 
have generated more
litigation than those with no such his
tory. Yet even in states
which at some point had or still have 
relatively vibrant
shellfisheries, many issues never r
each litigation at all. In
fact, some states rely heavily, pa
rticularly with regard to
regulatory issues, on state atto
rneys' general reports.
Consequently, this is an effort 
merely to identify those
 issues
which recur with some frequency
 or which have some n
ovel or
significant bearing on the fo
cus of this project.
· · · ed on a state-by-sta
te basis,
This section is organi
z 
beginning with the coastal 
states from Maine to
 Virginia.
then surveys, in alphabetica





For present purposes, Harding v. Commissioner of Marine 
Resources
288 
is the most significant state adjudication. This
case did not directly concern oysters, but it is one of the very 
few cases from any state in the northeast to address aquaculture. 
Pursuant to a state statute, two entities sought leases from the 
Department of Marine Resources (DMR) for the purpose of growing 
mussels ·in an aquaculture operation. The operation involved 
dredging mussels from the seabed and transplanting them less 
densely on the shallower inshore leases. This, the proponents 
alleged, would promote faster growth to market size. Harding, an 
adjoining shoreline property owner, sought judicial review of the 
DMR's decision-making process in granting the leases. 
Specifically, Harding alleged that the DMR erred as a matter of 
law in denying him an opportunity to present evidence concerning 
the impact of the leases on the value of his property. The 
superior court agreed with Harding and vacated the leases. The 
DMR appealed to the supreme court of Maine. 
On appeal, Harding argued that the language of the 
statute allowed adjacent property owners to submit evidence of 
property devaluations. Alternatively, Harding argued that the 
public trust doctrine compelled consideration of property 
devaluations by implication. The court disagreed on both 
accounts. 
288. 510 A. 2d 533 (Me. 1986).
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First, the court held that the Commissioner of DMR need 
only consider the narrow list of factors outlined in the statute. 
The statute required that the proposed project not unreasonably 
interfere with ingress and egress of riparian owners, navigation, 
fishing, and other uses of the areas and that the project not be 
in conflict with the applicable coastal zoning laws. The "other 
uses" language, according to the court, did not contemplate the 
consideration of property values. 
Second, in response to Harding's public trust argument, 
the court acknowledged Maine's long-standing recognition of the 
doctrine and cited authority from its own prior opinions that 
"the needs of a growing society may lead to a wider variety o 
b . t . " 2 8 9 Th t pu lie uses to be protected by the doc rine. e cour 
refused, however, to decide the exact scope of the doctrine. 
Instead, the court noted that historically Maine has used the 
doctrine to protect submerged lands for purposes of navig tion, 
fishing,· and fowling. The court did determine that individu 1 
private property valuations were not within the scope of the 
public trust considerations. 
th Other notable cases reflect issuesFor the most part, e 
already examined under federal jurisprudence. For instanc ,
289. 510 A.2d 537 (Me. 1986).
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long line of cases declares that title to shellfish in tidal 
waters is in the state as representative of the people, 
exercising not only the rights of sovereignty but also 
property.
290
The protection of these rights, of course, entitles the
state to undertake conservation and management which the state
has delegated to municipalities. Enabling legislation authorizes
municipalities to require licenses for taking shellfish and
allows the municipalities to exclude non-residents but only to
the extent reasonably necessary for the proper conservation of
r ' ' ' t. t t. 1 291 esources, and this delegation is cons i u iona . 
With respect to state conservation restrictions, one 
federal case (not included in the federal section because it 
sheds no new light on the federal jurisprudence examined there) 
struck down a statute requiring a Maine resident to be physically 
present in the state for eight months of each year for at least 
three consecutive years prior to applying for a lobstering 
license.292 other restrictions on the taking of lobsters, such
as size limits, catch limits, seasonal restrictions, and limits
290. State v. Norton, 335 A.2d 607 (Me. 1975).
291. State v. Boynton, 379 A.2d 994 (Me. 1977)·
292. Massey v. Apollonio, 387 F.Supp. 373 (O.C.
Me. 1974).
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on the number of licenses granted, the court found valid. But 
the court could find no rational basis for the residency 
requirement and rejected it as a violation of equal protection. 
Within the body of relevant Maine jurisprudence, two 
cases also reflect some of the effects of the Magnuson Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act. In State y, Lauriat,
293 the
Maine high court held that state prosecution of a Maine licensed 
fisherman harvesting lobsters from an otter trawling boat in 
violation of a state statute was pre-empted under the act294 
because he was operating outside the three-mile territorial sea. 
The act imposed an even harsher reality upon the state in 
295 the State of Maine v. Kreps, in which herring quotas
established by the secretary of Commerce were upheld on a finding 
that the act grants the secretary broad discretion. 
New Hampshire 
·The only relevant case in New Hampshire concerned a state
statute prohibiting the transportation, possession, or offering
for sale, of lobster meat when tail portion was less than four
and one-quarter inches in length. This statute was applicable
regardless of whether or not the meat was from within the
state.296 New Hampshire's highest court upheld the statute.
According to the court, the statute represented a valid exercise
293. 561 A.2d 496 (Me. 1989).
294. 16 USCA sec. 1855(g).
295. 563 F.2d 1052 (C.A.Me. 1977). 54) 296. Maritime Packers v. carpenter, 1
05 A.2d 38 (N.H. 19 
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of state police powers to promote the protection of the lobster 
supply in state waters. The statute also did not violate any 
provisions of trade agreements between the United states and 
Canada. Presumably, a similar statute limiting possession, sale, 
and transportation of oysters to protect the state oyster fishery 
would also be similarly upheld. 
Massachusetts 
In the 1990 case of commonwealth v. Tart,
297 the
Massachusetts high court ruled that the state permit
 for landing
fish in the Commonwealth was directed at protecti
ng the state's
interest in its fisheries and did not operate
 as a tonnage duty
or tax in conflict with a federal statute pro
hibiting such t xes
on licensed vessels. This was so even t
hough the defendant
caught the fish outside of the commonwea
lth's waters, and
the fish were to be sold beyond the Co
mmonwealth's bard rs.
·similarly, in commonwealth y
. Trott,
298 the de endant
were subject to a state statute reg
ulating fishing in co st l
waters though they fished from ves
sels enrolled and licen d 
pursuant to federal shipping law
s.
Massachusetts is one of m
any states that delegate
s
regulatory authority of marine 
resources to agencies as w
ell




to political subdivisions. 
has the power to protect fjsh 
and game of the Commo
nwealth and to
297. 408 Mass. 249, 557 N.E.2
d 1123 (1;!�)
.
298. 131 Mass. 491, 120 N.E.
2d 289 (19 
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of state police powers to promote the protection of the lobster
a u  e a  so 1 not violate any
supply in state waters. The st t t 1 d'd 
provisions of trade agreements between the United states and
Canada. Presumably, a similar statute limiting possession, sale,
and transportation of oysters to protect the state oyster fishery
would also be similarly upheld.
Massachusetts 
In the 1990 case of commonwealth v. Tart,
297 the
Massachusetts high court ruled that the state permit for landing 
fish in the Commonwealth was directed at protecting the state's 
interest in its fisheries and did not operate as a tonnage duty 
or tax in conflict with a federal statute prohibiting such taxes 
on licensed vessels. This was so even though the defendant 
caught the fish outside of the Commonwealth's waters, and 
the fish were to be sold beyond the commonwealth's borders. 
·similarly, in commonwealth v. Trott,
298 the defendants
were subject to a state statute regulating fishing in coastal
waters though they fished from vessels enrolled and licensed
pursuant to federal shipping laws.
Massachusetts is one of many states that delegates
regulatory authority of marine resources to agencies as well as 
to political subdivisions. The legislature, the court has ruled, 
has the power to protect fjsh and game of the Commonwealth and to 
297. 408 Mass. 249, 557 N.E.2d 1123 (1990).
298. 131 Mass. 491, 120 N.E.2d 289 (1954)·
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that end, once policy has been determined, execution of policy 
may be delegated to appropriate public officers or boards.299
Municipal governments possess significant authority under such 
delegations, including the right to control the taking of 
shellfish from beds within the municipality's geographical 
limits.300 Such regulatory authority, of course, must conform to
constitutional standards. Where a town restricted the commercial 
harvesting of shellfish to residents or taxpayers, however, the 
restriction was not prohibited by equal protection provisions 
absent a showing that it bore no reasonable relation to 
. . b. t. 301conservation or other permissible legislative o Jee 1ves. 
Moreover, a town is authorized to grant licenses to take 
shellfish from privately held flats so long as no taking or 
impairment of private rights results.
302 Nevertheless, municipal
governments do not have completely unbridled discretion. A city 
or town, for instance, cannot require anyone, resident or non­
resident, to secure a permit prior to taking shellfish except 
pursuant to a regulation which forms part of a shellfish 
management plan. That plan can be developed by the city or town, 
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Fisheries.303 The municipal government's authorization to
private individuals to use shellfish beds or to take shellfish is 
iron clad. Thus, where a former license holder staked off his 
former beds, his rights in the shellfish propagated and 
cultivated during the existence of his lease terminated and the 
municipal officers retained exclusive authority to assert the
rights of the public to .the fishery.304 
The Massachusetts courts have also recognized the 
aforementioned limitations of the language of the federal 
Submerged Lands Act305 which provides that title to natural 
resources within navigable waters within the boundaries of the 
states is vested within the states.306
Rhode Island 
Although Rhode Island has statutes and regulations 
specifically addressing oysters and aquaculture, there are no 
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Connecticut 
Connecticut, like Massachusetts, delegates to municipal 
governments authority to promulgate shellfish regulations, 
designate shellfish beds, and grant rights thereto. Under 1881 
legislation, all shellfisheries designated therein were ceded to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the state. All shellfisheries not 
within the described areas were left to the regulatory authority 
of the towns in which they were located. The state could grant 
franchises for cultivating shellfish in its beds and the towns 
could do likewise, but neither could franchise any natural oyster 
or clam beds.307 such actions are usually done by committee
308whose authority is limited, as are the rights conferred. 
Where such a committee designated the grounds for oyster beds 
between the low water mark and navigable waters to a person other 
than the riparian owner, the committee's authority was 
. . . . ht 309insufficient to deprive the owner of his riparian rig s. 
Thus, the right of a riparian to wharf out to deep water is 
the superior to that of an owner of an oyster bed provided that 
310 





285 33 A. 1006 (1895). Cook_v. Raymon?, 6� Conn. 
t' Ground committee of Town ofSee in re Application of oys er 
Darien, 52 Conn. 61 (1884)· 25 A 398 (1892). Prior v. Swartz, 62 conn. 132' 287 416 A.2d 1192 (1979).Lovejoy v. van Emene�, 177 conn. , 
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retains rights. The designation of an oyster bed merely gives 
the exclusive right to the oysters from that particular place, 
but every other public right to that public place is 
preserved.311
New York 
Although wild fish and game are usually owned by no one 
until reduced to possession, the court in U.S. y. Longcoye
s f 312ea ood. Inc., held that, unlike most wild animals, clams, 
mussels, and other sed�mentary or burrowing mollusks are deemed 
to be in possession of the owner of the land on which they are 
found so that taking them without the owner's permission 
constitutes larcency under New York law. In contrast, migratory 
marine fish are ferae naturae (wild animals) and are the property 
of the state. Fishing in navigable waters or arms of the sea is 
presumptably common to the public subject to the state's power to 
regulate the taking of fish even where they are found in private 
waters.313 This power to protect fish and game derives from the
state's sovereign capacity.314 Without a specific delegation of
these powers, a town has no authority to restrict by ordinance 
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jurisdiction. Thus, where the legislature granted a town power 
to make rules and regulations to encourage and prevent the 
destruction of the shellfishery, the town was not authorized to 
promulgate an anti gill netting ordinance on grounds that gill 
netting interfered with the shellfishery in limited areas.315
Generally, preservation of fish and game is a matter within the 
public interest because without adequate and special protection 
they would be wasted and destroyed.316
Somewhat unique to New York is a requirement under the 
conservation laws that prior to the processing, transportation, 
and shipment of shellfish, in either intra-state or interstate 
commerce, an appropriate permit to do so must be obtained. This 
requirement relates only to shippers and dealers, but not to 
fishermen. Obtaining shellfish outside the state's territorial 
t h . d f 317wa ers, owever, is no e ense. 
Hew Jersey 
New Jersey has a long line of cases verifying the common 
right of all citizens of New Jersey to take shellfish from 
natural beds and tidewaters of the state, except to the extent 
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individuals. 318 There is a similar line of cases litigating the 
rights and limitations of oysterrnen to stake off public oyster 
grounds. 319 On the other hand, many cases identify the 
limitations on the rights of private growers to stake off their 
beds. Specifically, they may not interfere with navigation. 
Furthermore, the staking off of beds without planting shellfish 
gives no right of ownership to the creek bed. 320 The case of 
321 Allgor v. Town of Monmouth county water company, apparently 
describes the standard for recovery from damages to oysters for 
pollution of a stream on a state claim. In that case, the court 
required the plaintiff to prove that the loss was the natural and 
proximate result of the alleged discharge. 
Delaware 
There are no relevant cases on the subject matter 
documented in the state of Delaware. 
2 NJ L. 391 (N.J.Sup. 318. See,�, Shepard v. Lever;oz, 936
. 









90 (N.J.Sup. 1887).319. �, DeGraff v. Truesdale, 361
. 
(N.j,sup. 1853); �, 320. B1rdsall v. Rose, 46 N.J.LL 80 (N.J.Sup. 1853). Townsend v. Brown, 24 N.J. · 1925) 321.· 3 N.J.Misc. 514, 128 A. 864 (N.J,Sup. 
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Maryland 
As has been the case elsewhere, Maryland allows only 
certain non-natural oyster beds areas open to leasing. Because 
Maryland waters have traditionally yielded such a valuable return 
of marketable oysters, the designation of natural beds and the 
leasehold rights to state bottoms have been the subject of 
substantial litigation. Much of it concerns what constitutes a 
natural oyster bar incapable of being leased. Despite various 
tests used to determine what constitutes a natural oyster bar 
over the years, the so-called "Goldsborough rule," for the most
part, continues to apply. In the seminal case of William T.
Winder v. Job T. Moore, cited in Department of Tidewater
Fisheries v. catlin,
322 and quoted in Popham y. conservation
Commission,
323 Judge Goldsborough said:
land cannot be said to be a natural oyste
r bar
or bed merely because oysters ar� scatte
red here
and there upon it, and because, if pl
anted they will
readily live and thrive there; but w
henever the 
natural growth is so thick �nd �bund
an� t�at the
public resort to it for a liveliho
od, it is a 
natural oyster bar or bed ... _ an�
 �annot be
located or appropriated by any i
ndividual. 
In Tidewater Fisheries y. Catlin
, supra, the court limited the
time in which the public has resorted to 
the bed for a livelihood
to five years prior to the date of fili
ng for an application to
lease it. The underlying notion, again
, is that oysters, like
fish and game generally, are origina
lly the property of the 
322. 196 Md. 530, 77 A.2d 13l (l9St
)
946) 
323. 186 Md. 62, 46 A.2d 184, 189 
l 
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state, and that no individual has any property rights in them 
other than such as the state may permit him to acquire.324 The
state may lease land under navigable waters within its 
territorial limits to private persons for oyster cultivation. 
Such person may hold it as any other property subject to the 
condition that he make no use of it which would interfere with 
the navigability of water that floats over it. 
Maryland historically has also imposed additional 
restrictions on the taking, cultivation, and processing of 
oysters, characteristic of a state with a developed industry. 
For instance, oyster packers and dealers have been required to 
obtain state licenses to set aside oyster shells for the state, 
and to comply with strict cull laws.
325
As to the public right to the natural oyster fishery, the 
courts recognized dredging oysters thereon as a valuable right 
entitled to protection.326 Tonging is an equally valuable
protected right, and individuals who derive there livelihood from 
tonging oysters in a particular body of water were granted 
standing to seek curtailment of dredging and filling operations 
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Presumably, public tongers would have standing to maintain an
action against the possible harm done by the introduction of a
non-native oyster species on the same theory.
Likewise, there is precedent for the state to take
protective actions. In the practical management of its
resources, such as game and fish, the state may conclude that the
time for action is long before the destruction has gone so far
that destruction of the species is imminent. The protective hand
of the state may be extended before the danger is unmistakably
imminent.328
Virginia 
Virginia has been the site of many of the more renowned
fisheries management and oyster fishery cases. These cases and
the major issues underlying them largely were considered in the
federal jurisprudence section of this report. There remain,
however; some state cases worthy of mention because they, like
some of the cases from Maryland, implicate issues that seemingly
arise where there is a fairly well developed oyster industry. To
that extent, such cases may indicate the types of issues most
likely to arise where an existing industry is revived or where,
for some reason, an oyster industry is created anew.
Virginia, unlike many northeastern states, does not
delegate to localities authority to grant leases or to regulate
328. Corsa v. Tawes, 149 F.Supp. 771, gffirrn
ed 355 u.s. 37
(D.C.Md. 1957).
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shellfishing within their jurisdictional boundaries. That fact 
would seem to simplify matters greatly, but it has not. There 
has been substantial debate, controversy, and litigation over the 
issue of private shellfish leasing and its regulation. 
Once again, the basic premise from which all policy 
emerges is that the state is the owner of all native oysters in
her waters, and within the bounds of the constitution, the state 
is entitled to legislative control over her oyster beds.329
Furthermore, the Virginia constitution prohibits the state from 
leasing, renting, or selling natural oyster beds, rocks, and 
shoals in Virginia waters, and no person can acquire the 
exclus. . ht t th 330 1ve rig o use em. The General Assembly is vested
with the right to make conclusive determinations of natural 
oyster beds from time to time.331 Virginia, unlike most states,
does not have title to the land between the high water mark and 
332 
the low water mark and does not lease such areas. Virginia
does have some authority regarding the degree to which there is 
federal jurisdiction, if not regulatory authority, over oystering 
activities. Specifically, like fishing, the harvesting of 
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of oysters is so closely related to harvesting that any 
interference with it meets the situs and nexus test in order to 
give a federal court admiralty jurisdiction.333 When the 
plaintiff's claim does not fall within the entire spectrum of the 
oystering industry, and it is instead a purely local claim, any 
impairment of harvesting and cultivation falls within the 
jurisdiction of the state.334
For the most part, then, the rights of the individual 
lessee are determined by the state. The lease of non-natural 
oyster beds is a contract between the state and the individual 
lessee. It gives the individual exclusive rights to plant and 
take oysters from the grounds during his term, but those are the 
limits of his rights, all other rights are reserved to the 
public.335 The Marine Resources Commission has been delegated 
broad authority to administer the oyster industry, but inasmuch 
as leas�s are grants of property rights, every lessee or other 
person whose property rights are affected by Commission decisions 
t. . 336 are en itled to a legal hearing. Lessees may maintain actions
for damages against the united states for negligently conducting 
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are less accessible,338 even though the lessee's interest in an
oyster bed is private property within the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment's takings clause.339
Virginia also subjects the private lessee to numerous 
regulations concerning the cultivation and harvesting of 
shellfish, just as it subjects those who exercise their rights in 
the public fishery to such restrictions. Thus, where the state 
restricted lessees from using hydraulic dredges to harvest 
shellfish from leased beds, the restriction was upheld as a valid 
protection of the public interest. Despite that the restriction 
made harvesting economically infeasible, the court found that the 
restriction did not unconstitutionally impair the contract.340
As to the public fishery, Virginia imposes similar 
restrictions on the modes and times of harvest. Surprisingly, 
few restrictions have been litigated, perhaps because, unlike 
leases, there is no clear property right at issue. The court 
have held, for instance, that the tonger has no property right in 
the natural oyster rocks, but only a privilege to take from them, 
and this privilege is subject to regulation.341 The state, being
the owner of native oysters in her waters, moreover, has the 
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impose a tonnage duty in violation of Article I, Section 10 of 
the United States Constitution.342
District of Columbia 
There are no relevant cases on the subject matter 
documented in the District of Columbia. 
Illinois 
Likewise, there are no relevant cases on the subject 
matter documented in the state of Illinois. There is, however, 
one law review article worth noting entitled "Aquaculture in 
Illinois: State and Federal Legal and Regulatory Environment," 
Southern Illinois Law Journal, 193, 1982. 
Indiana 
Although Indiana obviously has no seacoast and thus no 
natural·habitat, it does border Lake Michigan and therefore 
provides some case precedent for the scope of regulatory 
authority over commercial fishing in general. In particular, 
recent restrictions imposed to protect Lake Michigan's salmon 
populations have spurred relevant litigation. In State Ex. Rel.
N 3,
343 for example, theRalston v. Lake superior court, Room o, -
Indiana court announced that fish belong to all the people and
342. Johnson v. Drummond, 61 va. (20 Gratt.) 419 (1871
); ™'
Commonwealth v. Brown, 91 Va. 762, 21 S.E. 357 (1895). 
343. 546 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind. 1989).
(' 
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that a commercial fisherman possessed no property rights which 
would vest him with standing to enjoin the Department of Natural 
Resources regulations concerning gillnet fishing. Almost the 
exact same issue was litigated resulting in almost exactly the 
same results in 1987.344 The court ruled then that neither
commercial fishermen nor a restaurant had any property interest 
in fish·harvested from Indiana waters of Lake Michigan entitling 
them to enjoin the Director of the Department of Natural 
Resources from imposing an emergency ban on gillnetting. Despite 
wide variances in the estimates of chinook salmon saved by the 
ban, the court found that the department did not act arbitrarily 
or capricously. The department apparently has broad discretion 
under this rule. 
Other cases, primarily concerning inland bodies of water, 
clearly establish that the public has few, if any, rights to 
waters or fish in waters lying on private lands. The owner of 
lands upon which there is a non-navigable stream, for example,
owns the surface water and has the right to control it. The
public has no right of fishery or to go upon the waters without
th , · · 345 Thi's exclusive right holds true evene owner s permission. 
where the private waters have been stocked with fish by the 




514 N.E.2d 273, appeal after remand 546Ridenour v. Furness, 
N.E. 2d 322 (1989). 55 NE 2d 
Pollack, 115 Ind. App. 32, · · .i;:P:.2aL!:t:....!t::.SO,l!n�P�a.!..r.b.kaJ..___,iiun�c,<..:...• _V�- �-='-"'-==--
328 (1944). . · c 12 N E 2d 
Millspaugh v. Northern Indiana Public service
o., · · 
396, 104 Ind. App. 540 (1938). 
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participate in stocking oysters in a private aquaculture project,
the public would not accede to any rights as they would for wild
fish in navigable waters. 
Michigan 
Cases in Michigan highlight the possibility of conflict 
with superior rights of Indians to state fisheries. Such
superior treaty fishing rights of the Indians was the subject of 
litigation in Bigelow v. Michigan Department of Natural
Resources.347
Michigan case law reflects the trend from boldface 
declarations of state ownership towards the public trust 
doctrine. Wild fish and game are property of the state subject 
to its power to regulate and control in the exercise of its 
police power.348 In the 1970 case of Aikens v. conservation
Department,349 the Michigan court of Appeals held that fish are
not objects of private ownership but belong to the state which in
effect holds fish in public trust for all the people of the state
in their collective capacity. commercial fishermen may acquire
only such right to possession or ownership that the state may
allow under its police·powers. 
The right to take fish from public waters rests on their
publicness and not incident to the right of navigation.
347. 27 F.Supp. 346 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
348. People v. Zimberg, 321 Mich. 655, 33 N.
W.2d 104 (1� 48).
349. 28 Mich. App. 181, 184 N.w.2d 222, reversed, 387
 Mich. 495,
198 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. App. 1970). 
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Nevertheless the state holds navigable waters in a state of 
perpetual trust to secure to the public their rights of fishery 
and navigation. Thus, a private corporation, owning land through 
which a navigable and public stream flowed, could not enjoin the 
State Conservation Department from removing obstructions which 
the corporation had erected to use as a private fishing 
preserve.350 Likewise, riparian owners could not exclude the
public from fishing in a navigable and public stream by erecting 
barriers and by making deep excavations.351
Anyone engaged in the commercial fishing business must be 
prepared to submit to reasonable regulations and, consequently, 
t d. . . h d . f . 352 o iminis e expectations o privacy. Because the state is
the public trustee of its waters, and because acts of illicit 
harvesting of fish affront the state's interest in regulatory 
commercial fishing and damages its efforts to conserve valuable 
resources, the state is empowered to bring civil actions to 







Minnesota has no documented applicable cases. 
Ne-be-shone Association v. Hogarth, 7 F.S
upp. 885, affirmed
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Ruchton Ex. Rel. Hoffmaster v. Taggart
, 306 Mich. 4321 11
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Ohio 
Like many of the other states, Ohio has announced that 
the public has a right to common fishery in all navigable or 
tidewaters common to all.354 The exclusive right to fish in
private non-navigable waters belongs to the owners of the 
underlying soi1 355 subject to the state's power to regulate the
taking of fish and game on private as well as public lands and 
waters and to adopt appropriate means for their preservation for 
the benefit of all the people.356 Likewise, one who by express
grant from the government holds the title to land covered by 
navigable waters, holds it subject to the paramount right of 
fishery vested in the public, which right is not destroyed merely 
by the grant of such lands.
357 
In carrying out its enforcement of regulations d
esigned
to protect fish and game, the state may regulate the po
ssession,
buying, selling, or offering for sale, or transportat
ion of fish
and game, whether or not they are from within the
 state. All
fish brought into the state from another state 
or country are
made subject to the laws of Ohio.
358 
There is also one notable products 
liability case
relating to oysters from the state of Ohio
. In Allen Y·
354. Basslake Hollenbe




Millet:, 118 OS 36
0, 161 N.E. 12 
355. East Bay SQorting club v.
(1928). 
19, 82 N.E. 662 (1907)
.
356. State v. Hamlon, 77 OS
357. Hogg v. Beerman, 41 OS 81 (1
844).
(1894). 
358. Rowe v. state, 51 OS 209, 3
7 N.E. 259
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359 Grafton, the court stated that the test to determine whether a
substance in food is natural or foreign as to subject the
purveyor to liability, is whether a consumer would customarily
expect it and guard against it without warning from the
manufacturer or seller. Applying this standard to a claim that a
restaurant breached implied warranties of purity, safety, and
wholesomeness where it served fried oysters with a two centimeter
diameter piece of shell attached, the court held the restaurant
not liable. 
Pennsylvania 
As in cases we have seen elsewhere, a recent Pennsylvania 
case describes the rights of the owners of land underlying 
surface waters. In Intili v. Salak,
360 owners of property
abutting a non-navigable artificial lake were held not to have 
rights to fish in the lake from their shoreline where the lake 
was on property belonging to another owner. An older case 
dealing with the issue of what is a farm fish pond is 
362
similarly, 9ornmonwealth Y, Burgess, Commonwealth v. King.
361 
defined the essential elements of a regulated fishing lake as 1)
it must be artificial or man-made, 2) owned, leased, or
controlled in any manner by any individual, partnership,





170 OS 249, 10 o.ops2d 289, 164 N.E.2d 167 (196
0).
403 Pa.Super 578, 589 A.2d 761 (1991).
47 Berks. 235 (Pa. Quar. sess. 1955).
58 Luz. L. Reg. 267 (Pa. corn. Pl. 1960).
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fee for, and 4) in which all fish stocked are artificially 
propagated by commercial hatcheries or purchased from persons 
licensed to sell fish. 
Pennsylvania has explicitly recognized that state 
ownership is a myth; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stating that
the interests of the state in game and fish in the wild is that
of sovereign and not of owner. Furthermore, this interest is not
sufficient to support a civil action for damages resulting from
destruction of those fish which had not yet been reduced to
possession.363 But the Commonwealth does have the power for the
common good to determine when, by whom, and under what
conditions, fish running wild may be captured and thus ow
ned.
Likewise, the Commonwealth has the power to control 
resale and
transportation of such fish thereby qualifying the 
ownership of
the captor. These powers are rooted in the Commo
nwealth's
364 
sovereignty over land and people. 
Pennsylvania also has at least one p
roducts liability
case concerning oysters worthy of note. In Bonenbe
rger Y,
Pittsburgh Merchantile co.,
365 the court left the question 
of,
whether a pint of oysters containing a sh
ell was reasonably fit
for human consumption to the jury. The 
seller's liability was
not based on negligence but on warran
ty under the Pennsylvania
363. CQmm2nwealth Inc., 





er. 150, 232 A.2d 69
364. �ommQnHealth v. A�ai,
(1966). 
913 (1942).365. 345 Pa. 559, 28 A.2d
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Sales Act for implied warranty that food is wholesome and fit for 
human consumption, including freedom from foreign substances 
which may be injurious to the consumer. The warranty liability 
extends to the dealer who sells food in sealed containers even 
though he did not manufacture or pack it. 
Vermont· 
There is only one relevant case from Vermont. The case 
of State v. Haske11 366 says that wild fish are general property
of the people of the state in their united sovereignty. The 
owner of land through which a stream flows, though, has the 
exclusive right to fish within the boundaries of his territory, 
but his property rights in the fish in the stream are limited to 
the fish he actually lawfully reduces to possession. 
West Virginia 
·There are no recorded cases in West Virginia applicable
for present purposes. 
Wisconsin 
In 1929, the Wisconsin supreme court held that the public 
has a right to fish in navigable waters even in small streams 
provided they do not trespass on private property along the 
banks. Further, a stream which is navigable as a matter of fact, 
366 . 84 Vt. 429, 79 A. 852 (1911). 
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is public water to which the public has a right to resort for 
fishing.367 This holding is consistent with early precedent
asserting that at common law the right of fishing was incident to 
the right of navigation and that the right exists irrespective of 
whether title to the bed of the stream is in the state or the 
riparian owners.368
More recently, the Wisconsin courts have stated that 
title to navigable waters of the state and to beds of navigable 
waters is vested and continues in the state in trust for public 
use. Moreover, this public trust duty the court held, requires 
the state not only to promote navigation but also to protect and 
preserve its waters for fishing, hunting, recreation, and scenic 
beauty.369 Moreover, the state may, in the exercise of its
police power, make all reasonable regulations for the 
. . . 't 1· 't 370 preservation of fish and game within i s  imi s. The
delegation of power to the state conservation commission to 
establish those regulations for the protection, development, and 
use of fish and game is valid.
371 In a much more recent case,
the Wisconsin Appeals court addressed a specific regulation 






Nekoosa Edwards Paper co, v, Railroad commission
, �28 N.W.
144, 201 Wis. 40, reh'g denied 229 �.w. 631, 201 Wis. 40
, 
aff'd 51 s.ct. 532, 283 u.s. 7 85 (Wis. 1929). 
Diana shooting club y. Rusting, 145 N.w. 81
6, 156 wis. 261
(�914)-. . 
r oeoartment ofw1scons1n's Environmental pecade, nc, v, ---- ) 




state v. Nergarrd, 124 wis. 414, 102 N.W. 899 
( ) 
State v, Winkler, 255 Wis. 340, 352, 38 N.
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banning commercial trout fishing in a particular area of Lake 
Superior as an appropriate means to conserve lake trout because 
commercial fishing was having a greater effect on the trout 
population than sport fishing. Indeed, the ban was both 
reasonable and necessary to prevent substantial depletion of the 
fish supply.372 
· In establishing a migratory bird refuge, the court held
that Congress also possessed incidental power to make necessary 
regulations concerning non-migratory fish. The state maintained 
the right to regulate the taking and use of fish subject only to 
the authority exercised under the federal Constitution, namely 
th . t b 0 d 1 t· 373 e migra ory ir regu a ions. 
Following a long line of authority already cited, the 
f d 1 · · 1 · v. sw1· ft, 
3 7 4 thate era court in Wisconsin held in �L�a_:.C��a�i�r...__;_L,L._�-�-...-- - -
commercial fishermen have no absolute right to fish in state 
waters. A commercial fishing license is not a contract and 
creates·no vested rights. Rather, the licensee agrees to take 
fish in accordance with applicable state laws. Any property 
right in the fish in Wisconsin waters is in the state before they 
are caught. Furthermore, the state has the right and the duty to 
preserve fish in its waters from destruction or undue reduction 
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Trempeleau Vernon, and Grant counties, wis., 
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benefit. The state may control fish and game by regulating or 
prohibiting the taking of fish. 
200 
CONCLUSIONS 
Several trends are obvious from a review of the northeast
oyster industry. The resource has been in a state of marked
decline for a number of years. Management and regulatory
authority over the oyster industry is currently vested la
rgely in
the indi�idual states. State authority is exercised at 
many
different institutional levels. Local control is at
 one extreme.
Control at agency and departmental levels within 
state
governments is at the other extreme. one of t
he more
significant aspects affecting the oyster indust
ry is the great
disparity in management and regulation among 
the states. For
example, one of the most common traditional
 measures of oyster
harvesting is the bushel; yet, states ha
ve many different
definitions of a bushel. These differen
ces in definitions can
lead to significant differences in har
vesting figures. States'
attitudes towards modern aquaculture
, rack culture, and
introductions of non-native species
 and genetically altered
strains are frequently quite diffe
rent. As the health of t
he
industry has declined, the interes
t in introductions of n
on­
native species and genetically a
ltered strains has incr
eased. At
the present time, however, only 
a few states seem comm
itted to
this path due to the impacts suc
h introductions may h
ave beyond
state boundaries and the potent
ial for increased po
litical and 
litigative conflicts. There is 
some regional authorit
y over the
oyster industry via the Potomac
 River Fisheries C
ommission and 




Atlantic states Marine Fisheries Compact offers the potential for 
increased regional control. There has also been a growth in 
federal autho�ity through federal court decisions weakening 
traditional state authority, the passage of new legislation, and 
indirectly, through informal international agreements. 
The current status.of the oyster industry and developing 
trends raise questions regarding the need for more centralized 
authority over the industry. 
